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Essays on Law and Economics 
Jonathon Zytnick 
  
This dissertation analyzes the interaction between individuals and institutions, with a 
particular focus on how individuals make economic decisions within legal frameworks. It uses 
quasi-natural experiments and descriptive analyses to provide direct empirical evidence on these 
decisions. 
Chapter 1 investigates the extent to which mutual funds represent individual investors. 
Although mutual funds have widely varying voting patterns and predictable ideological 
disagreements, little is known about whether their underlying investors have similar preferences 
or sort by ideology into funds. I provide the first systematic documentation comparing the voting 
preferences of individual investors in the United States to those of the mutual funds they invest in. 
I find that individual investors are highly ideological in their voting and that Environmental, 
Social, and Governance (ESG) funds have an ideologically distinct shareholder base of individual 
investors whose preferences are reflected in the votes of the ESG funds. ESG funds are unique in 
this respect; although funds have distinct voting ideologies, as do individual investors, a mutual 
fund’s voting choices generally have little or no relationship with those of its underlying investors. 
 
 
 Chapter 2 —joint work with Alon Brav and Matthew Cain— studies retail shareholder 
voting using a nearly comprehensive sample of U.S. ownership and voting records over the 
period 2015–2017. Analyzing turnout within a rational choice framework, we find that 
participation increases with ownership and expected benefits from winning and decreases with 
higher costs of participation. Even shareholders with negligible likelihood of affecting the 
outcome have non-zero turnout, consistent with consumption benefits from voting. Conditional 
on participation, retail shareholders punish the management of poorly performing firms and are 
more likely to exit the firm after voting against incumbent management. We show that retail 
voting decisions are impactful, altering proposal outcomes as frequently as those of the “Big 
Three” institutional investors. Overall, our evidence provides support for the idea that retail 
shareholders utilize their voting power as a means to monitor firms and communicate with 
incumbent boards and managements. 
 Chapter 3 studies the effects of a selective tax on contract design and tax timing. Taxation 
affects income via both a compensation contract response and a worker response. I show that 
executive contracts adjust to a tax on severances, and executives shift their taxable income timing 
in response to the interaction of tax and contract. In particular, “golden parachute” severances tend 
to bunch at a threshold (tied to taxable income) where the tax rate discontinuously increases, and 
CEOs exercise stock options in bulk to raise their taxable income and boost their threshold. 
Identification comes from a bunching analysis exploiting a discontinuous change in exercise 
incentives over time and variation across CEOs in contract incentives and deal timing. The chapter 
demonstrates the role of contract structure in tax avoidance and additionally shows how contract 
structure affects worker behavior.  
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Chapter 1: Do Mutual Funds Represent Individual Investors? 
I. Introduction 
 
“There is another government… consisting of a handful of gigantic institutional asset 
managers… who own (on behalf of their customers) most of the stocks of most of the public 
companies, and can, in some loose sense, tell those companies how to behave. They are not 
chosen democratically, exactly, but they are representative; millions of people give their money 
to those institutions and trust them to make decisions for them.” Matt Levine, Bloomberg 
Opinion, June 25, 2020 (emphasis in original). 
 
The vast majority of investment by individuals is conducted via institutional 
intermediaries—especially mutual funds—who vote on their behalf, and a substantial literature 
has shown that these funds vote ideologically (Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010), Bolton et al. 
(2020), Bubb and Catan (2020)). But despite extensive research on mutual fund voting, there has 
been little research on the preferences and voting behaviors of individual investors. As observed 
in Bolton et al. (2020), “[w]hether these ideological differences [across institutional investors] 
reflect the ideology of the institutions’ client bases, we cannot say. It is not even clear that clients 
are aware that the funds they invest in have systematic ideological biases.” 
To date, researchers have been unable to explore questions on the ideological preferences 
of individual investors due to lack of data on individual preferences and shareholdings. In this 
paper, I introduce novel microdata on individual ownership of mutual funds and equities and 
voting on equities to evaluate the relationship between mutual fund ideology and the ideology of 
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the underlying investors of the mutual funds. Deriving individual investor preferences directly 
from the ballots they cast, I show that, for individual voting, firm and proposal characteristics are 
of second order importance as compared to voter tendencies. Individual vote choices feature 
strong consistency across proposals, firms, and years. 
Given that funds and individuals who vote on equities both have strong and consistent 
ideological preferences, we might expect a close association between individual and fund 
ideologies. Indeed, I find that shareholder ideological preferences find an outlet in mutual fund 
holdings via environmental, social, and governance (ESG) funds, which explicitly define 
themselves by their ideological mission. The individual investors in ESG funds have distinctly 
different ideologies from the investors of other funds. 
Surprisingly, however, outside of ESG funds, individuals do not sort to funds along 
ideological lines. As shown by Bolton et al. (2020), and Bubb and Catan (2020), among others, 
mutual funds vary widely in their voting ideologies, and take consistently different positions 
from each other on Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) matters, including many non-ESG 
funds that vote in favor of most SRI proposals. However, funds that support socially responsible 
investing (SRI) proposals are no more likely to have underlying investors that do the same—
excluding ESG funds, which constitute a relatively small portion of total investment. As a result, 
ESG funds appear to serve a unique role in the mutual fund ecosystem, as a channel for 
individual ideology. 
Why don’t shareholders choose like-minded funds? The problem is not one of market 
availability: fund categories feature ample variation in voting ideologies for individual investors 
to choose from. Instead, I offer evidence consistent with limited attention, in which the costs of 
acquiring more granular detail about funds, as compared to readily available information, exceed 
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the benefits. Although pro-SRI individuals select into ESG funds, they are otherwise no more 
likely to choose funds with higher scores in third party sustainability ratings and environmental 
friendliness of fund portfolio stocks. Similarly, in equity holdings, individuals select securities in 
ideologically compatible categories—for example, renewable energy or fossil fuel firms—while 
showing no relationship with third party SRI ratings of the firms. These results may be consistent 
with individual investors unwilling to acquire more granular information than the information 
apparent in the basic attributes of the potential investment. 
Consistent with this possibility, investors who make high-value investments feature a 
significantly stronger relationship between their own ideology and that of the funds in which 
they invest. In fact, when weighting individual investors within a fund by their ownership 
fraction of the fund, rather than equal-weighting individual investors within a fund, I find a 
strong positive association between fund ideology and the fund’s aggregate shareholder 
ideology, even controlling for ESG funds. This result may suggest either that individuals making 
large investments have greater information or willingness to acquire information, or that funds 
weight the preferences of large investors in their voting decisions. 
I conclude by presenting a broad picture of individual and fund ideology. Despite the lack 
of ideological sorting, funds and individuals have only moderate differences in their aggregate 
support for SRI. Unsurprisingly, this overall conclusion masks substantial heterogeneity. Funds 
that tend to vote in line with Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations tend to be 
substantially “to the left” of their shareholders on SRI matters; funds that tend to vote in line 
with management recommendations tend to be substantially “to the right” of their shareholders 
on SRI matters. The latter tendency is particularly pronounced in index funds, which tend to be 
vote against SRI proposals far more than other funds and have younger, slightly more pro-SRI 
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shareholders than other funds. Index funds, in fact, appear to reduce the overall 
representativeness of mutual fund holdings. I characterize index fund holders and SRI supporters 
by their portfolio and residence: both tend to be younger and come from more diverse, denser, 
poorer, and more educated zip codes. 
My main results are derived from the small fraction of mutual fund investors who own 
and vote on direct equities, but my results do not appear to be limited to this group, which may 
be more ideologically radical than those that do not vote on equities. I find similar results using 
the political voting results of the zip codes of mutual fund holders, which do not suffer from 
sample selection bias. The results are also robust to using inverse probability weighting to adjust 
for sample selection bias. 
The contribution of this paper is not to identify a new factor that individuals incorporate 
in their portfolio purchasing decisions; in fact, to the extent that individuals sort into like-minded 
mutual funds, such sorting may be based on the mutual fund’s overall sales pitch, not its votes. 
Rather, it is to document, at an economy-wide level, the extent to which intermediated ownership 
channels the preferences of underlying beneficiaries. I show that individuals have ideological 
preferences that connect their voting, equity purchases, and purchases of ESG funds. Mutual 
funds also vote in ideologically distinct blocs, but no fund advertises that it follows ISS, Glass 
Lewis, or management recommendations, even though these recommendations provide the spine 
of a variegated mutual fund party voting structure that the funds are quite disciplined in 
following (Bubb and Catan 2020). The result is a party structure without party members: mutual 
fund voting is correlated with individual investor ideology only to the extent that pro-SRI 
shareholders sort into a small bloc of highly ideological ESG funds. 
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The rapid growth of ESG funds over the past decade and the growing importance of SRI 
proposals suggest that some shareholders may have objectives other than maximizing risk-
adjusted returns, or, in the alternative, different beliefs about how to maximize risk-adjusted 
returns. Hart and Zingales (2017) argue that firms ought to maximize the utility of shareholders 
rather than firm value, and they propose shareholder voting as a mechanism to achieve such 
optimization.1 However, since most shareholders are institutional intermediaries, the interests of 
the entities casting ballots may not align with the interests of their underlying beneficiaries (see, 
e.g., Gordon and Gilson (2013) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst (2017)). 
Given that the mutual fund industry is competitive (Wahal and Wang (2013)) and mutual 
fund voting is publicly disclosed, we may expect the U.S. mutual fund industry to produce 
ideological representation similar to U.S. political institutions. The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission has created a regulatory disclosure system explicitly justified by the notion that 
individuals ought to be able to choose funds based on the funds’ voting patterns, and it has 
recently emphasized the importance of funds voting in line with investor expectations.2 My 
results show that, to the extent that the industry is representative, it is only because ESG funds 
constitute an overtly ideological “party.” Increasing representation may require policies that 
convey less granular disclosure to individuals. Otherwise, as the twin trends of delegated 
investment to intermediaries and social responsibility voting continue to grow in size and 
 
1 I note also the popularity, both in academia and the popular press, of the notion of “shareholder democracy”, 
referring to the primacy of shareholders to make decisions about the firm through voting (Fairfax (2009), Fos and 
Tsoutsoura (2014), Levit, Malenko, and Maug (2019), Gantchev and Giannetti (2018), Sorkin (2019)). 
2 The SEC’s main rationale for requiring mutual funds to disclose all votes was to enable “fund shareholders to 
monitor their funds' involvement in the governance activities of portfolio companies.” (SEC 2003). In March 2021, 
the Acting Chair of the SEC pledged to “examin[e] proxy voting policies and practices to ensure voting aligns with 
investors’ best interests and expectations.” (SEC 2021), and, in a separate speech, stated that, “[u]ltimately, 
corporate accountability is only possible when the funds that manage American investors’ savings diligently 
exercise their authority to vote, clearly disclose their votes to investors, and operate in a system that efficiently 
provides accurate information about vote execution” (Lee 2021). 
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importance, there may be a growing gulf between the preferences of the individual investor and 
how the investor’s money is voted. 
 
Literature Review 
This paper contributes to a new literature studying the relationship between individual 
ideological preferences and fund choices. While much is known about the voting behavior of 
institutional intermediaries, little is known about the preferences of their underlying investors. 
Aggarwal, Erel, and Starks (2014) document a positive relationship between fund voting and 
public opinion over time. Brav, Cain, and Zytnick (2021) describe the voting of individual 
investors who directly hold equities. Gordon and Gilson (2013) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst 
(2017), describe the potential for agency conflicts by institutional investors in their stewardship 
of firms. 
A large body of literature describes mutual fund voting preferences. Matvos and 
Ostrovsky (2010) first established that mutual funds vote ideologically, and Bubb and Catan 
(2020) and Bolton et al. (2020) both map out the dimensions of institutional investor ideology. 
Several papers focus on the causes of the rise of ESG funds. Riedl and Smeets (2017) 
combine administrative data from a Dutch mutual fund provider with survey and experimental 
evidence to establish that individuals who invest in socially responsible funds are willing to 
forego returns and have pro-social preferences. Hartzmark and Sussman (2019) show that fund 
flows are connected to Morningstar’s sustainability ratings. Relatedly, a growing literature 
discusses the social responsibility of firms and how firm social responsibility relates to the firm’s 
investors (Hart and Zingales (2017), Dyck, Lins, Roth, Wagern (2019), Broccardo, Hart, and 
Zingales (2020)). 
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The concept of representation is the subject of a large body of writing in political science 
(see Urbinati and Warren (2008) for a review of theoretical developments on the topic). I 
incorporate concepts from the representation literature into the field of shareholder voting. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In Section II I describe the data. In Section III I 
provide background information on shareholder voting and ownership, including new empirical 
facts. In Section IV, I show the extent to which variation in fund voting mirrors variation in the 
voting by their underlying shareholders. In Section V I deepen the analysis by examining 
possible explanations for the results in the previous sections. In Section VI I explore the extent of 
similarity in fund voting as compared to individual investor voting. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Data 
In this paper, I introduce an individual-level dataset of U.S. investors, including holdings 
by beneficial owners of almost all U.S. public equities, the individual votes on those equities, 
and individual holdings of roughly one third of U.S. mutual funds. Data on investor 
shareholdings come from Broadridge, which separately provides datasets with direct ownership 
of equities and ownership of funds. The set of direct ownership of operating company equities 
was first introduced in Brav, Cain, and Zytnick (2020), and the set of mutual fund ownership 
(including both open-end and closed-end funds) is newly introduced in this paper. 
For both sets, at the time of a shareholder meeting of a fund or firm, I observe for each 
individual investor account that owns the fund: (i) its number of shares of the equity or fund, (ii) 
whether it voted, (iii) how it voted, and (iv) its zip code. Each account has a unique identifying 
number, allowing an account’s entire portfolio to be linked across securities and over time. For 
any firm or fund with a shareholder meeting, the equity and fund datasets contain complete 
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snapshots of individual ownership of the fund or firm at the time of its shareholder meetings 
(annual or special) during the period 2015-2017. 
For closed-end mutual funds, which are required to hold annual meetings, I have annual 
ownership snapshots for the three-year period. Open-end mutual funds are not required to hold 
annual meetings; generally, an open-end mutual fund holds a meeting when it wishes to revise its 
operating agreement. Consequently, I have no snapshot of ownership for many open-end funds 
operating in the period 2015-2017. Those open-end funds which did hold a meeting in the period 
2015-2017 often held only a single meeting, so, for such funds, I have one snapshot in the three-
year period. Because public operating companies are required to hold annual shareholder 
meetings, the dataset of direct ownership of firms provides a nearly comprehensive set of annual 
individual investor ownership for the three-year period. Brav, Cain, and Zytnick (2020) 
extensively describe the dataset of direct ownership of operating company equities, including 
methodology in merging to other datasets and summary statistics.  
To summarize, if mutual fund 𝑓 has a shareholder meeting in March 2017 with a record 
date of December 2016, I would observe all of the accounts that own the mutual fund as of 
December 2016 with their number of shares. Because account identification numbers are 
consistent across sets, I also observe the account owner’s zip code, other funds and direct equity 
holdings. Finally, for 𝑎’s direct equity holdings, I observe whether she voted and how she voted. 
In the Data Appendix, I discuss in detail the data and methodology for cleaning and 
merging the Broadridge data on retail ownership of mutual funds, including tables describing the 
coverage of the data. For data and methodology regarding retail ownership of operating 
companies, please refer to Brav, Cain, and Zytnick (2020). Using these datasets as a base, I 
conduct an extensive data collection process. I collect mutual fund votes reported on Form N-PX 
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and proposal-level information using ISS Voting Analytics, which I merge by meeting and 
proposal to the Broadridge datasets using a combination of algorithmic matching and hand-
matching. I divide proposals into categories as described in Brav, Cain, and Zytnick (2020). 
I obtain financial information on firms, including share prices, from the CRSP monthly 
securities file and Compustat fundamentals annual. Following Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), I 
obtain SRI ratings on firms from MSCI (formerly KLD). I use SIC codes to determine if firms 
are in fossil fuels industries. I designate renewable energy firms as those that appear on 
NASDAQ’s Clean Edge Green Energy index or Wilderhill’s New Energy Global Innovation 
Index, which I hand-match by name to the set of firms. 
The CRSP Open-End mutual fund dataset provides information on open-ended mutual 
funds, including fund management, returns, and whether it is an index fund. I merge by fund 
name to the ISS Voting Analytics N-PX dataset, beginning with an algorithmic merge, hand-
checking each match, and then hand searching for all unmatched funds. The result is a dataset 
combining fund votes from ISS Voting Analytics with fund features from CRSP. I use the CRSP 
monthly securities file to add prices of closed-end funds, and hand-merge these closed-end funds 
by name to the ISS Voting Analytics N-PX dataset. I merge this combined dataset to the 
Broadridge dataset by fund CUSIP, and hand-match funds that do not match by name. 
I categorize a mutual fund as an ESG fund as follows. I begin with a list of sustainable 
funds in Appendix B.A1 of Hale (2018).3 I then add to it funds that have “Sustainable”, “ESG”, 
“Social”, or “Clean Energy” in their name, confirming in their prospectuses that they incorporate 
ESG criteria. Finally, I include all funds that belong to any of five fund families (with funds that 
 
3 Hale (2018), as part of a Morningstar research report, begins with all funds that, in their prospectus, “state that they 
incorporate ESG criteria into their investment processes, or indicate that they pursue a sustainability-related theme, 
or seek measurable sustainable impact alongside financial return.” He then removes funds that invest based on 
values rather than sustainability. 
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held shareholder meetings in 2015-2017) that are explicitly centered on ESG themes in their 
family-wide branding: Calvert, Parnassus, Pax, Praxis, and Trillium. 
For zip code level voting, I use 2016 Presidential returns from the MIT Election Data and 
Science Lab. As in Brav, Cain, and Zytnick (2020), I obtain zip code-level demographic 
information from the Census Bureau and zip code-level adjusted gross income from the IRS 
website. As an additional measure of investor age, I identify investors who hold a “Target 
Retirement Date” fund, which I identify as funds that have “Target” in their fund name but do 
not have the words “College” or “Maturity”, and hand-verify that each of the funds represents a 
target date retirement fund. I then use the retirement year in the fund name to impute a proxy for 
the age of the individual investor. 
There is, to my knowledge, no public source of Glass Lewis recommendations. In Online 
Appendix B.D, I describe in detail how I impute Glass Lewis recommendations. 
Data Appendix Table 1 shows I have roughly 30% of the open-end funds in CRSP’s 
mutual fund database and slightly more than 50% of the asset value, along with almost all 
closed-end funds that appear in CRSP’s monthly securities dataset. 
In total, I have 80,209,211 unique fund-owning accounts, 16.7% of which also own direct 
equity securities. (I have 46,686,015 unique equity-owning accounts, as described in Data 
Appendix Table 2.) 
 
III. Individual Investor Ownership and Voting  
Background 
Mutual investment is structured such that the fund owns assets, which may include 
publicly traded equity securities, and the fund’s investors hold shares in the fund; thus, the 
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individual investor is the ultimate economic beneficiary of the fund’s performance but has no 
right to cast ballots in the underlying securities. Instead, a mutual fund’s voting choices are 
determined by the fund’s manager and may be determined at the level of the individual fund or 
together with other funds of an adviser. Mutual funds are commonly regarded as having a 
fiduciary duty to vote, and mutual fund voter turnout is virtually 100%. 
A substantial portion of individual investors directly hold operating company equities, 
permitting them to vote directly in shareholder meetings. In Figure 1, I display the distribution of 
the number of individual investors in each mutual fund and the number of individual investors in 
the fund who also own operating company equities. A relatively small group of superstar funds 
have a disproportionate number of individual investors—the right side of the figure is convex 
even on a logarithmic scale. Averaged across equal-weighted funds, 30.4% of individuals who 
own mutual funds own at least one equity, and 8.2% of individual fund investors cast at least one 
ballot on an equity holding in the three-year period. 
Shareholder votes are often significant points of contention. Among other things, there 
are conflicts over whether shareholder governance proposals effectively increase firm value; 
whether negative votes on management proposals serve to monitor management; and on the role 
of proxy advisors, most notably Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, who 
are paid by mutual funds and other clients to make recommendations on firm proposals. These 
debates may center on differences in beliefs regarding how to accomplish the shared objective of 
maximizing firm value (Kakhbod, Loginova, Malenko, and Malenko (2020)). 
 In this paper, I focus on a single category of corporate proposals: shareholder 
environmental and social proposals (collectively, SRI proposals). SRI proposals provide a setting 
in which mutual funds have a minimal information advantage as compared to individual 
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investors. Disagreement on SRI proposals likely arises from disagreement as to the objective 
function of the corporation, in which case the parties have a genuine conflict of interest, not 
information asymmetry. In the alternative, to the extent that disagreement on environmental and 
social proposals reflects differences of opinion about how best to maximize corporate value, as 
opposed to a disagreement as to the objective function of the corporation, assessing the long-run 
relationship between firm profitability and environmental and social practices does not require 
granular firm-specific knowledge. By contrast, if a fund’s votes on director elections diverge 
from those of its underlying investors, such divergence may simply reflect the fund’s superior 
knowledge of the directors and firms. 
 
Individual and Fund Voting 
Most shareholders, whether institutions or individuals, vote remotely by proxy rather than 
physically at the shareholder meeting. Kahan and Rock (2008) and Brav, Cain, and Zytnick 
(2020) detail the mechanics by which shareholders of firms are identified and notified and how 
they cast their ballots. Individual investors receive either a mailed package of materials or a 
notice entitling them to log onto a website to view materials. On the actual ballot, the individual 
sees the text of the proposal and the management recommendation (for SRI proposals, nearly 
always “Against”). Funds generally use a proxy voting service—ISS, Glass Lewis, or Broadridge 
to facilitate the voting mechanics—and the fund’s votes are generally pre-populated based on the 
fund’s specifications or customized recommendations, with the fund holding the option to log in 
and alter votes as desired. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for individual voting as compared to fund voting. 
Nearly all individuals who vote on equity securities hold mutual funds as well (even though only 
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a fraction of mutual funds appear in the data). The bottom portion of the table shows statistics on 
proposals reaching 50% in favor. 
In the aggregate, individuals vote similarly to funds on SRI proposals. The inclusion 
criteria—who gets counted—and weighting rules—how votes are aggregated—make a large 
difference, though individuals vote similarly to funds for each set of rules. Individuals and funds 
with more shares tend to vote against SRI proposals, with value-weighted support substantially 
lower than support measured using other aggregation schemes. Individuals and funds favor SRI 
proposals more than management does and less than ISS does; Glass Lewis, the second largest 
proxy advisor, votes similarly to individuals and funds. Although support by both individuals 
and funds is substantial, few SRI proposals garner 50% support from either group. 
 
Individual Investor and Fund Ideology 
 As a preliminary question, we may ask what is more important in investor voting: 
variation across proposals or variation across shareholders? Given that individuals and funds 
have similar aggregate support for SRI proposals, their voting choices have similar overall 
variance; to understand the sources of variation in voting, I estimate: 
𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛿0 + (𝛿1𝑋𝑝𝑐𝑡) + (𝜙𝑝) + (𝜓𝑖) + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 
𝑖 indexes investors, 𝑝 indexes proposals, 𝑐 indexes firms, 𝑡 indexes years, 𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 is 𝑖’s vote on 
proposal 𝑝, 𝑋𝑝𝑐𝑡 is a vector of firm-month and proposal-level covariates, and 𝜙𝑝, 𝜓𝑖, and 𝜙𝑡 are 
proposal, investor, and year fixed effects, respectively. 
 Table 2 contains results estimating the equation above separately for individuals and 
funds. First, we see in column 2 that fund voting on SRI proposals is highly correlated with ISS 
and Glass Lewis recommendations and uncorrelated with firm performance. Individual investor 
 22 
voting in column 1 shows a much smaller (though still substantial) correlation with ISS 
recommendations and none with other covariates. Returning to the question posed above, 
variation across proposals explains a large portion of variation in fund voting: an 𝑅2 of 22%, in 
column 4, versus an 𝑅2 of only 3% for individual investors in column 3. (The 19% 𝑅2 for funds 
in column 2, which is very close to the 22% 𝑅2 in column 4, further implies that variation across 
proposals in fund voting is mostly determined by proxy advisor recommendations.) Investor 
identity determines a much greater portion of variation in voting than does proposal identity, and 
this difference is even more pronounced for individuals than for funds: in columns 5 and 6, with 
account fixed effects, the 𝑅2 is 65% for individuals and 42% for funds. Table 2 establishes an 
important empirical fact: with respect to shareholder voting, especially individual voting, firm 
and proposal characteristics are of second order importance as compared to voter tendencies. 
Individual voting on SRI proposals is marked by consistency. In Figure 2, Panel A, I plot 
the distribution of individual and fund ideologies by calculating, for shareholders with at least 10 
votes, their fraction of SRI proposals voted favor, 𝑌𝑖. A large portion of both individuals and 
funds almost always vote against SRI proposals, but individual investors have more mass near 
the tails: they are more consistent, or, put another way, more extreme.4 An individual shareholder 
is more likely than a fund to vote the same way on all or almost all SRI proposals. 
Individuals exhibit consistency in voting that extends across firms and years. Following 
Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010), I measure the extent to which an individual’s votes in a category 
are predicted by its vote at other firms the previous year: 
𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖(−𝑐)(𝑡−1) + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡  
 
4 I note that by limiting to those with ten or more SRI votes, I subset to a group of individuals who vote more often 
and have larger accounts, both of which are associated with voting against SRI. Table 1 shows that percentage in 
favor is lower among those with ten or more SRI votes. I discuss sample selection bias and population measures of 
support in Section VI. 
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𝑖 indexes investors, 𝑐 indexes firms (and −𝑐 denotes firms other than 𝑐), and 𝑡 indexes 
time. The left hand side is the investor’s vote on a particular proposal, and the right hand side is 
her vote on a randomly drawn proposal from a different firm in the previous year.5 𝜙𝑡 represents 
time fixed effects. I do the same for funds. Table 3 shows that an individual vote on one proposal 
in year 𝑡 − 1 is highly predictive of her votes on different firms in year 𝑡. An individual’s vote in 
favor of a single randomly drawn SRI proposal increases her likelihood of voting in favor of an 
SRI proposal at a different company the next year by 47.7 percentage points, more than 10 
percentage points more than funds. 
Individual consistency also extends across proposals. I aggregate the voting outcome on 
each proposal separately for individuals and funds and display the distribution of results in 
Figure 2, Panel B. SRI proposal voting features substantial heterogeneity in results among 
mutual funds, with many strongly disfavored and many others strongly favored, but exhibits 
strikingly little heterogeneity among individuals. 
Individual sorting into funds compresses individuals’ aggregate votes. Figure 2, Panel C 
displays a histogram of the average individual vote within funds, overlaid over the histogram of 
fund voting. Fund aggregates are far closer to each other than the funds themselves are, 
suggesting that individuals do not strongly sort across funds based on ideology. 
Following the political economy literature, we may represent account 𝑎’s difference in 
utility from voting in favor of proposal 𝑝 minus utility from voting against the proposal using a 
spatial distance model (generally attributed to Downs (1957)), in which 𝑧𝑎 is the account’s “ideal 
 
5 I modify Matvos and Ostrovsky to use a single vote from last year on the right hand side, rather than the average of 
all the shareholder’s votes, to avoid having greater precision in the right-hand side variable for voters with more 
ballots cast last year. 
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point” in the ideological dimension, 𝑧𝑝 and ?̅?𝑝 are the ideological location of the proposal 
passing and failing, respectively, and 𝐿(∙) is a loss function: 
𝑢𝑎𝑝 = 𝐿(∥ 𝑧𝑎 − 𝑧𝑝 ∥) − 𝐿(∥ 𝑧𝑎 − ?̅?𝑝 ∥) + 𝑎𝑝 
One example of such a model is NOMINATE, which uses a Gaussian loss function 
(Rosenthal and Poole (1985)). If individuals are non-ideological, voting on SRI proposals based 
on the idiosyncratic features of the proposal, then the utility equation above would do a poor job 
of capturing individual votes. Following Bolton et al. (2020), I estimate a NOMINATE model on 
a random subsample of individual investors with 20 or more votes on SRI proposals, with results 
in Online Appendix B. C. These results provide additional evidence that individuals are highly 
ideological and that voting on SRI proposals is well-described by a single ideological dimension 
that captures the bulk of variation in voting. Scores in this dimension line up closely with the 
investor’s simple fraction in favor of the proposals.6 
 
IV. Representation in Voting 
Hypothesis Development 
 How should we think about the role of funds as intermediaries in voting? I borrow from 
political science the notion of “representativeness” of elected representatives. An investor’s 
choice of mutual fund shares many elements with electing a representative: the intermediary 
stands in for a large number of constituents; it casts ballots on various issues, some of which are 
more ideological in nature while others require expertise; the constituents have opportunities to 
change intermediaries based on past and expected performance; an intermediary may make its 
 
6 Unlike Bolton et al. (2020) and Bubb and Catan (2020), I have limited to a single proposal type, to focus on a 
domain in which voting is easily interpretable as a representation of ideology. Thus, this dimension reduction is not 
intended capture the relationship between individual votes on different types of proposals. 
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voting choices to maximize its appeal or based on other factors such as social welfare or private 
benefits; even an intermediary solely focused on its constituents’ welfare may not vote exactly as 
its constituents would vote—for example, the intermediary may have superior information. 
Of course, most investors likely view the primary role of the intermediary as choosing a 
portfolio rather than voting. But this is a difference of degree, not kind—voters choose 
representatives based on factors other than the representative’s voting choices as well. 
 A vast literature in political science is devoted to empirically estimating the 
representativeness of political institutions. Representation captures the relationship between 
constituent opinion and variation in voting by intermediaries. A well-established finding in the 
political science literature is the high degree of representation in U.S. politics (see Wlezien 
(2004) for a list of such findings and Shapiro (2011) for a survey). 







 𝑌𝑖𝑝 ∈ {0,1} is 𝑖’s vote on proposal 𝑝, ℋi is the set of SRI proposals that 𝑖 votes on, and 
|𝐻𝑖| is the number of proposals that 𝑖 votes on.
7 
Consider the following empirical model of voting: 
?̅?𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∑ ?̅?𝑎
𝑎∈Θ𝑓
+ 𝜈𝑓             (1) 
 
7 I use this fraction rather than an account’s W-NOMINATE ideal point for several reasons: first, fraction in favor is 
more easily interpretable. Second, individual and fund voting may produce different ideological spaces, and it is 
non-obvious how to weight the two groups when constructing a joint space. Third, estimation of individual 
ideological loadings is computationally intractable for more than a few thousand individuals. Fourth, determining 
one’s NOMINATE score requires a large number of votes cast. Bolton et al. (2020) restrict to voters with 50 or 
more votes cast. For estimating NOMINATE, I restrict to those with 20 or more. 
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In which 𝑓 indexes funds, 𝑎 indexes individual accounts, Θ𝑓 is the set of accounts at fund 
𝑓. ?̅?𝑎 and ?̅?𝑓 represent the individual’s and fund’s average vote on SRI proposals, respectively. 
As described in Section III, the probability in favor serves as a simple metric of the investor’s 
orientation towards social value maximization versus shareholder value maximization, as in 
Bolton et al. (2020). 
Equation (1) is the standard representativeness equation. An alternative version of 
Equation (1), tailored for finance, would weight accounts by their ownership of the fund, rather 
than equal-weighting all accounts in the fund. 
If there is no sorting into funds on preferences, then 𝛽1 = 0. 𝛽1 ∈ (0,1) would imply that 
funds dampen individual ideology; 𝛽1 > 1 would imply that funds amplify aggregate individual 
ideology. Both are ex ante plausible. For example, 𝛽1 > 1 could occur if a fraction of individuals 
choose funds based on the fund’s exogeneous voting choices. Low or negative 𝛽1 would imply 
that funds do not serve as representative intermediaries for their customers. 
Results 
I begin with Figure 3 by plotting a scatterplot, at the fund level, of fund ideology (on the 
y-axis) and the mean ideology of the fund’s underlying investors (on the x-axis). I weight funds 
and individuals equally. 
Figure 3, Panel A, which separately demarcates ESG funds and non-ESG funds, reveals 
the basic picture of representativeness in shareholder voting. Although funds have a wide range 
of positions towards ESG proposals, with a thick band ranging from 0% to 70% in favor, their 
mean individual owner tends to stay in a much narrower range, around 30% in favor. Even those 
funds whose underlying investors do not fit into the narrow band—those which appear on the left 
or right side of the figure—show no apparent correlation in how the funds themselves vote.  
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An exception is ESG funds, which vote substantially more in favor of SRI proposals and 
whose shareholders also vote substantially more in favor of SRI proposals. The gap between 
ESG funds and non-ESG funds provides clear visual evidence of representativeness (that is to 
say, sorting on ideology), though, if we exclude ESG funds, there is no obvious graphic evidence 
of representativeness. 
In Figure 3, Panel B, I separately mark index funds and non-index funds. Index funds are 
substantially more opposed to SRI proposals than non-index funds. 
Table 4, column 1 presents results of a regression estimating Equation (1). As in Figure 3, 
I aggregate each fund’s investors and equal-weight both funds and individuals. This follows the 
standard political science regression, which is at the representative or constituency level, not the 
constituent level. I cluster at the fund meeting level.8 
The significantly positive coefficient in Table 4, column 1 suggests that, on the whole, 
there is substantial representation in voting by mutual funds. For every 10 percentage point 
increase in the SRI vote of the fund’s underlying shareholders, the fund itself votes 8.95 
percentage points more in favor of SRI. However, as I will show, this result relies on ESG funds 
and is sensitive to the specification. 
Role of ESG Funds 
Figure 3 implies that ESG funds are a factor driving representation. In this subsection, I 
explore more deeply the factors driving or undermining representation. 
 
8 Iliev and Lowry (2015), Liu, Low, Masulis, and Zhang (2020), and Butler and Gurun (2012) cluster at the fund or 
firm level, whereas Morgan et al. (2011) and Bubb and Catan (2020) cluster at the fund sub-adviser level. Following 
Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge (2017), since a fund is only included in my sample when it has a 
shareholder meeting, and since groups of funds have shareholder meetings together, these groups of funds are the 
appropriate level for clustering. The fund meeting level is similar to the sub-adviser level. 
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Basic representation does not necessarily incorporate causality. For example, we may 
care whether U.S. representatives’ positions on foreign policy correlate with those of their 
constituents, even if the constituents do not know or care about their representatives’ position 
and the representative does not know or care about the positions of her constituents. Any 
correlation in this dimension may be driven by other factors—whether policy-related, such as the 
political parties of the relevant actors, or not, such as the tone that the politician strikes in public 
communications. Controlling for political party or politician tone in a regression of 
representative ideology on constituent ideology would reduce interpretational clarity. 
A natural question is how much of the representativeness shown in Table 4, column 1, is 
driven by fund features such as ESG or index funds.9 Merely adding such explanatory covariates 
to the right-hand side of the equation would reduce the interpretational clarity; instead, we are 
interested in how these variables affect 𝛽1, the coefficient on individual investor ideology. 
Gelbach (2016) explores this class of regressions, using as an example the black-white 
pay gap from a regression of wages on a race indicator. The baseline regression of wages on race 
without covariates is substantively interesting; explanatory covariates (in Gelbach (2016)’s case, 
test scores and educational achievement) are interesting in how they change the coefficient on 
the race indicator. Gelbach (2016) develops a tool to measure the impact of additional covariates 
on the coefficient of interest (as well as the statistical significance of the impact), independent of 
the order the coefficients are added. 
Consider: 
 
9 Note that such factors are conceptually distinct from the directionally channel driving—that is, whether individuals 
choose funds based on their voting or something correlated with their voting or whether funds make voting choices 
based on the preferences of their accounts or something correlated with them. 
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?̅?𝑓 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∑ ?̅?𝑎
𝑎∈Θ𝑓
+ 𝛾2𝑋𝑓 + 𝑓             (2) 
In which 𝑋𝑓 is a vector of categorical fund characteristics, such as fund objective or whether it is 
an index or ESG fund. 𝛾1 represents the within-category representativeness. A high 𝛾1 but low 𝛽1 
suggests that the overall system is not representative but that, once investors choose funds within 
a category, there is within-category representativeness. A significant gap between 𝛾1 and 𝛽1 
indicates that representativeness is being driven (or undermined) by selection into the category. 
In Table 4, Columns 2 and 3, I estimate Equation (1), including ESG and index fund 
dummies as covariates. Below each column, following Gelbach (2016), I include the impact of 
the covariates on the coefficient on mean owner ideology (from the base regression in Panel A), 
as well as the standard error of the impact. 
As anticipated by Figure 3, Panel A, ESG funds are the major driver of correlation 
between funds and investors. Including an ESG indicator decreases the coefficient by 0.888 
percentage points, which is roughly the coefficient in column 1. That is, controlling for ESG 
funds eliminates any relationship between fund and individual ideology.10 
ESG funds are small. Table 4, columns 1 through 4 weight each fund equally. In columns 
5–8, I weight each fund by its number of account-holders so each individual investor is weighted 
equally. The coefficient on 𝛽1 becomes insignificant in column 5, due to the greater weight 
placed on index funds (which are large) and the reduced weight placed on ESG funds (which are 
small). The result in column 5 implies that, as between two fund holdings by individuals, one of 
whom is more pro-SRI than the other, there is no statistically significant prediction as to whose 
 
10 In column 4, I add fixed effects for fund objective, and find no change. For computational tractability, in column 4 
and column 8, when using high-dimensional fixed effects, I do not calculate the impact on 𝛽1 of adding additional 
variables (or the standard error of the impact). 
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fund is more pro-SRI. This is in sharp contrast to the political science literature, for which a 
correlation between constituent and representative ideology is a core established empirical fact. 
In columns 6–8, I mirror columns 2–4 by adding in ESG funds and index funds, but this 
time weight observations by account. Column 7 shows that, with marginal significance but a 
high coefficient, index funds negatively drive overall representation. Index funds are 
substantially less pro-SRI than other funds, whereas their shareholder bases are significantly 
more pro-SRI than those of other funds (see Online Appendix Table B.A8). Due to the sheer size 
of index funds, the effect is negligible in column 3 and large in column 7. 
 
Account Characteristics 
In the previous subsection, I observe that index funds reduce the degree of overall 
representation with marginal statistical significance. Here, I show how this result may derive 
from the characteristics of pro-SRI individuals and individuals at different types of funds. 
Specifically, in Online Appendix Tables B.A1 and B.A2, I use account information and zip code 
characteristics to yield insights on demographic features of funds and individuals.  
In Table A1, I regress fund characteristics on account and individual characteristics, first 
aggregating to the fund level, then with observations at the account-fund level (which places 
relatively greater weight on funds with more accounts). I demean all right-hand-side variables so 
that intercepts can be interpreted as the mean of the dependent variable. Notably, whereas 1.5% 
of funds are ESG funds (Panel A), only 0.6% of account-fund observations are ESG funds (Panel 
B), and whereas 16.1% of funds are index funds, 24.5% of account-fund observations are index 
funds, indicating that ESG funds tend to have few accounts and index funds tend to have many. 
Table A1 makes clear that account zip-code level demographic characteristics are strongly 
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correlated with fund choices. Variation in fund-level aggregate zip code demographic 
characteristics and account portfolio characteristics can explain a substantial fraction of variation 
in fund characteristics, including 40% of cross-fund variation in a fund’s closed-end status. 
In Online Appendix Table B.A2, I regress account SRI percent on zip code and account 
characteristics, again demeaning all right-hand-side variables so that intercepts can be interpreted 
as the mean of the dependent variable. Pro-SRI investors are poorer and live in denser, younger, 
more educated, more diverse, lower-income zip codes. Index fund owners are wealthier and hold 
smaller stakes in each fund, and also live in younger, denser, more diverse, more educated zip 
codes. These results give some indication why index funds reduce representation—index funds, 
which vote strongly against SRI, draw from pools of individuals who tend to be more pro-SRI. 
To what extent can the above results be interpreted as describing individual investors, as 
opposed to merely where they live? Caution is warranted when interpreting group characteristics 
as proxies for individual micro-characteristics, since mutual fund holders are not randomly 
selected from each zip code but are rather a self-selecting group.11 To the extent that the residual 
with respect to the (unobserved) individual characteristic is correlated with the zip-code level 
characteristic, the estimated coefficient would be biased. (For example, if older individuals in 
older zip codes and older individuals in younger zip codes have different propensities to buy 
index funds, then we could not accurately interpret the coefficients in Online Appendix Table 
B.A1 as the relationship between index fund ownership and investor age.) As an alternative, for 
investors who own “Target Date Retirement” mutual funds, I use the target date of their 
retirement as a micro-level proxy for age. Online Appendix Table B.A3, Panel A contains a 
 
11 Using a group characteristic also tends to downwardly bias the coefficient estimate even if mutual fund holders 
were a randomly selected group from each zip code. This should not affect the qualitative interpretation of these 
results, though it may cause Online Appendix Tables B.A1 and B.A2 to understate magnitudes. 
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validation check—the imputed age is strongly correlated with the zip code age. Online Appendix 
Table B.A3, Panel B shows that imputed age of the individual investor is closely related to fund 
choice and SRI preferences: a fund held by an investor ten years older is 2.5 percentage points 
less likely to be an index fund. An investor ten years older is 4.2 percentage points less 
supportive of SRI proposals on average (though estimated on the small group of accounts that 
vote on SRI proposals on equity holdings and own target retirement funds). These numbers are 
highly significant and fully consistent with those obtained using group characteristics above. 
 
Individual Choice Model and Estimation 
Equation (2) describes a potential empirical relationship but is not intended to describe 
the decision-making of any particular actor. As an alternative to Equation (1), I could model 
account 𝑎’s decision whether to own fund 𝑓 as follows: 
𝑄𝑎𝑓 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1(?̅?𝑓 − ?̅?𝑎)
2
+ 𝜅2𝑋𝑎𝑓 +𝜙𝑓 + 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑓           (3) 
𝑄𝑎𝑓 equals 1 (multiplied by 100) if account 𝑎 owns fund 𝑓, ?̅?𝑓 and ?̅?𝑎 are fund and 
account ideology, 𝑋𝑎𝑓 is a vector of additional variables concerning the match between 𝑎 and 𝑓, 
𝜙𝑓 is fund fixed effects and 𝑎 is account fixed effects. Fund fixed effects ensure that Equation 
(3) does not capture the factors that drive total fund flow from individual investors but rather the 
factors that drive a match between a particular investor and fund. I include in 𝑋𝑎𝑓 the distance 
between individual and fund headquarters to add to the literature on home bias whether 
individuals invest in mutual funds that are headquartered closer to home. Equation (3) uses a 
standard quadratic loss function, as in Ansolabehere (2008). 
 Such a model takes fund ideology as exogeneous but allows individual investors to 
choose funds based on the fund’s votes. This assumption is plausible. For one, mutual funds 
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cannot observe their beneficial owners, though they may use market research to ascertain 
preferences. Even if funds vote to attract customers, they may set their votes based on the 
ideologies of potential customers or institutional customers, not existing individual customers. 
Estimating Equation (3) with an observation for every possible account-fund combination 
would be computationally intractable, generating a vast sparse matrix that is too large to estimate 
(Bertsimas and Cory-Wright 2020). Instead, in Table 5, I estimate Equation (3) by selecting at 
random, for each account, twenty control group funds that the account does not own and 
adjusting the estimation for the sampling weights. The estimation results appear in Table 5. 
Observations are at the account-fund level. As in Table 4, column 5, there is no significant 
overall correlation between individual and fund ideology when not weighting funds equally. 
Table 5, Column 2 shows that controlling for ESG funds reduces the representation 
correlation, implying that ESG funds increase representation. It also shows that an account that 
votes 100% in favor of SRI proposals is 0.07 percentage points more likely to own a particular 
ESG fund than one that votes 0% in favor—quite large, given that the account has a 0.05 
percentage point likelihood of owning the ESG fund unconditionally. 
Table 5 also provides clearer evidence of an index fund effect. Column 3 shows that pro-
SRI accounts are substantially more likely to own index funds, and index funds, as we have seen 
elsewhere, are substantially less pro-SRI. Table 5, column 4 shows that just as there is local 
home bias by fund managers (Coval and Moskowitz (2002)), individuals are also more likely to 




My results are drawn using the subset of individuals that vote on equity proposals. In the 
Online Appendix, I use Inverse Probability Weighting to adjust for sample selection bias. The 
critical assumption in inverse probability weighting is that, for selection variable 𝑠, Pr (𝑠 = 1|Θ) 
is known when 𝑠 = 1, where Θ is a set of observable variables. 
Inverse probability weighting has several appealing features. Conditional on the above 
assumption being true (and some weak technical assumptions that are not important here) then 
all M-estimators are consistent, including the ones that I use: means (in Section VI) and least 
squares regression coefficients. 
I use a flexible polynomial of zip code and portfolio characteristics of fund owners to 
estimate ?̂? ≡ Pr (𝑠 = 1) conditional on these characteristics. Online Appendix Table B.A4 
contains the results from a logit specification on a random subsample of fifteen million accounts, 




Online Appendix Table B.A5, I repeat my main specifications but weight each observation by its 
inverse probability weight. The results are extremely similar to the main results. 
As a simple visual check on whether the subset of investors I use are fundamentally 
different from excluded mutual fund investors in a way that creates sample selection bias, I use a 
proxy for one’s ideology that is available for all mutual fund holders. The political voting results 
for the investor’s zip code—specifically, the two-party share of the vote received by Hillary 
Clinton in the 2016 Presidential Election—are available for all accounts except for a small 
fraction that are missing a zip code or that live in a zip code for which political results are 
unavailable. As a validation test, in Online Appendix Table B.A6, I test zip code ideology as a 
proxy for SRI votes and show that, for the subset of mutual fund holders who vote on equities, 
 35 
there is a large, highly significant correlation between zip code ideology and support for SRI. A 
10 percentage point increase in the account’s zip code’s Democratic two-party share is 
associated with a 1.6 percentage point increase in the account’s percentage in favor of SRI 
proposals. Online Appendix Figure B.B1 shows a binned scatterplot of the relationship between 
zip code political ideology and fraction in favor of SRI proposals. 
In Online Appendix Figure B.B2, I repeat Figure 3, Panel A, using, rather than the fund’s 
mean account SRI vote, the fund’s mean account zip code ideology, excluding all accounts with 
10 SRI votes (i.e. excluding accounts that appear in the main tests). The results show that the 
basic picture of representation is the same using this alternative metric: there is ideological 
sorting into ESG funds, but otherwise no evidence of sorting by ideology. 
It is possible that individuals sort into funds on ideology other than SRI ideology. In 
Online Appendix Table B.A7, I provide results for governance and management votes, as well as 
the account’s composite voting rate in line with management recommendations. Unsurprisingly, 
governance proposals appear to feature weaker (marginally significant) representation than SRI 
proposals, owing to a smaller (marginally significant) effect from ESG funds, and management 
proposals have no significant representation and no significant effect of ESG funds on 
representation. The impact of index funds on representation in governance proposals is at least as 
strong as for SRI proposals. 
In the Online Appendix, I test variations on the main specifications in Tables 4 and 5. In 
Figure 3 and Table 4, my measure of aggregation of individual accounts is the fund’s mean 
account ideology. In Online Appendix Figure B.B3, I replicate Figure 3, Panel A, replacing the 
fund’s mean account ideology with a series of points in each fund’s distribution of account 
ideologies. The basic picture is identical: strong evidence of sorting into ESG funds, and little 
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evidence of sorting apart from that. Funds with relatively few anti-SRI voters (non-zero 10th and 
25th percentiles) are very likely to be ESG funds, and ESG funds have far more pro-SRI median 
voters. These results show that all funds tend to have a complete range of account ideologies, but 
non-ESG funds have a large mass of investors who almost always vote against SRI proposals 
and a small mass of pro-SRI investors, whereas ESG funds have a small mass of anti-SRI 
investors and a large mass of pro-SRI investors. 
The coefficients in Table 4 must be interpreted in light of Figure 3. Namely, Table 4 
features fairly large standard errors, permitting the possibility that the true population coefficient 
could be large. Fund aggregate account ideologies are tightly bunched on the x-axis (other than 
ESG funds); therefore, with fund aggregate account ideology on the right-hand-side (as in Table 
4, following the standard political science representation equation), the line of best fit tends 
towards vertical with large standard errors. In Appendix Table B.A8, I place the fund account 
ideology on the left-hand-side with fund ideology on the right-hand-side and show that standard 
errors and coefficients drop substantially, since fund ideology has extensive variation and fund 
account ideology has little variation. The interpretation is identical, of course: funds have a wide 
range of voting ideologies, and there is little sorting by account ideology except to ESG funds. 
 
V. Limited Attention 
What explains the lack of sorting into like-minded mutual funds other than ESG funds? 
In this section I explore potential explanations. I look at suggestive evidence related to the 
granularity of information related to an investor’s potential acquisition. I also show that the 
relationship between individual and fund ideology increases significantly with the individual’s 
investment size. 
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One possibility is that individual investors seek fund types for which there is a lack of 
variation in mutual fund ideology. This does not appear to be the case. Appendix Figure B.B4 
shows a series of histograms of fund ideologies for common fund objectives separately for index 
and non-index funds and excluding ESG funds. These fund types provide ideological options for 
an individual seeking a fund specific ideology. In Online Appendix Table B.A9, I show that 
there is no relationship between the number of funds with a certain type and the strength of the 
match between fund and individual ideology. These results suggests that lack of availability is 
not driving lack of sorting. 
Another explanation could be that individuals wish for their funds to vote differently than 
they do. Such a desire could be due to an information channel: funds receive private signals as to 
the impact on firm value of a given proposal, and so individuals might expect the informed funds 
to pursue the individuals’ interests by voting differently than they do. Alternatively, individuals 
may receive a consumption benefit from voting a certain way but do not want their voting 
choices effectuated; for example, individuals may enjoy voting for SRI proposals but not want to 
see SRI policies actually imposed on firms. A related possibility is that pro-SRI individuals, even 
if they prefer pro-SRI policies effected, prefer to own mutual funds that vote against SRI policies 
as a signal of the fund’s commitment to value maximization. These possibilities cannot be ruled 
out, but they do not appear capable of explaining my results, since they fail to fully explain why, 
despite the breadth of SRI ideology in non-ESG funds, the shareholder base of each fund appears 




Granularity of Information 
Another candidate is limited attention, which may cause an ideological shareholder to 
invest little in acquiring information about the social impact of the firms or funds she invests in. 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Peng and Xiong (2006), and Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) discuss 
the role of limited attention in investor purchasing decisions. Rational inattention may have an 
especially pronounced impact in a voting context: the shareholder might not invest in 
information acquisition on a proposal due to the small likelihood of her vote being pivotal. But it 
also applies to her choice of delegated voting intermediaries: even if the shareholder has 
complete information on all proposals, if she lacks information about how the intermediary 
would vote on those proposals, she might not invest in information acquisition on the 
intermediary’s choices due to the small likelihood of her investment causing the intermediary’s 
vote to be pivotal. 
Information about fund voting may be costly for individuals to acquire. Individuals may 
not know that funds disclose their votes and voting procedures, and, to the extent they are aware, 
may not be willing to expend the costs required to read and understand these materials.  
Funds disclose votes on two forms. First, funds disclose all their past votes on Form N-
PX. A fund may own hundreds of securities, sorted by firm, each of which may have ten or more 
proposals each year. Online Appendix Figure B.B5, Panel A, contains a representative excerpt 
from the Form N-PX for a mid-sized institution for a single year. The full form totals 423 pages. 
Funds also are required to disclose their voting policies and procedures on a forward-looking 
basis. Online Appendix Figure B.B5, Panel B, contains a representative excerpt of one such 
page; the policy totals three pages. These policies and procedures tend to be vague, aspirational, 
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and give little insight into how the fund would vote in any particular situation; and, in any event, 
they may still be costly for an individual to acquire and understand. 
I present evidence consistent with the notion that individuals use broader information in 
making portfolio choices. First, I explore the connection between pro-SRI individual investors 
and ESG funds. In Table 6, Panel A, I estimate the following equation: 
∑ ?̅?𝑎
𝑎∈Θ𝑓
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑋𝑓 + 𝑓 
The left hand side contains fund 𝑓’s mean account ideology and the right hand side 
contains a vector of fund features related to environmental goals. Columns 1 and 2 show the 
Morningstar Sustainability Rating, which Hartzmark and Sussman (2019) show drive fund flows. 
There is no relationship between the rating and the mean account ideology. I column 3, I include 
the nature of the firms in the fund portfolios—the value-weighted fraction of holdings that are 
fossil fuel or renewable energy firms. There is a strong significant relationship between account 
ideology and ownership of renewable energy firms, but the relationship goes away once an ESG 
indicator is added in column 4. ESG funds serve to match individuals with portfolios that fit their 
voting ideology, but, aside from ESG funds, individuals show no matching by such portfolio 
characteristics. 
In column 5, I add an indicator for whether the fund is explicitly a fossil fuels or 
commodities fund—whether it has “Oil”, “Commodities”, “Energy”, “Natural Resources”, 
“Global Resources”, or “Pipeline” in its name (other than ESG funds). Funds with these in the 
name have marginally significantly lower mean account SRI voting, consistent with individuals 
making ideological choices based on salient information. 
Individual Selection of Equities 
 Next, I perform a similar test for equities. 
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One could envision that individual investors view ownership and voting as substitutes, 
and that individuals who vote against SRI proposals may own greener firms. I regress an 
account’s voting percentage on ownership of fossil fuel firms and renewable energy firms: 
?̅?𝑖 = 0 + 1𝐾𝑐 + 𝑖𝑐 
Table 6, Panel B, contains results estimating this equation. I find that individuals who 
vote in favor of SRI proposals are more likely to own renewable energy firms and less likely to 
own fossil fuel producers. I conclude that individual ideology with respect to SRI proposals is 
positively associated with the shareholder’s choice of equities. Column 1 provides clear evidence 
that individuals incorporate ideology into their equity portfolio decisions.12 
In columns 2–4, I test KLD’s SRI scores, as well as other KLD ratings that may be 
subtler than the general firm business line. Despite the evidence from column 1 that ideological 
voters seek ideologically aligned equities, I find no relationship—if anything, there is a slightly 
negative relationship. 
Table 6 provides suggestive evidence that individual investors make choices based on the 
broad categorizations of firms and funds—ESG, renewable energy, fossil fuel—and not on more 
granular information on the fund’s holdings or using third party information. Such an 
explanation would be consistent with evidence, such as Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005), that 
individual investors react more to more salient information.13 
 
12 In Online Appendix Table B.A10, I repeat this specification where, rather than using an account’s entire voting 
history, I exclude the account’s votes on the firm in question. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively highly 
similar. 
13 It may also be consistent with reports in the popular press that individuals choose ESG funds even if those funds’ 
portfolios are not environmentally friendly (Otani 2019). 
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Investment Size 
To the extent rational inattention plays a role, individuals making larger investments may 
show a closer relationship between individual and fund attention due to a greater willingness to 
pay to acquire information (or due to greater financial sophistication). In Table 7, Panel A, I 
show that the degree of representation between individuals and funds is significantly larger for 
individuals with larger investments. I estimate Equation (3), modified as follows: 
𝑄𝑎𝑓 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1(?̅?𝑓 − ?̅?𝑎)
2
+ 𝜅2?̅?𝑓 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎 + 𝜅3(?̅?𝑓 − ?̅?𝑎)
2
∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎 + 𝜅4𝑋𝑎𝑓 + 𝜙𝑓 + 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑓          (3𝐵) 
Where 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎 is the log of the average stake value in account 𝑎’s 
securities, and where I exclude all ESG funds.14 In column 1, I find a significantly positive 
coefficient 𝜅3: that is, the relationship between individual and account ideologies is greater for 
individuals with higher investment amounts, even excluding ESG funds. In columns 2 and 3, I 
add controls for the account’s number of SRI votes cast, to ensure the results are not driven by 
greater precision in measuring account preferences. 
The results of Table 7, Panel A, show that as one’s investment size increases, a pro-SRI 
investor is more likely to pair with a pro-SRI fund, and an anti-SRI investor is more likely to pair 
with an anti-SRI fund, even excluding ESG funds. 
As an alternative specification, for each actual individual fund-pairing, I regress: 
?̅?𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̅?𝑎 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑓 + 𝛽3?̅?𝑎 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎𝑓   
In which 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 represents the log stake value of account 𝑎 in fund 𝑓. The results 
are in Online Appendix Table B.A11; I find a significantly positive coefficient on 𝛽3. 
 
14 I use an account’s average investment value across her portfolio holdings, rather than the value of any particular 
holding, because this regression includes both actual account-fund pairings and control group account-fund pairings 
in which the account has no investment in the fund. 
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In Table 7, Panel B, I re-estimate Table 4 but weight accounts within a fund by their 
ownership portion of the fund, not equally, when calculating the fund’s mean account ideology. 
The results are striking: a complete reversal of the null result in Table 4, column 2. Even 
controlling for ESG funds, funds have a strong significant correlation with their mean account 
ideology when weighting those accounts by the account’s share of ownership of the fund.  
Individuals with larger investments have a closer ideological fit between their own votes 
and the votes by their mutual funds. This relationship may be because such individuals are more 
financially sophisticated or more willing or able to expend effort to learn about their investment. 
Another explanation might be funds take into account the ideologies of their wealthier investors 
in determining how to vote. Regardless of the explanation, the picture of representativeness 
looks markedly different for large investors. 
 
VI. Degree of Similarity in Voting 
In the preceding sections I focused on the degree to which individuals sort to funds by 
ideology, and to which variation in fund voting is associated with variation in individual investor 
ideology. In this section, I assess a more straightforward question: do mutual funds vote similarly 
to mutual fund investors, collectively? 
Table 1 shows that across different methods of weighting, funds vote highly similarly to 
individual investors on SRI proposals. What explains the relatively moderate degree of 
difference between individuals and funds in Table 1, given the lack of sorting observed in 
Section 4? The role of proxy advisers deserves mention. Proxy advisor recommendations not 
only influence fund votes (Malenko and Shen (2016)), but in fact provide the key dimensions of 
variation across funds. Specifically, Bubb and Catan (2020) find that fund voting is effectively 
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divided into three clusters: those that vote with management, those that vote with ISS, and a 
smaller cluster that vote with Glass Lewis. ESG funds, which vote against management more 
than the three clusters, are a small collection of funds outside of the clusters. The results in Table 
2, column 2, showing a large and significant impact of ISS and Glass Lewis recommendations, 
support this finding. 
Returning to Figure 3, the Bubb and Catan (2020) finding can be observed on the single-
dimensional space of SRI voting. A large cluster of funds vote against almost all SRI proposals, 
and another large cluster, ISS voters, vote for 50-60% of SRI proposals. Both clusters deviate 
substantially from individual investors, who tend, at almost all non-ESG funds, to vote 25 to 
30% in favor of SRI proposals. It appears that these major clusters balance each other out on SRI 
proposals, with respect to individual investor preferences. 
In Figure 4, I graph the relationship between a fund’s distance to its underlying investors 
and its agreement rate with management, ISS, and Glass Lewis recommendations. High rates of 
agreement with Glass Lewis are associated with greater similarity to a fund’s investors, and 
funds that closely follow Glass Lewis recommendations tend towards significantly greater 
ideological similarity to their investors than those that closely follow management or ISS 
recommendations. By contrast, similarity to a fund’s investors is maximized when agreeing with 
management recommendations on 70 to 80% of SRI proposals. 
 
Robustness Checks 
Since the individual investor numbers are calculated using a non-random subset of 
individual investors, I assess the extent to which sample selection may be producing sample 
means that differ from the population mean. 
 44 
I start by assessing how the individuals whose preferences I do not observe compare, 
ideologically, to voters. I find that such non-voters may be more pro-SRI than non-voters, though 
the difference is likely slight. In Online Appendix Figure B.B6 and Table A12, I compare 
frequent voters to infrequent voters. In Figure B6, Panel A and Table A12, Panel A, I show that 
as voting frequency decreases towards zero, support for SRI increases. in the Online Appendix 
tests relationship this formally. Second, since I observe the zip codes of all mutual fund 
investors, whether or not they own or vote on equities, I test the turnout rate among liberal zip 
codes versus conservative zip codes among investors who own equities. Online Appendix Figure 
B.B6, Panel B and Online Appendix Table B.A12, Panel B, contain the results. I find that 
liberals are slightly but significantly less likely to turn out, even controlling for number of 
securities owned. 
A key question of interest is what the average account vote would look like if we 
observed votes for all accounts. In Online Appendix Table B.A13, I show individual investor 
support for SRI proposals using a series of methods to impute the preferences of accounts whose 
votes I do not observe. In column 1, I do no imputation. In column 2, I use inverse probability 
weights. In column 3, I use a two-stage two-sample least squares-style approach, first regressing 
one’s SRI support on account and zip characteristics, then using that equation to impute the SRI 
support for all accounts. In column 4, I simply take the zip code average SRI support for each zip 
code and then use that as the imputed SRI support for all accounts. Accounting for those who do 
not vote on equity securities generally adjusts the average very slightly in favor of SRI proposals. 
In no specification does the average support by retail shareholders change by more than 2.5 
percentage points. There is no evidence that sample selection bias is substantially altering the 




In this paper, I use novel microdata on individual ownership of mutual funds and 
ownership and voting of equities to evaluate the relationship between fund and individual voting. 
I begin by showing that individual investors are consistent in their preferences on SRI: they are 
more ideologically extreme than funds and they vote consistently across proposals. I show that 
individual voting and mutual fund voting have a high correlation. This correlation is driven 
entirely by ESG funds, which have an ideologically distinct shareholder base. Despite the variety 
in preferences among mutual funds, each mutual fund (excluding ESG funds) has ideologically 
similar owners, and variation in mutual fund voting (excluding ESG funds) has no relationship to 
variation in individual voting. 
ESG funds serve a unique role in the mutual fund ecosystem, as they produce ideological 
sorting by ordinary investors. These results may be driven by limited attention. Individuals select 
funds and firms ideologically by type, but do not appear to incorporate subtler information. 
Wealthier shareholders are likelier to hold funds that match their ideological preferences, even 
excluding ESG funds.  
My results suggest that individuals are willing to make acquisition decisions based on 
their ideologies. In particular, ESG funds provide a powerful tool for individual sorting. To the 
extent that non-ESG funds have diverse ideology, it appears unrelated to the preferences of 
ordinary individual investors. 
The canonical model of voting participation would suggest that, due to their negligible 
probability of being pivotal, individuals should not turn out, and, to the extent they do turn out, 
should not invest resources in information acquisition regarding their vote. The paradox of 
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voting is that, in corporations as in political elections, some individuals do vote, and when they 
vote, they vote in a coherent and ideological manner. That coherence extends to selection of 
funds, which may be thought of as a delegation: individuals choose between an “ESG” party and 
a “non-ESG” party, and do so in conformance to their ideologies. And yet, mutual fund voting 
features a diversity of opinion not captured by the simple binary of ESG and non-ESG, and most 
variation in voting across mutual funds is not reflected in the investors in the funds. Individual 
investors have a party structure with which they can align (Bubb and Catan (2020)), but they 






Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Number of Fund Owners 
 
This figure plots, for each of the 4,965 funds in the dataset, the number of individual investors who own the fund, on a logarithmic 
scale. The figure also displays the number of owners of the fund who also own at least one equity security and the number of owners 
of the fund who vote on at least one equity security. Funds are sorted by number of investors, then number of direct equity-holders, 
then by number of equity voters. The y-axis contains the number of investors; the x-axis represents the fund’s ordinal ranking with 










Figure 2. Ideology of Individuals and Funds 
 
This figure displays distributions related to the ideology of individuals and funds with respect to SRI proposals. Panel A displays the 
distribution of individual and fund ideologies at the shareholder level, calculated as the fraction of SRIs proposals voted in favor. The 
figure is limited to investors with at least 10 votes on SRI proposals. Panel B displays the distribution of SRI proposal results among 
individuals and mutual funds, calculated as the fraction of votes in favor, votes weighted equally. Panel C displays the distribution of 
fund ideologies (with at least 10 SRI votes) and the distribution of the mean account at the fund (with at least 15 accounts). 
 

























Figure 3. Scatterplots of Fund Ideology with Mean Account Ideology. 
 
This figure plots fund votes and the aggregate votes of the individuals who own the fund. Observations are at the fund level. The 
sample is limited to individuals with at least 10 votes on SRI proposals and funds with at least 15 qualifying accounts and 10 votes on 
SRI proposals. Fund Votes on SRI proposals refers to the fund’s fraction of SRI proposals voted in favor; Fund’s Account Mean Votes 






Figure 4. Fund Ideological Distance to Individual Investors and Outside 
Parties. 
 
This figure plots a binned scatterplot representing the relationship between a fund’s voting 
similarity to its underlying investors and its voting similarity with outside parties, specifically 
management and proxy advisors. I calculate each fund’s rate of agreement with management, 
ISS, and Glass Lewis recommendations on SRI proposals, and place them into 10% bins, ranging 
from 30% to 100% agreement, for each of management, ISS, and Glass Lewis agreement rates. 
For each fund, I calculate the absolute value of the difference between the fund’s fraction in 
favor of SRI proposals and the mean of the fund’s accounts’ fractions in favor of SRI proposals. 
In a series of separate regressions, for each of the 21 bins (7 bins × 3 outside parties) I regress 
the absolute ideological difference between fund and account ideology on the intercept. I then 
plot the intercept for each of the 21 regressions. The sample is limited to individuals with at least 
10 votes on SRI proposals and funds with at least 15 qualifying accounts and 10 votes on SRI 
proposals. Fund Votes on SRI proposals refers to the fund’s fraction of SRI proposals voted in 
favor; Fund’s Account Mean Votes on SRI Proposals refers to the average, across investors in 
the fund, of their fraction of SRI proposals voted in favor. The figure represents 95% confidence 












Table 1. Summary Statistics on Voting on SRI 
 
This Table contains summary statistics on Environmental and Social shareholder proposals. The row marked “Votes weighted 
equally” treats all votes as a single unit; the row marked “Investors weighted equally” aggregates to the individual investor level 
before averaging; the row marked “Value-weighted” weights each vote by the value of the stake size. When weighting investors 
equally, I limit to investors who cast at least 10 SRI votes in the first row, and make no limitation in the second. The row marked 
“Total value” consists of the average value of each investor’s stake in a given firm (across votes in that firm, so limited to investor-
firm pairings in which at least one SRI vote was cast by the investor), totaled over investors and firms. The funds column consists of 
all funds that appear in CRSP and ISS Voting Analytics that cast a ballot on an SRI proposal (regardless of whether they appear in my 
individual investor data). 
 






Management ISS Glass 
Lewis 
Percent of Votes in Favor       




25.6 25.0 25.0 -- -- -- 
Investors weighted 
equally—all voters 
29.3 29.8 29.8 -- -- -- 
Value-weighted 8.6 12.2 11.7 0.0 50.0 22.5 
Num. votes 396,421 36,510,289 37,702,595 669 669 632 
Num. investors 5,171 3,534,694 3,650,092 1 1 1 
       
Percent of Proposals with 
50% Support 
      
Votes weighted equally 8.0 1.4 1.4 -- -- -- 
Value-weighted 4.1 1.5 1.5 -- -- -- 
 





Table 2. Individual and Fund Variation in Voting 
 
In this table, I estimate the following specification:  
𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛿0 + (𝛿1𝑋𝑝𝑐𝑡) + (𝜙𝑝) + (𝜓𝑖) + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 
𝑖 indexes investors, 𝑝 indexes proposals, 𝑐 indexes firms, 𝑡 indexes years, 𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 is 𝑖’s vote on proposal 𝑝 (multiplied by 100), 𝑋𝑝𝑐𝑡 is a 
vector of firm-month and proposal-level covariates, and 𝜙𝑝, 𝜓𝑖, and 𝜙𝑡 are proposal, investor, and year fixed effects, respectively. 
Columns 1, 3, and 5 are for individuals; Columns 2, 4, and 6 are for funds. The sample of individuals consists of a randomly drawn 
subset of 500,000 individuals with SRI votes in consecutive years at different firms. All regressions are weighted so that each investor 
has equal weight. All right-hand-side variables are demeaned over the regression sample, so that the intercept term reflects the average 
value of the dependent variable in the sample (no other coefficient is affected). Standard errors clustered at the account and proposal 
level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Individuals Funds Individuals Funds Individuals Funds 
       
Total q -0.16 0.01     
 (0.14) (0.11)     
ROA 3.07 6.94     
 (6.02) (3.74)     
Market to Book Ratio -0.02 -0.04     
 (0.11) (0.07)     
ISS in Favor 6.32*** 31.34***     
 (1.39) (1.20)     
Glass Lewis in Favor 0.34 14.89***     
 (1.41) (1.46)     
Constant 27.71*** 27.48*** 27.86*** 28.63*** 27.18*** 28.09*** 
 (0.58) (0.61) (0.04) (0.41) (0.34) (0.90) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No 
Investor Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.22 0.66 0.42 
N 6,425,963 228,962 7,230,501 264,932 7,190,605 264,799 
Number of Clusters 397 389 466 458 466 458 





Table 3. Systematic Heterogeneity in Voting 
 
In this table, I estimate the following specification, following Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010):  
𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖(−𝑐)(𝑡−1) + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡  
In which 𝑖 indexes investors, 𝑐 indexes firms (and −𝑐 denotes firms other than 𝑐), and 𝑡 indexes time. The left hand side is the 
investor’s vote on a particular proposal. The right hand side contains the same investor’s vote (randomly selected) for a different firm 
in the previous year. Column 1 contains individual votes; column 2 contains fund votes; and column 3 contains both, with an 
interaction term capturing the difference between them. The sample of individuals consists of a randomly drawn subset of 500,000 
individuals with SRI votes in consecutive years at different firms. Standard errors clustered at the account level are in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Individuals Funds Both 
    
Last year’s vote 47.7*** 36.2*** 37.4*** 
 (0.1) (0.7) (0.8) 
Individual   -2.5*** 
   (0.4) 
Last year’s vote × 
Individual 
  10.3*** 
   (0.8) 
Constant 15.1*** 19.4*** 17.6*** 
 (0.0) (0.4) (0.4) 
Proposal Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.25 0.34 0.25 
N 7,230,501 264,932 7,495,433 
Number of Clusters 500,000 3,792 503,792 





Table 4. Representation 
 
This table presents a regression of fund ideology on the mean ideology of its underlying individual investors. Specifically, I estimate: 
?̅?𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∑ ?̅?𝑎
𝑎∈Θ𝑓
+ 𝜈𝑓 
In which 𝑓 indexes funds, 𝑎 indexes individual accounts, Θ𝑓 is the set of accounts at fund 𝑓, and ?̅?𝑓 and ?̅?𝑎 are fund 𝑓’s and 
account 𝑎’s fractions of SRI proposals voted in favor. Observations are at the fund level, with accounts aggregated within a fund. The 
sample is limited to funds and individuals with at least 10 SRI votes, and to funds with at least 15 qualifying individual investors. 
Below the table, I include the impact on 𝛽1 of including coefficients, along with standard errors, calculated using the b1x2 STATA 
function created in Gelbach (2016). Standard errors clustered at fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 





 Funds Weighted Equally Funds Weighted by Number of Accounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraction in Favor 
of SRI, Fund 
Mean Owner 
0.895*** 0.006 0.158 0.221 0.495 -0.703 0.312 0.210 
(0.256) (0.192) (0.176) (0.189) (0.649) (0.528) (0.405) (0.283) 
ESG Indicator  0.573*** 0.534*** 0.522***  0.806*** 0.646*** 0.710*** 
  (0.092) (0.085) (0.088)  (0.085) (0.058) (0.050) 
Index Indicator   -0.117* -0.099   -0.127*** -0.105** 
   (0.047) (0.054)   (0.028) (0.037) 
Intercept -0.039 0.195*** 0.181** 0.151* 0.011 0.326* 0.093 0.096 
 (0.077) (0.053) (0.055) (0.060) (0.167) (0.136) (0.111) (0.082) 
Fund Type FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
𝑅2 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.29 
N 800 800 800 671 800 800 800 671 





 0.888** 0.829***   1.198** 0.960**  




  -0.092    -0.776*  
  (0.066)    (0.313)  
 





Table 5. Ownership on Ideology Match 
In this table, I estimate the relationship between ownership and the match between individual and fund ideology. Specifically, I 
estimate account 𝑎’s decision whether to own fund 𝑓 as follows: 
𝑄𝑎𝑓 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1(?̅?𝑓 − ?̅?𝑎)
2
+ 𝜅2𝑋𝑎𝑓 +𝜙𝑓 + 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑓  
In which 𝑄𝑎𝑓 equals 1 (multiplied by 100) if account 𝑎 owns fund 𝑓, ?̅?𝑓 and ?̅?𝑎 are fund and account fraction of SRI proposals 
voted in favor, 𝑋𝑎𝑓 is a vector of additional variables concerning the match between 𝑎 and 𝑓, 𝜙𝑓 is fund fixed effects and 𝑎 is 
account fixed effects. 𝑋𝑎𝑓 is distance between individual and fund headquarters. I select, for each account, twenty control group funds 
at random that it does not own, and calculate the sampling weight as the inverse of the probability of being selected. Standard errors 
clustered at the account and fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Fund SRI Fraction - 
Account SRI Fraction)2 
0.005 0.014 0.005 0.007 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
ESG Indicator × 
Account SRI Fraction  
 0.072*** 0.060** 0.067** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
Index Indicator × 
Account SRI Fraction  
  0.059*** 0.054*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Log Distance in Miles    -0.015*** 
    (0.004) 
Intercept 0.240*** 0.238*** 0.236*** 0.351*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.026) 
Account Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 7,884,474 7,884,474 7,884,474 6,521,915 
Num Clusters 346 346 346 308 





Table 6. Non-Salient Fund and Firm Characteristics 
This table presents estimates designed to capture whether features of an individual’s fund or firm holdings predict her ideology. In 
Panel A, I estimate: 
∑ ?̅?𝑎
𝑎∈Θ𝑓
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑋𝑓 + 𝑓 
In which 𝑓 indexes funds, 𝑎 indexes individual accounts, Θ𝑓 is the set of accounts at fund 𝑓, ?̅?𝑎 is account 𝑎’s percentage of 
SRI proposals voted in favor, and 𝑋𝑓 is a vector of fund features. Observations are at the fund level, with accounts aggregated within a 
fund. The sample is limited to individuals with at least 10 SRI votes, and to funds with at least 15 qualifying individual investors. 
Standard errors clustered at fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses. Panel B contains results from the following regression: 
?̅?𝑎 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑐 +𝜙𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
In which 𝑎 indexes investors, 𝑡 indexes years, 𝑐 indexes firms, and 𝑋𝑐 is a vector of industry categories. Standard errors clustered at 
the account and firm level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 





Panel A: Individual Selection of Funds 
Dep. Variable: Fund 
Mean Account SRI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ESG Indicator  0.264***  0.258*** 0.258*** 
  (0.039)  (0.030) (0.030) 
Morningstar 
Sustainability Rating 
0.006 -0.003    
 (0.005) (0.002)    
Fossil Fuels   -0.016 -0.008 0.003 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
   (0.045) (0.031) (0.032) 
Renewable Energy   0.356*** 0.085 0.087 
   (0.054) (0.063) (0.064) 
Energy Fund Name     -0.025* 
     (0.011) 
Constant 0.263*** 0.282*** 0.283*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑅2 0.01 0.42 0.03 0.36 0.36 
N 745 745 1,140 1,140 1,140 
Number of Clusters 203 203 288 288 288 
 





Panel B: Individual Selection of Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Variable: SRI 
Percentage of Holder 
     
      
Fossil Fuels -0.99**  -1.10**  -1.30*** 
 (0.36)  (0.40)  (0.39) 
Renewable Energy 7.19***  7.32***  7.37*** 
 (1.72)  (1.81)  (1.77) 
KLD SRI Score  -0.06 -0.07   
  (0.04) (0.04)   
KLD Environmental 
Score 
   -0.21* -0.23* 
    (0.10) (0.11) 
Constant 28.71*** 28.81*** 28.81*** 28.95*** 28.98*** 
 (0.16) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 5,000,000 4,376,471 4,376,471 4,376,471 4,376,471 
Number of Clusters 5,591 2,596 2,596 2,596 2,596 





Table 7. Investment Size 
This table presents estimations related to an account’s average stake size. In Panel A, similar to Table 5, I estimate the 
relationship between ownership and the match between individual and fund ideology. Specifically, I estimate account 𝑎’s decision 
whether to own fund 𝑓 as follows: 
𝑄𝑎𝑓 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1(?̅?𝑓 − ?̅?𝑎)
2
+ 𝜅2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎 + 𝜅3(?̅?𝑓 − ?̅?𝑎)
2
∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎 + 𝜅4𝑋𝑎𝑓 +𝜙𝑓 + 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑓        (4𝐵) 
Where 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎 is the log of the average stake value in account 𝑎’s securities, 𝑄𝑎𝑓 equals 1 (multiplied by 100) 
if account 𝑎 owns fund 𝑓, ?̅?𝑓 and ?̅?𝑎 are fund and account fraction of SRI proposals voted in favor, (?̅?𝑓 − ?̅?𝑎)
2
 is a measure of 
ideological distance, 𝜙𝑓 is fund fixed effects and 𝑎 is account fixed effects. 𝑋𝑎𝑓 includes the distance between individual and fund 
headquarters and the interaction of distance with the account’s (log) number of SRI votes cast. I exclude all ESG funds. I select, for 
each account, twenty control group funds at random that it does not own, and calculate the sampling weight as the inverse of the 
probability of being selected. Standard errors clustered at the account and fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses. 
Panel B recreates Table 4 weighting accounts by ownership of the fund. Specifically, I estimate: 
?̅?𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∑ 𝑤𝑎𝑓?̅?𝑎
𝑎∈Θ𝑓
+ 𝜈𝑓 
In which 𝑓 indexes funds, 𝑎 indexes individual accounts, 𝑤𝑎𝑓 is account 𝑎’s ownership fraction of fund 𝑓, Θ𝑓 is the set of 
accounts at fund 𝑓, ?̅?𝑓 is the fund’s fraction in favor of SRI proposals, and 𝑌𝑎 is account 𝑎’s fraction in favor of SRI proposals. 
Observations are at the fund level, with accounts aggregated within a fund. The sample is limited to funds and individuals with at least 
10 SRI votes, and to funds with at least 15 qualifying individual investors. Standard errors clustered at fund shareholder meeting level 
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 





Panel A: Ownership on Ideology Match, Interacted with Account’s Average Investment Value 
Dependent variable: Ownership*100 (1) (2) (3) 
(Fund SRI Fraction - Account SRI 
Fraction)2 
0.256** 0.254** 0.237** 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
Account Log Average Investment 
Value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Fund SRI Fraction - Account SRI 
Fraction)2 × Account Log Average 
Investment Value 
-0.024** -0.025** -0.025** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log Distance in Miles -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Account Number of SRI Votes  0.000  
  (0.000)  
(Fund SRI Fraction - Account SRI 
Fraction)2 × Account Number of SRI 
Votes 
 0.000  
  (0.000)  
Log Account Number of SRI Votes   0.000 
   (0.000) 
(Fund SRI Fraction - Account SRI 
Fraction)2 × Log Account Number of 
SRI Votes 
  0.007 
   (0.005) 
Intercept 0.359*** 0.359*** 0.359*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Account Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 6,292,362 6,292,362 6,292,362 
Num Clusters 300 300 300 
 
  





Panel B: Representation, Accounts Weighted by Ownership Fraction of the Fund 
Dependent 
variable: Fund 
For % on SRI 
Props 































For % on SRI 
Props, Fund 
Mean Owner 
0.912*** 0.473** 0.440** 0.487** 1.333*** 0.848*** 0.472** 0.375* 
 (0.164) (0.152) (0.147) (0.161) (0.265) (0.171) (0.179) (0.150) 
ESG Indicator  0.439*** 0.447*** 0.437***  0.565*** 0.606*** 0.666*** 
  (0.101) (0.095) (0.098)  (0.072) (0.049) (0.051) 
Index Indicator   -0.112* -0.096   -0.109*** -0.095* 
   (0.047) (0.054)   (0.029) (0.039) 
Intercept -0.014 0.084 0.118** 0.094 -0.170** -0.062 0.060 0.063 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.044) (0.049) (0.055) (0.043) (0.048) (0.044) 
Fund Type FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
𝑅2 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.23 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.30 
N 798 798 798 669 798 798 798 669 
Num Clusters 290 290 290 192 290 290 290 192 
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Chapter 2: Retail Shareholder Participation in the Proxy Process: 
Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting 
I. Introduction 
A central premise of corporate governance research is the shareholder collective action 
problem, as dispersed individual shareholders may have weak incentives to gather information and 
monitor the companies they invest in. Research tends to focus on those hired to act on behalf of 
individual investors: firm management and directors, and, in more recent decades, the institutional 
investors who make investment choices and vote on behalf of underlying investors. While previous 
research has produced extensive empirical analysis on institutional investor voting, little is known 
about turnout and voting by retail shareholders—those who invest for their own accounts—whose 
preferences, access to information, and incentives to monitor likely differ from those of 
institutional investors. 
Utilizing a sample of U.S. retail shareholder voting data covering virtually all regular and 
special meetings during the three years 2015 to 2017, we provide the first detailed empirical 
analysis of retail shareholder turnout and voting decisions. We find that retail domestic shareholder 
aggregate share ownership is sizable, averaging 26% of shares outstanding, declining from an 
average of 38% for firms in the smallest size quintile to 16% for firms in the largest size quintile. 
The number of retail investors, however, strongly increases with firm size, with firms in the largest 
size quintile held by more than a quarter million retail accounts, on average. 
Since institutions who report their votes are effectively mandated to vote, retail 
shareholders offer a unique opportunity to obtain a more complete picture of shareholder 
engagement in the proxy process. We analyze the retail turnout decision within a rational choice 
framework that ties turnout to a voter’s probability of being pivotal, her costs of participation, and 
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the benefits of success. Consistent with this framework, we find that turnout increases with stake 
size and benefits from winning and decreases with costs of voting. Retail shareholders turn out 
more when a portfolio firm underperforms or for special meetings, which serve as proxies for 
potential benefits—especially when they own a larger portion of the firm. Holding constant the 
portions of the firms they own, accounts turn out more for higher-value investments, again 
consistent with a relationship between benefits from winning and turnout. Higher costs, proxied 
by restrictions on the shareholder’s access to her preferred voting method, result in lower turnout. 
Despite the lack of an apparent “civic duty” to vote in shareholder elections, we find non-
zero turnout even for a shareholder with a very low stake in a firm and thus a negligible likelihood 
of being pivotal. Shareholder turnout in corporate elections is positively associated with aggregate 
turnout in the shareholder’s county in political elections, consistent with consumption benefits 
from voting that cannot be easily explained by variation in financial benefits from voting. We also 
evaluate information-based and preference-based theories that could potentially explain non-zero 
turnout and find evidence that turnout increases with proxies for information. Our results suggest 
that both financial and non-financial motives play a role in retail shareholder turnout. 
Conditional on the decision to turn out, we study how public information is incorporated 
into retail shareholder voting decisions. We find that retail shareholders punish the management 
of poorly performing firms, as proxied by low valuation, low profitability, and stock price 
performance. Retail shareholders are more supportive of incumbent management of firms in which 
they hold larger stakes, suggesting individuals self-select into firms of which they approve of the 
management teams. This latter evidence is buttressed by our results on exit. We find that retail 
shareholders are more likely to exit the firm after voting against incumbent management, 
especially in director elections, evidence which is consistent with the findings by Li, Maug, and 
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Schwartz-Ziv (2019) regarding mutual fund trading subsequent to shareholder meetings, and, 
recently, the heterogenous preference model in Levit, Malenko, and Maug (2021). 
Our data allow us to compare the impact of the retail shareholder vote with that of 
institutions. We ask how voting outcomes within our sample period would have changed under 
various counterfactual scenarios for turnout, voting choices, and retail ownership structures. 
Consistent with the idea that retail shareholders vote differently from other shareholders, when we 
alter retail shareholder votes in close elections so they vote like other voting blocs, management-
sponsored proposals are more likely to fail and shareholder-sponsored proposals are more likely 
to pass. The frequency of altered voting outcomes due to the modified retail shareholder voting 
decisions is similar to that when we alter the voting decisions of the “Big Three” institutional 
investors. We similarly find that shifts in retail ownership result in a substantial change in voting 
outcomes, again consistent with a persistent difference in voting relative to that of institutional 
investors.  
We use data on institutional shareholder voting to document substantial differences in 
voting between retail and institutional shareholders on specific proposal categories. Compared to 
institutional investors, retail shareholders do not support environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) proposals to the same degree. Institutions support environmental and social proposals 
somewhat more often than retail shareholders, potentially consistent with different incentives 
between investing for one’s own account versus the accounts of clients, but institutions also 
support shareholder governance proposals to a far greater degree than do retail shareholders. The 
overall retail shareholder support for environmental and social proposals masks substantial 
heterogeneity across retail shareholders: retail shareholders with large stake sizes support 
   
 69 
environmental and social proposals less often than institutions, but retail shareholders with small 
stake sizes support environmental and social proposals more often than institutions.  
Retail shareholder voting is correlated with proxy advisor recommendations, implying that 
there is some information that retail shareholders and proxy advisors both observe and incorporate 
into their voting decisions. We find, however, that the sensitivity to proxy advisor 
recommendations is far lower among retail shareholders than institutional investors. This 
difference in sensitivity between retail and institutional investors does not vary across portfolio 
size and other observable characteristics: for example, large retail shareholders’ sensitivity to 
proxy advisor recommendations is similar to that of small retail shareholders, not to institutional 
investors of similar size. To the extent that wealthier accountholders have access to or are willing 
to pay for more refined information, these results provide evidence inconsistent with different 
access to information driving the different sensitivity to proxy advisors. 
Our results speak to the role of small shareholder voting in monitoring firms. Shareholders’ 
channels of disciplining management are commonly outlined following Hirschman’s (1970) 
classic framework as “voice or exit.” Investors can “exit” by selling their shares when they are 
dissatisfied with management or use “voice” by communicating with the management and the 
board. The expanding power of institutional investors has placed increased emphasis on the latter 
mechanism as monitoring by institutional investors became a plausible solution to the collective 
action problem (Gilson and Kraakman (1991) and Black (1992)). The advent of mandatory voting 
disclosure by mutual funds in 2003 gave rise to a large literature on institutional investor voting.15 
 
15 Empirical studies of mutual fund voting decisions have used the mandatory vote disclosures to examine how firm 
and fund characteristics are associated with fund voting decisions, including funds’ own governance practices and 
costs of monitoring (Morgan et al. (2011)), business ties with portfolio firms (Davis and Kim (2007)), other cross-
holdings (Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008)), peer effects (Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010)), tax-driven incentives 
(Dimmock et al. (2018)), investment horizons (Duan and Jiao (2016)), and proxy advisor recommendations (Iliev 
and Lowry (2015) and Malenko and Shen (2016)). Bubb and Catan (2020) and Bolton et al. (2020) expand on this 
work by breaking down the party structure of different mutual funds. A more recent theoretical literature extends 
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In contrast to the literature on mutual fund voting, little is known about retail shareholder 
voting. Van der Elst (2011) studies the turnout of small shareholders – those who own less than 
5% of voting rights – in several European countries and documents a relationship between turnout 
and ownership structure. Schmidt (2017) surveys retail shareholders at a single publicly listed 
German firm, finding that participation increases with investment experience, age, and financial 
sophistication. In the U.S., Kastiel and Nili (2016) show that overall investor turnout has remained 
roughly constant over the past two decades even though this period saw a number of technological, 
regulatory, and corporate governance changes meant to strengthen retail shareholder participation. 
They also find that when brokers are restricted from voting on behalf of beneficial owners who do 
not cast a ballot, the overall non-voting rate increases by ten percentage points. The historical 
perception is that when they do vote, retail investors vote with management (Stewart (2012), 
Chasan (2013)), while work by Maug (1999) and Edelman, Jiang, and Thomas (2019) assumes 
that shareholders with small stakes vote randomly. However, no academic work has directly tested 
these assumptions. 
Several papers, including Kastiel and Nili (2016) and Gulinello (2010), have pushed for 
changes to promote greater participation among retail shareholders, and the SEC has made 
increased retail participation a regulatory priority.16 Others, such as Hart and Zingales (2017), have 
argued for shareholder preferences as the ultimate objective function of firms. As Fisch (2017) has 
argued, retail shareholders have “skin in the game” and will select to monitor and engage only if 
 
some of the insights from work on turnout in political science to study shareholder elections. Zachariadis et al. 
(2020) study the relationship between preferences and turnout by shareholders with discretionary participation such 
as retail shareholders. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2020) examine the participation decision by a large blockholder at a 
firm with many small shareholders with private signals.  
16 In 2015, the SEC held a roundtable on methods to increase retail voting participation and in 2019, the SEC’s Investor 
Advisory Committee recommended changes to the proxy system in part to increase retail voting participation.  
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they are adequately informed, whereas institutional votes are cast by intermediaries. Our study 
adds to these efforts by studying the decisions of direct owners to participate and by comparing 
their voting with that of institutional investors. 
The evidence provided in this paper is also relevant to the renewed focus on the efficacy 
of monitoring and stewardship by large institutional investors (Coates (2018)). As Gilson and 
Gordon (2013) trace, a growing movement towards diversification and changing regulations 
regarding retirement savings in the latter half of the 20th century have shifted savings away from 
individual stock ownership towards concentrated institutional ownership. This concentrated power 
has drawn attention to the incentives faced by fund advisors and whether they allocate adequate 
resources towards monitoring of portfolio firms (Kahan and Rock (2019), Lewellen and Lewellen 
(2018), Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon (2019), Bebchuk and Hirst (2019)). Some, 
including Lund (2018) and Griffith (2020), have proposed reducing or eliminating the power of 
institutional intermediaries to vote. Given retail shareholders’ significant ownership in public 
firms, our study provides an indication of what voting may look like if these shareholders were 
given more power. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide the hypothesis development. 
Section III provides institutional background on the proxy voting process and how shares are 
owned and voted. Section IV describes the retail shareholder voting data and descriptive statistics 
on ownership, turnout, and voting. Section V presents evidence pointing to the impact of retail 
investor participation. Section VI provides empirical results on the retail decision to turn out. 
Section VII provides evidence on the factors associated with retail support for management and 
shareholder proposals. Section VIII offers some concluding remarks. 
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II. Theory and hypothesis development 
To set the stage for the empirical analyses, we present the canonical political science 
framework of the decision to vote in political elections and an overview of the literature on voter 
turnout. To date, it has been challenging to test models of participation in corporate elections with 
data on investment advisor voting decisions since these institutions are effectively required to vote 
(Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2020)). We study shareholder participation decisions directly, utilizing 
insights from the political science and political economy literatures. 
A. General utility framework for participation 
The rational choice framework of Riker and Ordeshook (1968) sets the utility from a 
voter’s participation, U, as, 
𝑈 = 𝑃 ∗ 𝐵 − 𝐶 + 𝐷     (1) 
𝐵 captures the difference to the voter, measured in utility, between her more favored proposal 
outcome succeeding relative to it failing (her “benefit”). 𝑃 is the probability that her vote would 
change the outcome from her disfavored choice to her favored choice—that is, the probability that 
she is pivotal. 𝐶 is her cost of voting, and 𝐷 is any consumption benefit from voting. She would 
vote if and only if 𝑈 >  0. 
The “paradox of voting” is that—assuming 𝐷 = 0 and given that the likelihood of a voter’s 
pivotality, 𝑃, is negligible in most elections—even with very small costs of voting, 𝐶, the benefit 
to a voter of winning, 𝐵, would have to be unrealistically high to induce voting (Downs (1957)). 
Feddersen (2004) notes that in response to the paradox of voting, theorists have generally assumed 
that the decision to vote is non-strategic or independent of other strategic choices. However, there 
is extensive empirical research in the political science literature showing that the individual 
components of Eq. (1) correlate with voter participation, even if it is not obvious how benefits of 
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voting outweigh costs for any voter (Geys (2006), Blais (2006), Smets and van Ham (2013), and 
Cancela and Geys (2016)).17 
We build on insights from the theory of rational voter participation, as well as more recent 
extensions to the corporate voting setting, to guide our analysis of retail shareholder participation. 
Denoting the account’s ownership share of the firm as 𝛼, the likelihood of pivotality, 𝑃, should be 
increasing in 𝛼. 𝐵 can be expressed as the sum of (i) the financial benefits from winning, which is 
the utility from 𝛼 ×  𝑏𝑓, in which 𝑏𝑓 is the dollar benefits to the firm from winning, and (ii) any 
social benefit from winning, if the shareholder places positive weight on social benefits. Since we 
observe large variation in 𝛼 both across shareholders in a given firm and across portfolio firms for 
a given shareholder, shareholder elections provide a unique setting for testing the basic structure 
of the framework in Eq. (1). In particular, we explore the relationship between turnout and proxies 
for pivotality, costs and benefits from participation, and the interaction among these variables. Our 
aim is to assess whether the turnout decision is driven by these fundamental costs and benefits, 
including whether Eq. (1) captures the basic structure of turnout.18 We also present three broad 
categories of models of voter participation that attempt to explain non-zero turnout: (i) models that 
are based on differences in information, (ii) models based on differences in voter preferences, and 
(iii) models in which voters derive consumption utility from voting, D. 
 
17 Voter participation has been linked with variation in proxies for the pivot probability, 𝑃, (Geys (2006), Blais and 
Dobrzynska (1998), Oliver (2000), Cox and Munger (1989), and Agranov et al. (2018)). This literature also finds 
that differences in participation are linked to benefits from participation, 𝐵 (Hogan (1999), Patterson and Caldeira 
(1983), Aker, Collier, and Vicente (2017), and Filer and Kenny (1980)). Turnout has also been shown to vary 
systematically with costs to voting, 𝐶 (Hill and Leighley (1993), Wolfinger, Highton, Mullin (2005), Walker, 
Herron, and Smith (2019), and Kirchgaessner and Schulz (2005)). 
18 The structure in Eq. (1) yields no clear predictions regarding the shape of turnout with respect to 𝛼 and how turnout 
varies with the interaction of 𝛼 and variables proxying for the increase in firm value, 𝑏𝑓. These depend on how 
pivotality, P, varies with 𝛼, and how monetary gain from winning translates into utility. 
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1. Information-based models 
Information-based models tend to assume that voting is costless and then try to explain the 
“paradox of not voting”: why any voter fails to turn out despite costless voting (Feddersen and 
Pesendorfer (1996)). Matsusaka (1995) proposes a rational-choice information-based model with 
a consumption benefit from voting, 𝐷, and finds that voters with less information or ability to 
evaluate the candidates choose to abstain to avoid voting for the incorrect candidate. Feddersen 
and Pesendorfer (1996) show that even when voting is costless, uninformed voters strategically 
abstain to allow informed voters to decide the outcome. More recently, Bar-Isaac and Shapiro 
(2020) extend this intuition to a corporate setting by introducing a large blockholder. The 
blockholder differs in the amount of information she has, and they show that if she has imprecise 
information she may want to only partially vote her shares so as to avoid “drowning out the 
information by other shareholders.” One central insight from these models is that uninformed 
shareholders are more likely to abstain under the assumption that their interests are aligned with 
informed shareholders. A commonality among these theories is that information is positively 
associated with turnout, which we test with proxies for information. 
2. Preference-based models 
A second group of models, preference-based game-theoretic models with no role for 
private information, tend to predict positive turnout even with costly voting. Palfrey and Rosenthal 
(1983) study a voting game in which voting is costly and every voter has complete information 
about the preferences and voting costs of every other voter. They show that it is possible to arrive 
at equilibria with significant turnout, independent of electorate size. However, Palfrey and 
Rosenthal (1985) introduce uncertainty about preferences and costs of participation, which causes 
voters with positive costs of participation to abstain, leading to near-zero turnout. More recently, 
Myatt (2015) studies costly voting when there is aggregate uncertainty about the popularities of 
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the candidates. In this setting, when voters are unsure which candidate is more popular, turnout is 
substantial and increases with the importance of the election and with the precision of voters’ 
beliefs about the candidates’ popularities. Importantly, voters’ asymmetric prior beliefs result in 
an “underdog effect” where the perceived leading candidate sees greater turnout for her 
competitor. This effect increases the likelihood that the election will be a close race, resulting in a 
higher turnout and the possibility that the more popular candidate loses. 
Zachariadis, Cvijanovic, and Groen-Xu (2020) build on Myatt (2015) to study how 
shareholder participation and voting outcomes depend on a firm’s ownership structure. They 
recognize that some shareholders, such as mutual funds, are mandated to vote, whereas the rest, 
denoted discretionary shareholders, select whether to cast a vote. Aggregate uncertainty over the 
discretionary shareholders’ preferences leads to significant participation. Discretionary voters’ 
participation choice depends on the ownership fraction of regular voters and their known support 
for the proposal, the discretionary voters’ benefit-to-cost ratio associated with voting, and the 
uncertainty of their preferences. As in Myatt (2015), they find that in equilibrium there is an 
“underdog effect” in that disagreeing discretionary voters turn out more with weaker support by 
regular shareholders. Because we observe the turnout decisions of discretionary voters, our setting 
allows us to test some of the model’s predictions. In particular, we use proxies for the preferences 
of retail shareholders and regular voters to evaluate whether retail shareholders turn out more when 
they have underdog preferences. 
3. Models based on altruistic motives 
Models in this category explain positive turnout by introducing altruistic motives or 
consumption benefits from voting. As emphasized by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), voters may 
experience utility benefits, such as satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting, 
satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system, satisfaction from deciding, and 
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satisfaction from the act of informing oneself for the decision, all of which may generate high 
turnout in political elections despite the low probability of being pivotal. Feddersen and Sandroni 
(2006) present a model in which no voter is pivotal but voter preferences extend beyond which 
candidate wins to include the social cost of the election. Models with consumption benefits are 
buttressed by lab experiments, which tend to show utility from voting itself (e.g., Fowler (2006)). 
Our setting provides a useful contrast to political elections since it is unclear whether 
motivations relating to civic duty and altruism play a role in participation in financial markets.  We 
explore whether consumption benefits appear in shareholder voting by examining whether there is 
positive turnout among shareholders in settings where their chance of being pivotal is negligible.  
B. Shareholder voting decisions 
In this subsection, we discuss predictions for how retail shareholders make their voting 
choices conditional on the decision to participate. Although there is an extensive empirical 
literature on mutual fund vote choices, the theoretical literature provides relatively little guidance 
on how individual investors should make vote choices.19 
We ask first whether the retail shareholder vote differs from the institutional vote. Retail 
and institutional voting choices may differ for several reasons. Retail shareholders invest for their 
own accounts, whereas mutual fund managers generally manage the investments of others. Retail 
 
19 A notable exception is Maug and Rydqvist (2009), who study sincere and strategic shareholder voting on 
management proposals. Consistent with their strategic voting model, they find that while pass rates are independent 
of majority requirements, shareholders adjust their behavior in response to higher majority rules by voting for 
proposals more often. More recently, Levit, Malenko, and Maug (2020) study how shareholder voting and trading 
decisions are determined in a setting in which shareholders differ due to heterogeneity in their preferences. Since we 
do not observe retail shareholder trading decisions, we cannot study their predictions linking the changing shareholder 
base to voting outcomes, shareholder value, and welfare changes. 
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shareholders may therefore place a greater weight on portfolio value maximization than social 
surplus as compared to institutions. We also explore whether differences in voting are attributable 
to the greater size and diversification of funds that may capture differences in access and 
interpretation of information about the firm and the proposal on the ballot.  
The influence of proxy advisor recommendations merits special mention. There is 
extensive research focusing on the influence of proxy advisors on mutual fund votes, particularly 
focused on the extent to which they causally influence fund decisions or instead serve as a 
reflection of client preferences. To the extent that retail shareholders do not have access to ISS 
recommendations, their voting choices provide a unique opportunity to compare the extent to 
which ISS recommendations comove with retail shareholder voting and institutional shareholder 
voting. If retail voting decisions comove with ISS recommendations to the same degree as that of 
institutions, this would be consistent with the idea that proxy advisors serve as a means to 
aggregate institutional investor preferences that are shared by retail investors. The extent to which 
the retail response to ISS recommendations differs from that of institutions may, however, indicate 
the degree to which ISS recommendations aggregate sources of information not available to retail 
shareholders or reflect preferences that differ from retail preferences. 
Finally, we also study the relationship between voting and the decision to exit a firm by 
selling. As discussed in the introduction, shareholders have long been viewed as having a choice 
between exit and voice. Li, Maug, and Schwartz-Ziv (2019) study mutual fund trading subsequent 
to shareholder meetings and find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if the outcome of the 
election is different from the votes they cast. They argue that models in which shareholders hold 
differences of opinion predict a relationship between voting choices and exit such that disagreeing 
   
 78 
shareholders exit the firm. We similarly ask whether exit decisions by retail shareholders are 
related to disagreements with management. 
III. The proxy voting process 
This section provides a summary of the proxy voting process, focusing on how share 
ownership is structured and how shares are voted.20 As shareholders typically do not attend 
shareholder meetings in person, voting occurs mostly through proxies that are solicited before the 
meeting. This process of proxy solicitation differs depending upon whether the shares are owned 
by registered owners or by beneficial owners. A registered owner holds securities in certificated 
form or in electronic form (“book-entry”) through a direct registration system, which allows an 
investor to have her ownership of securities recorded by the issuer without having a physical 
certificate issued. Registered owners are often an issuer’s management, directors, employees, or 
pension fund (Daly (2017), Racanelli (2018)). A beneficial owner (or “street name” owner) holds 
shares in a custodial account with an intermediary or custodian. The beneficial owner is considered 
the holder of a “securities entitlement in a financial asset,” meaning she has a pro rata interest in 
all like securities of the intermediary held in common by all other customers who own the same 
security. Most shares are now held as beneficial shares—75% to 80% of all public issuers’ shares, 
according to one estimate (Racanelli (2018)). Online Appendix D.C provides in detail the process 
by which registered and beneficial shares are matched to their owners and sent proxy materials.  
Retail investors typically manage their stockholdings through a broker. Brokers generally 
maintain proprietary online platforms that allow their investors to log in, view information about 
their accounts, and execute trades. Other platforms provide retail investors with information on 
 
20 The material in this section and in Online Appendix D.C draws upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System (2010), Kahan and Rock (2008), and Fisch (2017). 
   
 79 
how to vote their shares, but brokers are not required to connect these platforms directly to the 
retail investors’ brokerage accounts. As a result, investors on these platforms must navigate to a 
different website run by a proxy services provider to submit voting instructions to their broker. For 
example, ProxyVote.com, run by Broadridge Financial Solutions, is an online platform that 
enables shareholders to attend shareholder meetings virtually. Before each shareholder meeting 
that the investor is eligible to attend, ProxyVote sends an email with instructions on the process 
by which the investor can view proxy materials and vote. Shareholders may cast their votes online, 
through mail-in ballots prior to the meetings, or by telephone (voice response system). 
As emphasized by Fisch (2017), unlike institutional investors, retail investors cannot 
provide customized voting guidelines to their broker and thus they must indicate a voting decision 
for each individual item on the proxy. If they fail to submit their votes to their broker, then their 
shares are categorized as broker nonvotes. For “routine” matters, the broker may determine 
whether and how votes should be cast, where “routine” is determined by New York Stock 
Exchange Rule 452 and approved by the SEC. Broker voting is subject to the rules of the exchange 
of which the broker is a member, not the listing exchange of the firm, and nearly all brokers are 
subject to NYSE regulations (Hirst (2017)). Routine proposals are generally considered to consist 
of auditor ratifications and proposals to adjourn the meeting, and explicitly exclude director 
elections and proposals affecting shareholder rights. 
There has recently been a push to increase retail investors’ participation in proxy voting, 
especially through the use of digital platforms. The SEC has attempted to further facilitate the 
increased use of electronic forums through its rulemaking, most notably by adopting the Notice 
and Access system, described in greater detail below, to encourage the use of electronic platforms 
(Securities and Exchange Commission (2010)). On its investor site, www.investor.gov, the SEC 
   
 80 
provides educational materials about the proxy voting process for the average retail investor, and 
a number of issuers and shareholder organizations also provide links to this information. 
IV. Data and descriptive statistics 
A. Retail shareholder voting data 
U.S. retail shareholders, whether registered or beneficial, do not publicly report their 
shareholdings or votes, making it challenging to conduct empirical research on their voting 
decisions. In this study, we utilize a novel dataset of retail shareholder votes provided to us under 
a confidentiality agreement with Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. The data contain all annual 
and special meetings over the three-year period from 2015 to 2017 for firms for which it serves as 
the service provider, constituting 17,937 meetings for 6,782 firms. 
For each meeting, the dataset contains the voting records, including failures to vote, for 
each retail shareholder account that is a beneficial owner with voting rights in the firm as of the 
record date of the meeting. The dataset defines an account as “retail” if the account does not use 
Broadridge’s online proxy voting product for institutional investors and financial advisors, 
ProxyEdge, or does not come from third-party vote agents via Broadridge’s Consolidated Data 
Feed. The data we received include single-client family investment offices, which we include in 
our definition of retail.21 Non-U.S. shareholder accounts are aggregated into a single observation 
for each meeting, allowing us to observe only the aggregate number of non-U.S. retail shareholder 
votes cast, so we remove them for all analyses. All data provided to us by Broadridge were first 
anonymized by Broadridge so that individual investor accounts are unidentifiable. Broadridge 
 
21 In practice, there may be a handful of small hedge funds and multi-client family investment offices included in the 
data. Internal Broadridge research has found this to be a trivial number of non-retail participants; in any event, with 
forty-six million accounts in our data, it is implausible that any non-retail shareholders in the data could make a 
substantial difference, and our results are robust to removing large accounts. To assess the impact of large accounts 
on our analyses, we reproduce two of our key results on turnout and voting excluding all account-years with 
portfolios greater than one million dollars. The results, reported in Online Appendix Table D.A17, are virtually 
identical to the results in the main paper. 
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assigns a unique code, the key to which Broadridge retained, so voting can be tracked across firms 
and over time without revealing any data on account numbers, names, or street addresses. 
A retail investor account is associated with its broker through an anonymized broker ID, 
the key to which Broadridge has retained. Thus, if an individual holds an individual account with 
a broker, a joint account with her spouse with that same broker, and an individual account with a 
different broker, we observe these as three separate accounts. To further protect shareholder 
identity, Broadridge excludes data whenever there is only one shareholder in a zip code. 
Each account-meeting level observation includes the number of shares in the firm held by 
the individual as of the record date of the meeting and the shareholder’s zip code. For each proposal 
on the meeting agenda, we observe whether the shareholder voted and, conditional on voting, her 
voting decision, as well as the management recommendation. Proposal text and firm CUSIP are 
included in a second dataset separate from the retail voting data, requiring a merge of the two 
datasets. In total, the data contain approximately 461 million account-meeting level observations 
from 46 million accounts, 7.0 million of which vote at least once in the three-year period. 
B. Non-proprietary data 
We use several public sources of data. We obtain proposal-level data from the ISS Voting 
Analytics database including, for each proposal, its description, sponsor, total voting results, and 
the recommendation on the proposal by ISS, the most influential proxy advisor. We further retrieve 
additional proposal-level data from SharkRepellent, which duplicates some ISS data and allows 
for error correction. Online Appendix Table D.A1 provides a categorization of the proposals into 
a set of 12 categories and Online Appendix Table D.A2 details the number of proposals by type 
included in the retail voting data. The number of proposals increases from 16,583 in 2015 to nearly 
20,000 in 2017, including, each year, roughly 500 shareholder-sponsored proposals, of which 
roughly 200 per year are environmental or social proposals. 
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Votes by mutual funds and other registered management investment companies, including 
the Big Three institutional investors, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, come from ISS 
Voting Analytics, which we match to institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters and the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Funds dataset. We gather information on 
ownership of brokerage accounts from the Federal Reserve Board’s 2016 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, a nationally representative cross-sectional survey of U.S. households. Families 
participating in the SCF respond to questions on financial and nonfinancial assets, debt, 
employment, income, and household demographics, providing the most comprehensive and 
highest quality microdata on U.S. household wealth (Bricker, Henriques, and Moore (2017)). 
We obtain county vote totals for the 2016 presidential election from CQ Voting and 
Elections. From the Census Bureau, we obtain the voting-eligible population and zip code-level 
demographic information. Zip code employment comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
zip code-level adjusted gross income data is from the IRS website. For securities data, we use data 
from CRSP to calculate firms’ lagged annual abnormal return and dividend yield. We use 
accounting data from Compustat to calculate Tobin’s q and return on assets (ROA). Appendix 
C.A.1 provides information on the sources and construction of these variables. 
The merging process between the Broadridge data and other datasets, which involves 
proposal-by-proposal matching with ISS Voting Analytics, is extensive and is detailed in 
Appendix C.A.2. In Appendix C.A.3, we further discuss the process of cleaning errors in the 
proposal-level ISS Voting Analytics dataset. Appendix C.A.4 provides a description of the 
construction and merging of mutual fund voting data from Form N-PX via ISS Voting Analytics.  
C. Descriptive statistics 
We now turn to describing retail shareholder characteristics, the characteristics of retail 
ownership at the firm level, and retail voting. Online Appendix D.D provides a detailed example 
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of a single meeting at an anonymized major U.S. firm to provide an initial impression of the scope 
of the retail voting data. 
1. Retail shareholder characteristics 
Table 1, Panel A provides a description of the retail shareholder accounts in the sample. 
For each account-year, we add up the reported equity stakes on record dates to produce an account-
year-level snapshot of portfolio holdings. We also use account zip codes to merge in zip code-
level IRS income data. Accounts hold an average (median) of roughly four (two) securities, similar 
to the evidence in Barber and Odean (2000). Panel A shows a large spread between the median 
account (roughly $13,000 in value) and the average account (roughly $130,000), reflecting a strong 
right skew in the distribution of the account values. The average account dividend yield is 2%. We 
calculate yearly market abnormal return for an account as the equal weight buy-and-hold return on 
its securities, assuming the account held all securities for the past year, minus the CRSP value-
weighted index return. The abnormal return of accounts in the sample averages to near zero in the 
aggregate. Finally, the accounts derive from zip codes with substantially higher income than the 
average zip code income of $61,000 in our U.S. Census dataset. 
We sort accounts into account value quintiles in Table 1, Panel B. Accounts in the lowest 
portfolio value quintile average $588 and hold fewer than two securities, whereas accounts in the 
top quintile average close to $650,000 and hold nine securities, on average. The market-adjusted 
abnormal return increases across account value quintiles, though dividend yield is constant at 
roughly two percent. Next, although we do not observe the entire trading records of these accounts, 
we proxy for how frequently accounts are turning over their assets based on the rate at which 
accounts invest and divest in portfolio firms. An account’s firm purchase rate is the proportion of 
firms it currently owns that were added to the portfolio in the past year; the account’s firm sale 
rate is its proportion of firms owned last year that were removed from its portfolio in the past year. 
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The average firm purchase rate declines from 43% to 33% as we go from lowest-value quintile to 
highest-value quintile, whereas average firm sale rates vary little across account quintiles, with a 
range of 33% to 36%. Finally, voting participation, that is, the portion of accounts voting (rather 
than the portion of shares that are cast) increases from 3% at the smallest quintile to 15% in the 
largest account value quintile. Fig. 1, Panel A displays this evidence. 
Table 2, Panel A details retail shareholder ownership at the firm level. Overall domestic 
retail ownership averages 25%–27% of shares outstanding each year, rising to 35–40% in the 
smallest quintile of firms; an additional 4% is held by non-U.S. retail investors. The table reports 
the average and median number of investors per firm in thousands. Unsurprisingly, larger firms 
are owned by more investors: while the median firm in the smallest size quintile is held by roughly 
two thousand accounts, the median firm in the largest size quintile is held by roughly 120 thousand 
accounts. Table 2, Panel B describes the yearly distribution of ownership stakes, defined as an 
account’s shares in a given firm divided by the firm’s shares outstanding, in millionths. Each year, 
the median account owns about 0.13 millionths of a firm; the average account stake ranges from 
5.42 to 6.27 millionths of the firm. Predictably, for smaller firms, each individual retail stake tends 
to own a larger portion of the firm. Fig. 1, Panel B displays some of this evidence.22 
 
22 The Online Appendix further documents our data and coverage. Table A3 details the percentage of firms in the 
CRSP universe for which we have a match in the Broadridge retail dataset. In total, our final sample consists of 
about 3,200 firms each year in our retail dataset that match to both CRSP and ISS, as compared to 3,766 U.S. 
publicly listed firms as of 2015 in Kahle and Stulz (2017), with the discrepancy mostly attributable to small firms 
not covered by ISS. Our final dataset contains only publicly traded firms. Online Appendix Table D.A4 analyzes 
household ownership of brokerage accounts using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. It shows that the 
probability of owning a brokerage account increases with the household’s education, age, income, and net worth and 
decreases with household size. Households that report more willingness to take financial risks, that have a savings or 
retirement account, or that invest in mutual funds or hedge funds also are more likely to own brokerage accounts. 
Online Appendix Table D.A5 breaks down ownership by industry; telecommunications firms tend to be more 
widely held than other industries, perhaps reflecting the size of some major technology firms. 
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2. Retail voting characteristics 
Retail voting can be described at two levels of weighting: by retail shares, which 
emphasizes the largest shareholders and is more informative about firm outcomes; or by retail 
accounts, which are more reflective of the small retail accounts that comprise the bulk of accounts 
but a smaller fraction of shares. Table 3 provides ballot-level statistics: retail voters cast ballots for 
32% of shares owned, reflecting the decision of only 11% of accounts to participate, indicating 
that retail shareholders with small equity stakes are less likely to cast votes. For special meetings, 
turnout rises to 38% (by shares) or 15% (by accounts). This evidence provides an initial indication 
of heterogeneity in retail participation by account attributes and meeting characteristics which we 
study later in Section VI within the general utility framework for participation. 
76% of shares cast (58% of accounts participating) support management on every proposal 
on the ballot at annual meetings, indicating that a substantial fraction of retail voters, especially 
small ones, oppose management on at least one proposal. Online Appendix Table D.A6 expands 
on Table 3 by conditioning on the proposal types voted at the meeting. 
Table 4 contains information on turnout and voting choices at the proposal level. Cast (%) 
reflects proposal-level turnout, defined as votes For and Against divided by shares outstanding.23 
For (%) represents support, defined as the number of votes For divided by the total cast For and 
Against. The three sets of columns are labeled All votes, providing the firm-wide voting totals, 
Retail votes, providing the total retail voting results, and Retail accounts, providing retail voting 
results weighting each account equally instead of by number of shares. 
Table 4, Panel A classifies proposals by sponsor. Non-retail shareholders are far more 
likely to cast votes, with a 79% aggregate turnout rate across all investors, whereas retail 
 
23 Since this table is at the proposal level, we count a ballot as cast only if it makes a selection For or Against on the 
proposal in question. Elsewhere, we count it as cast if the ballot is submitted. Because almost all submitted votes 
make a selection, the two metrics are highly similar. 
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shareholders vote For or Against on only 31% of proposals, by shares (or 11%, by accounts). This 
difference reflects the fact that many institutional shareholders are effectively mandated to vote. 
As measured by shares owned, retail shareholders are somewhat less supportive of management 
proposals than are non-retail, and substantially less supportive of shareholder proposals. However, 
small retail accounts support shareholder-submitted proposals more than large retail accounts do.  
Panel B of Table 4 describes variation in turnout and support by firm size. Retail 
shareholder turnout decreases with firm size, whereas turnout by shareholders collectively shows 
no such pattern. The bottom part of Panel B reports on shareholder proposals. Shareholder 
proposals in small firms receive a substantial degree of retail and non-retail support, but support 
declines as we move to larger firms, especially among retail shareholders. Importantly, small 
accounts tend to support shareholder proposals more than large accounts do for firms of any size. 
Panel C of Table 4 provides information on retail voting by proposal category. Retail 
turnout is highest (46%) for proposals regarding mergers and acquisitions, whereas for the overall 
electorate, turnout varies little across categories. Retail and non-retail support for M&A 
transactions exceeds support for other management proposals, which may reflect management 
control over the timing of such transactions. As in Panel A, shareholder proposals (environmental, 
social, and governance) receive weaker support from retail shareholders relative to the overall 
electorate. The weaker support of social responsibility proposals by retail shareholders as 
compared to institutions may reflect the different incentives involved in managing one’s own 
account as compared to managing money for others, which we discuss in greater detail in Section 
VII.C. 
Finally, Panel D of Table 4 shows voting split by sponsor and recommendations by 
management and ISS. The overall electorate shows a large difference in voter support between 
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management proposals that are supported by ISS and those opposed by ISS. We find a more muted 
variation in retail shareholder support between ISS-supported and ISS-opposed proposals with an 
even starker difference within shareholder proposals. For the overall electorate, shareholder 
proposals supported by ISS have 36% support and those opposed by ISS have 8% support, but for 
retail voting, that gap is smaller: 17% vote in favor of proposals supported by ISS whereas 14% 
vote in favor of those opposed by ISS. We examine this difference in detail in Section VII.C.24  
V. Influence of retail vote on voting outcomes 
In this section, we ask whether retail shareholder participation and voting preferences are 
important determinants of voting outcomes. We ask whether shocks to either retail participation, 
retail ownership, or, conditional on participation, retail voting preferences, would have altered 
observed outcomes. We document the number of failed (successful) proposals that pass (fail) under 
our counterfactual scenarios and then compare whether the impact of changes to retail 
participation, ownership, and voting preferences differs from similar shocks to other non-retail 
 
24 We provide additional descriptive statistics on retail shareholder voting in the Online Appendix. Table D.A7 
provides information on shareholder proposals, breaking into finer subcategories and adding in voting by the Big 
Three asset management funds. The Big Three vote strongly against environmental and social proposals, but they 
support a substantial portion of governance proposals. We report on how retail voting varies by voter and firm 
characteristics in Online Appendix Table D.A8. Low-value accounts are highly unlikely to vote, but conditional on 
voting, they are far more likely to support shareholder proposals and less likely to support management proposals. 
Online Appendix Table D.A9 compares frequent to infrequent voters. The voting behavior of infrequent voters is of 
special interest should regulatory changes be made that increase retail participation. We find that, whereas frequent 
voters tend to turn out consistently across all proposal types, infrequent voters cast their ballots for major transactions 
far more than for other proposal types. Infrequent voters are also far more supportive of all types of shareholder 
proposals than are frequent voters. 
   
 88 
voters that serve as benchmarks. As we show, the effect on outcomes from shocks to retail voting 
is as large as that of other voting groups that we consider. 
We begin by considering the scenario in which retail participation is set to zero and assess 
the collective retail shareholder impact on voting outcomes. We compare the resulting change in 
outcomes to similar shocks to the participation of two other groups of voters: (i) all non-retail 
shareholders and (ii) the “Big Three” institutional investors. In our second set of tests, we assess 
how proposal outcomes change when we increase the retail ownership of firms that have low retail 
ownership or decrease the retail ownership of firms that have high retail ownership. In our third 
set of tests, we limit the sample to close elections and evaluate voting outcomes if retail 
shareholders voted using different decision rules, holding observed participation rates fixed. We 
compare to the change in outcomes that would result if the Big Three institutional investors voted 
using those decision rules. The subset of proposals that we use in all tests is constructed as follows. 
First, we remove routine proposals and director elections, which are less likely to be contested. 
Second, we remove proposals for which passage requires sufficient votes as a percentage of 
outstanding shares, since removing votes mechanically causes these proposals to fail. 
Table 5, Panel A illustrates how many proposals would have different outcomes if a 
group’s participation rate were set to zero. We pool together management and shareholder 
proposals. Columns (1) and (2) provide the number of passing and failing proposals, respectively. 
Under the hypothetical that the voting rate for a given group goes to zero, columns (3) and (4) 
reflect the number of proposals whose outcome would flip, while columns (4), (5), and (6) provide 
the number of proposals whose final percentage counts would move by five, ten, and twenty 
percent, respectively. The consequences of eliminating retail voter participation are given in the 
first row in the panel. Setting retail participation to zero, 122 (39) proposals that passed (failed) 
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would switch outcomes and fail (pass). The second row, in which Big Three participation is set to 
zero, shows that the resulting change in voting outcomes is similar to the removal of retail 
shareholders. In the third row in Panel A, we set the participation of all non-retail voters to zero 
and thus allow retail investors to decide the outcomes of these proposals. This counterfactual leads 
to more flipped proposals, reflecting the fact that non-retail voters comprise the bulk of shares cast 
and that the retail vote often substantially diverges from the non-retail vote. 
In Table 5, Panel B, we hold the rate of participation and voting choices fixed and alter the 
ownership structure of the firm by shifting ownership between retail and non-retail shareholders 
while holding constant total shares owned, as well as each group’s participation rates and percent 
in favor. We begin by calculating the standard deviation of retail ownership of all firms in the 
sample, 18.4%, which we use as the yardstick by which we shift retail ownership. Next, we sort 
firms into quintiles of retail ownership and ask how an increase (decrease) in ownership for firms 
in the bottom, second, and third (third, fourth, and largest size) quintile impacts vote outcomes. 
We report the consequences of these ownership changes separately for management and 
shareholder proposals. The results show that reducing retail ownership leads to change in outcomes 
for management proposals from pass to fail and shareholder proposals from fail to pass.  An 
increase in retail ownership leads to more successful management proposals and fewer successful 
shareholder proposals, consistent with retail having stronger support for management than other 
shareholders in close votes. 
Table 5, Panel C provides our final set of counterfactual tests, in which we hold fixed 
participation and then measure how many close proposals would flip outcomes if retail voters (or 
Big Three voters, respectively) were to vote with the proposal support rates that different groups 
of voters had for that proposal. Specifically, each row shows how many proposal outcomes would 
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change if a subset of retail voters (or Big Three Voters, respectively) voted like the following 
shareholders: (i) retail voters; (ii) non-retail voters; (iii) Big Three voters; (iv) all in favor; or (v) 
all opposed. To ensure a consistent comparison across the two voting groups, the number of votes 
we alter for a proposal is limited to the minimum of the number of retail votes and the number of 
Big Three votes. We report the results separately for shareholder and management proposals and 
limit to close elections whose final overall vote result was between 40 and 60 percent of the 
threshold for passage. Columns (1) and (2) contain the number of passing and failing proposals in 
the subset. Similar to Bach and Metzger (2019) and Babenko, Choi, and Sen (2019), we find that 
management tends to win a disproportionately high fraction of close votes. Columns (3) and (4) 
(or (5) and (6), respectively)) reflect the number of proposals whose outcome is changed under the 
hypothetical that retail voters (or Big Three voters, respectively) alter their voting decisions. 
The main takeaway from Panel C is that the consequences of altering retail shareholder 
voting preferences are of the same magnitude as altering Big Three voting preferences. For 
example, were retail shareholders to vote like all other non-retail shareholders, 17 shareholder 
proposals that had actually failed would now pass and 35 management proposals that had passed 
would now fail. When we repeat the test for the Big Three and ask how voting outcomes would 
change had they voted like all other non-retail shareholders, we find similar results.25 
 
25 As discussed in Appendix C.A.4, we only observe the votes of funds that appear in ISS Voting Analytics’ N-PX 
dataset and therefore may undercount the shares held by the Big Three. In Online Appendix Table D.A10, we 
provide a robustness check in which we scale up the observed Big Three votes to the total holdings by Big Three 
open-end mutual funds and ETFs on each firm, calculated from CRSP. The larger Big Three share ownership 
increases the impact of Big Three shareholders in Panel A, though it is still roughly comparable to that of retail 
investors. 
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VI. Retail shareholders’ decision to participate 
In this section, we provide evidence on retail shareholder participation. We adopt the 
standard political science utility framework presented in Section II to shareholder voting and then 
evaluate theories of participation related to information and preferences. 
A. Cost-benefit tradeoff 
In this subsection we ask the following: (i) whether retail shareholder turnout increases 
with greater financial benefits of voting; (ii) whether it decreases with higher costs to participation; 
and (iii) whether turnout is non-zero even when the financial benefits of voting are negligible. 
1. Benefits from winning 
As described in Section II, a voter’s utility from participation depends on her expected 
costs and benefits from participation plus any consumption benefits from voting. The benefit of 
winning is captured by the term 𝑃𝐵 in Eq. (1). In this subsection, we empirically evaluate the 
relationship between turnout and proxies for the voter’s probability she is pivotal, 𝑃, and her 
benefits of success conditional on being pivotal, 𝐵. 
A plausible null hypothesis is that turnout is unrelated to 𝑃𝐵. Nearly all retail shareholders 
have an ex-ante pivot probability near zero, implying that variation in benefits of the election 
should not correlate with utility from voting; in fact, a prominent viewpoint in political science is 
that voters vote for purely expressive reasons (see, e.g., Brennan and Hamlin (1998)). Furthermore, 
retail shareholders may not find it profitable to engage in costly monitoring of their portfolio even 
if they were certain to be pivotal. 
The results in this subsection reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
turnout and 𝑃𝐵. We document below that across retail shareholders in a given firm, those who 
hold larger stakes are more likely turn out to vote. Further, within retail accounts, investors are 
more likely to vote at firms where they hold a larger stake. Turnout also increases when the 
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expected benefit from winning, 𝐵, as measured by various proxies, is higher. As suggested by the 
structure of the 𝑃𝐵 term, the interaction between ownership and benefits is positive: owners with 
larger stakes are more sensitive to variation in benefits across firms. 
i. Share ownership, 
We begin by considering the relationship between turnout and the fraction of the firm 
owned by the account, 𝛼. The setup in Eq. (1) predicts that turnout increases with 𝛼 because the 
likelihood of pivotality, 𝑃, and the benefits of winning, 𝐵, both increase with 𝛼. 
Although our goal is to document factors whose variation explains turnout, we are limited 
by endogeneity concerns. We attempt to address issues of omitted variables and endogeneity by 
incorporating high-dimensional fixed effects. We compare turnout within a given meeting, within 
a given account-year, and within a given account-firm, thereby controlling for meeting-invariant, 
account-year-invariant, and account-firm-invariant heterogeneity. 
We estimate specifications of the form: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log(𝛼𝑎𝑚𝑐𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑎𝑚𝑐𝑡 + (𝜙𝑚 +  𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜙𝑎𝑐) + 𝑎𝑚𝑐𝑡 (2) 
in which 𝑎 indexes accounts, 𝑚 indexes meetings, 𝑐 indexes firms, and 𝑡 indexes time. 𝑋𝑎𝑚𝑐𝑡 is a 
vector of covariates. 𝜙𝑚 denotes meeting fixed effects, to control for variation in benefits to the 
firm from the proposal, which are replaced, in different specifications, by: account-year fixed 
effects, 𝜙𝑎𝑡, to control for the composition of retail accounts at a meeting; industry fixed effects, 

𝐼𝑛𝑑
; and account-firm fixed effects, 𝜙𝑎𝑐, to control for variation in account-firm-specific voting 
propensities. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 provide results estimating Eq. (2) with meeting fixed 
effects, columns (3) and (4) include account-year and industry fixed effects, columns (5) and (6) 
include both meeting and account-year fixed effects, and column (7) includes meeting, account-
year, and account-firm fixed effects. To allow for multiple high-dimensional fixed effects and 
multi-way clustering to be computationally practicable, we use a sample of randomly selected 
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accounts for our account-level regressions. We demean our right-hand-side variables by the 
average across all meetings in the sample so that the intercept can be interpreted as the turnout for 
an observation with average values of all covariates. 
The results in columns (1), (3), (4), (5), and (7) all show a strong positive relationship 
between share ownership, 𝛼, and turnout. We postpone discussion of columns (2) and (6) because 
they include interaction terms with 𝛼. Doubling an account’s stake size results in a propensity to 
vote 1.8 percentage points higher relative to a baseline account at the same firm meeting (column 
(1)). For a given account, doubling the stake size results in a 0.3 percentage points higher 
likelihood of turnout (column (3)), which increases to roughly 0.6 percentage points once we 
control for firm covariates (column (4)) or absorb cross-meeting variation entirely (column (5)). 
These are economically large changes given that the overall turnout rate is roughly 8–9%, as shown 
in the intercepts.26 The estimates in column (7), in which we add account-firm fixed effects, 
indicate that when a shareholder purchases more of a given stock, she tends to vote more than she 
did beforehand, by 0.6 percentage points. The evidence is clear: shareholders who own larger 
stakes in a given firm are more likely to participate in voting, and a given shareholder is more 
likely to vote at firms she owns more of. 
As discussed in Section II, although there is a clear prediction regarding the direction of 
the relationship between turnout and ownership 𝛼, there is no clear prediction regarding the shape 
of the relationship; it depends on the relationship between pivotality 𝑃 and 𝛼, the concavity of the 
shareholder’s utility function, and the relationship between utility and turnout. Fig. 2 presents 
evidence on the association between shareholder turnout and 𝛼. Given the large dispersion in retail 
 
26 This turnout rate is slightly lower than the 11% reported in Table 3. The discrepancy is driven by the different 
weighting schemes used by the tables: Table 3 weights all accounts within a meeting equally, then aggregates across 
meetings, treating each meeting equally, whereas Table 6 weights all account-years equally. As a result, Table 6 
places more weight on firms with more shareholders and accounts with fewer securities as compared to Table 3. 
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ownership and the small stakes held by most retail investors, we split the support of 𝛼 into four 
intervals so that each of the four scatterplots provides a different range for share ownership. While 
the first interval describes the turnout of the large number of accounts in our sample who own very 
small stakes, the fourth interval describes the turnout of the smaller number of wealthy accounts 
with large stake sizes. We observe a consistently increasing but concave relationship between 
turnout and 𝛼.27 
Although large shareholders turn out far more often than small shareholders, our evidence 
on the concavity of turnout with respect to 𝛼 suggests that the differences between mid-sized, 
small, and very small shareholders are more important for determining heterogeneity in turnout 
than the difference between large and mid-sized shareholders. 
ii. Benefit from success, bf 
If shareholders respond to financial benefits of voting, then their propensity to vote ought 
to be higher at poorly performing firms and important meetings because the benefit of winning, bf, 
is higher. We now ask whether proxies for high 𝑏𝑓 are associated with higher turnout. We estimate 
specifications as in Eq. (2), including the following meeting-level variables to proxy for the 
difference in firm value between proposal outcomes: yearly abnormal return, ROA, Tobin’s q, and 
an indicator for special meetings. We assume that poor performance or the calling of a special 
meeting are associated, on average, with voting options in which the expected difference in value 
between winning and losing would be higher. We also include the following additional covariates: 
log market equity, an indicator for whether the firm paid a dividend, the firm’s institutional 
 
27 Since high market capitalization firms tend to have shareholders with a smaller share ownership than smaller firms, 
we report in Online Appendix Fig. D.B1 how the relationship between turnout and 𝛼 varies within firm size sorts. As 
with the full sample, we find that within each size quintile, retail shareholder turnout is concave with respect to 𝛼.  
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ownership percentage, and account-year and industry fixed effects. While excluding meeting fixed 
effects, 𝜙𝑚, potentially introduces omitted variable bias by comparing turnout across different 
meetings, it allows us to test the association between meeting-invariant variables and turnout. 
Table 6, Panel A, column 4 provides the results. We find that special meetings and poorly 
performing firms, as measured by Tobin’s q and ROA, see significantly higher turnout, as 
predicted. The results are consistent with shareholders performing a monitoring role, turning out 
to vote when the financial consequences are greater. 
Although Table 4, Panel B shows turnout decreasing with firm size, Table 6, Panel A, 
Column 4 shows that, once we control for 𝛼 and account-year fixed effects, turnout increases with 
firm size. This is again consistent with greater turnout when there are larger utility benefits to the 
shareholder. Although there is no simple predicted relationship between a firm’s ownership 
structure and the likelihood of pivotality of small shareholders, we also find that turnout decreases 
significantly with institutional ownership. Appendix Table D.A11 uses additional measures of 
institutional ownership and finds that this relationship is robust. 
iii. Interaction of share ownership and the benefit from success, bf 
In this section, we explore how the sensitivity of turnout with respect to the shareholder’s 
benefit from success from the vote outcome varies with 𝛼. As a shareholder’s portion of the firm 
owned increases, her monetary benefit from a gain in firm value increases. However, because her 
utility from an additional dollar may be concave, the framework in Section II does not generate a 
clear prediction for how turnout varies with the interaction of 𝛼 and proxies for benefits to the firm 
from winning. 
To assess this relationship, we turn to the specification in Eq. (2) in which we examine 
shareholder turnout with meeting fixed effects. Table 6, Panel A, column (2) provides regression 
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results in which we include interactions of log 𝛼 with the proxies for variation in the financial 
benefit from success, bf, that were significantly associated with turnout: Tobin’s q, special meeting, 
and ROA. We find that turnout’s correlations with Tobin’s q and special meeting are stronger with 
larger 𝛼. In column (6) we further add account-year fixed effects; in this specification, ROA also 
shows a stronger correlation with turnout with larger 𝛼. 
These results are consistent with a multiplicative structure in which larger benefits from 
voting are experienced most by those with larger ownership of the firm. Moreover, the evidence 
is consistent with retail shareholders that are motivated at least in part by the anticipated financial 
consequences of casting their ballot. Not only do they vote more when the company they own 
performs poorly or when the firm is contemplating a large transaction, but their turnout is most 
sensitive when they own a larger stake.28 
2.  Net costs 
In Eq. (1), shareholders weigh expected financial benefits 𝑃𝐵 against net costs 𝐶 − 𝐷, in 
which 𝐷 represents any consumption, or “expressive,” benefit of voting other than the direct 
financial benefit of expected electoral victory. As discussed in Section II.A.3, many political 
scientists believe it implausible that the likelihood of a voter being pivotal in a political election is 
high enough to overcome costs of voting, and empirical studies—generally experimental—have 
produced evidence for utility from voting itself. 
In this section, we begin by evaluating the propensity for participation among shareholders 
for whom 𝑃𝐵 is near zero to assess whether there exist shareholders for whom the consumption 
benefit outweighs the costs of voting such that the net cost, 𝐶 − 𝐷, is negative. We then ask 
 
28 The multiplicative structure of Eq. (6) also implies that larger dollar benefits from voting are experienced most by 
those with large ownership, 𝛼, in larger market capitalization firms. We estimate the regression in Eq. (2), adding in 
the triple interaction of log𝛼 , 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐸, and either Tobin’s q, special meeting, or ROA and report the results in Online 
Appendix D.A15. The coefficients on the special meeting interaction are significant in both specifications, and the 
coefficients on Tobin’s q and ROA interactions are significant in one specification each.  
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whether there is an association between voting in political and corporate elections, which may 
imply heterogeneity across voters in net costs of participation that spans election types. Finally, 
we exploit an exogeneous change in the voting methods available to some accounts to study the 
effect on turnout of changing costs of participation. 
i. Consumption benefits of voting, D  
 An interesting feature of our setting is that altruistic motives would not be expected to 
matter as they would in political elections. Shareholder voting is commonly understood to be 
intended to maximize shareholder profits, and we have already demonstrated in previous sections 
that retail shareholders appear to turn out more when the opportunity for an increase in share value 
is greater. A consequent null hypothesis would be that shareholders who own a minute portion of 
a firm, and therefore face no realistic possibility of being pivotal, should exhibit zero turnout. 
Table 6, Panel B, column (1) provides turnout levels for shareholders with small stake 
sizes. Specifically, we estimate Eq. (2) without covariates or fixed effects other than a series of 
indicator variables for 𝛼 > 10−9,…,𝛼 > 10−6, so that the regression intercept represents turnout 
among shareholders who own a portion of the firm 𝛼 ≤ 10−9, and each coefficient represents 
additional turnout for shareholders in the next higher 𝛼 group. Shareholders who own less than 
one billionth of the firm’s shares outstanding have 2.7% turnout. Those who own less than one 
hundred millionth of the firm have 3.4 percent turnout (0.7+2.7), those with less than one ten 
millionth of the firm have 6.4 percent turnout (3.0+0.7+2.7), and those with less than one millionth 
have 9.1 percent turnout (2.7+3.0+0.7+2.7). These numbers remain little changed in column (2), 
where we limit the sample to firm meetings at which no proposal in the final voting outcome comes 
within 30% of its vote threshold in either direction. In column (3), we limit the sample to stake 
sizes lower than $100 in value and still find significant nonzero turnout. 
   
 98 
Given the small stakes that they own, even if these shareholders were to be pivotal, the 
expected financial gains would be negligible. Thus, just as in political elections, the evidence from 
shareholder elections appears consistent with 𝐷 ≥ 𝐶 for at least some shareholders, even without 
an obvious civic duty or Kantian imperative to vote. In Online Appendix Table D.A18, we further 
limit the sample to firms that, pursuant to Thomson Reuters, have a single institutional owner with 
more than 50% holdings. For these firms, we know that these shareholders’ probability of being 
pivotal is zero. However, we find positive turnout even in this subsample, consistent with the idea 
that some shareholders derive consumption benefits from voting. 
We next explore whether 𝐷 may be indexed by proposal type. Investors may feel a civic 
duty to vote on proposals that have a broader impact, such as shareholder proposals on 
environmental or social issues. Column (4) in Table 6, Panel B shows that, as compared to the 
reference group (annual meetings with no shareholder proposals on the ballot) there is no 
significant relationship between social responsibility proposals on the ballot and turnout for a 
particular meeting. However, shareholders do turn out more for ballots with governance-related 
proposals, suggesting that there may be some content-based reasons for the increased turnout. 
As mentioned in Section II.A, successful SRI proposals may generate positive social 
surplus and it is possible that some accounts place positive weight on such surplus. That is, the 
benefit from voting on SRI proposals may derive both from the financial consequences associated 
with such proposals and the social surplus generated by a victory, rather than by the consumption 
benefit from voting itself.  We would therefore expect the utility benefit from voting on SRI 
proposals to increase with share ownership, 𝛼.  Online Appendix Table D.A19 provides analysis 
similar to that in columns (2) and (6) of Table 6, Panel A, in which we include an indicator for 
whether there is an SRI proposal on the ballot and the interaction of log 𝛼 with this SRI indicator 
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variable. While we find a positive significant relationship in the specification without account-year 
fixed effects, the association between participation and the interaction of 𝛼 and SRI on the ballot 
is insignificant in the specification with account-year fixed effects. 
ii. Relationship with political turnout 
The evidence in Table 6, Panel A, in which the 𝑅2 increases from 0.04 to 0.79 when 
account-year fixed effects are included in column (3), is consistent with large variation across 
shareholders in turnout propensity and net consumption benefits of voting, 𝐶 − 𝐷.29  In this 
subsection, we ask whether net benefits extend across different types of elections by documenting 
whether an individual’s propensity to vote in corporate elections correlates with her propensity to 
vote in political elections. While we do not observe whether an accountholder votes in political 
elections, we do observe her county’s aggregate turnout. To the extent that the decision to locate 
in a certain county is determined in part by characteristics that correlate with net consumption 
benefits, we ask whether turnout in corporate elections is correlated with turnout in political 
elections. A positive association would bolster the evidence that certain individuals have a higher 
propensity to vote that cannot be easily explained by variation in financial benefits from voting. 
We provide results from regressions estimating Eq. (2) in column (5) of Panel B of Table 
6. We include the account’s county-level political turnout in the 2016 presidential election. We 
find that political turnout in the account’s county is positively correlated with shareholder turnout. 
This association may be driven by several causes—those who turn out in political elections may 
 
29 The explanatory power of person and area-level variables is itself a question of interest in the political science 
literature. Matsusaka and Palda (1999) find that standard area-level variables capture 15% of variation in political 
election turnout, substantially higher than we capture with our zip code and account-level variables, whereas they 
find that including person-specific past turnout captures 30% of variation in turnout in political elections, 
substantially lower than our 𝑅2  from including account-specific fixed effects. The existence of demographic 
similarity may have the potential to produce unintentional coordination that can enhance the impact of retail 
shareholder votes, as Kandel, Masa, Simonov (2011) find for Swedish retail shareholder trades. 
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have lower costs of acquiring information, may have lower costs of voting, or may experience 
greater altruistic benefits of voting. In any event, the evidence is consistent with a person-specific 
element to turnout that carries across types of elections. 
iii. Costs of voting, C  
How do shocks to costs, 𝐶, affect shareholder turnout? In this subsection, we use a triple-
differences approach to measure how the removal (or addition) of a certain voting method available 
to some shareholders differentially changes the costs of voting for the shareholders who prefer 
those methods. In particular, we show that the bundle of materials that an account receives, which 
affects both its readily available information and its available voting methods, substantially 
impacts its likelihood of turning out. We then attribute the impact to the loss of the option to vote 
by mail or telephone (as opposed to internet) when that is the account’s preferred voting method. 
In what follows we describe the setup.30 
There are three forms of materials regarding the vote that an individual may receive: (i) 
Hard Copy materials, consisting of a complete copy of proxy materials sent to the shareholder via 
mail, including the proxy statement, annual financials, and ballot or vote instruction form; (ii) 
Notice, a mailed one-sheet notice to announce the meeting with information on how to obtain a 
complete package of proxy materials or use the service provider’s online website for voting; or 
(iii) E-Delivery, in which links are delivered via e-mail to direct the shareholder to either the online 
voting website or to brokerage firms’ investor mailboxes for voting. 
Accounts choose to receive either (i) Hard Copy, (ii) E-delivery, or (iii) the firm Default 
delivery method. Firms may choose to send Hard Copy or Notice or may choose a mixture of the 
 
30 Online Appendix D.E provides additional information on our identification approach, beginning with a specification 
of turnout which incorporates information materials and then deriving our triple-difference empirical specifications. 
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two (Notice to some shareholders, Hard Copy to others). The following table shows that the actual 
materials received by an account depend on a combination of the firm’s choice and the 
shareholder’s choice (removing mixtures for simplicity): 
  Firm Choice: 
 (a) Hard Copy (b) Notice 
Shareholder Choice: 
(i) Hard Copy Hard Copy Hard Copy 
(ii) E-Delivery E-Delivery E-Delivery 
(iii)  Default Hard Copy Notice 
An account’s choice of Hard Copy or E-Delivery is determinative of the materials it receives; for 
the rest of the accounts, the firm’s choice of Hard Copy or Notice determines their materials. We 
observe both the firm’s choice and the retail shareholder account’s choice at the time of initial 
delivery. For example, if an account receives a Notice, and then subsequently requests Hard Copy 
materials for the meeting, we observe the account’s selection as Notice. 
To identify the effects of the materials an account receives on turnout, we exploit variation 
resulting from the subset of firms that switch their choice of materials either from Notice to Hard 
Copy or Hard Copy to Notice during our sample period. Because the firm’s choice affects only 
accounts that chose Default, Default accounts comprise our treatment group. We use a triple-
differences approach — (i) across firm choice whether to switch or not, (ii) across time whether 
post-switch or not, and (iii) across shareholder choice whether Default or not. 
We begin by presenting graphical evidence from firms switching from Hard Copy to Notice 
and those switching from Notice to Hard Copy. We first show that firms switching their choice of 
materials alters the materials that Default shareholders receive while leaving non-Default 
shareholders unaffected. The top part of Fig. 3 shows the portion of accounts receiving Hard Copy 
materials leading up to and following the switch, split by whether the account chose E-Delivery, 
Hard Copy, or Default. The combination of the firm’s choice and the account’s original choice is 
almost completely determinative of the materials the account receives. The E-Delivery and Hard 
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Copy groups continue as before following the switch, whereas the Default group switches 
materials almost completely. 
The bottom part of Fig. 3 shows turnout leading up to and following the switch in delivery 
method, split by whether the account chose E-Delivery, Hard Copy, or Default. We normalize each 
line by scaling by the voting rate in year -1. The graphs again show extremely strong parallel pre-
trends, with nearly indistinguishable lines between the three groups. Default accounts at firms that 
switch from Hard Copy to Notice or Notice to Hard Copy in 2017 have virtually no pre-switch 
pre-trend in voting rates from 2015 to 2016, nor are there pre-trends in non-Default accounts, 
which are our placebo groups. The E-Delivery and Hard Copy groups’ turnout rates continue as 
before following the switch, strong placebo tests substantiating our identification strategy. The 
Default group, by contrast, sees a large drop in turnout when firms switch to Notice and a large 
rise in turnout when firms switch to Hard Copy.  
We adopt the following specification to model account turnout as a function of the materials 
the account receives: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 + 𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐𝑡 + 𝜈𝑎𝑐𝑡  (3A) 
in which 𝑎 indexes accounts, 𝑐 indexes firms, and 𝑡 indexes time. 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡 reflects whether the account 
turns out to vote, and 𝑀 represents whether the account received Hard Copy Materials. The 
materials received by an account as compared to the materials the account received in other periods 
are a function of changes in the firm’s decision: 
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝐴𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 + 𝛿1𝐵𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 
(3B) 
     + 𝛾2𝑋𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 +𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐𝑡                         
in which 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 equals 1 if a firm switches from Hard Copy to Notice (or vice versa for 
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐), 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡  equals 1 if it is after the firm’s switch, and 𝐷𝑎0 equals 1 if the account 
had selected Default at time 0. The 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ variables shift the bundle of materials the account 
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receives, which may affect its turnout. The account’s turnout as compared to the account’s turnout 
in other periods is thus an indirect function of changes in the firm’s decision: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝐴𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 + 𝛿1𝐵𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 
(3C) 
       + 𝛾2𝑋𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 +𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐𝑡  
To absorb as much variation as possible, we include two-way fixed effects at the account-
firm, account-year, and firm-year levels. Account-firm fixed effects ensure we compare the same 
account at the same firm over time. Account-year fixed effects ensure we compare the same 
account at the same time to other firms in its portfolio. Firm-year fixed effects ensure we compare 
across accounts at the same firm at the same time. 
Importantly, we do not require that the firm’s decision to switch materials is exogeneous. 
The primary identifying assumption for the triple-differences setup is parallel trends in materials 
received and in turnout among Default shareholders at switching firms as compared to non-Default 
and non-switching firms. Fig. 3 shows clear evidence of parallel pre-trends; our identifying 
assumption is that those trend lines would remain similar if, counterfactually, accounts did not 
receive different materials following the switch. 
Table 7 provides results of regressions formally estimating Eq. (3A), (3B), and (3C). 
Column 1 estimates Eq. (3B), with receipt of Hard Copy materials on the left-hand side. We find 
that a firm switching its delivery methods yields a 89.8–91.7 percentage point change in the 
likelihood of receiving Hard Copy materials for Default accounts, as compared to different years 
of the same account-firm, different firms in the same account-year, and different accounts in the 
same meeting. Column (2) provides regression estimates of Eq. (3C). We find that a firm switching 
its delivery methods yields a 2.5–4.2 percentage point change in turnout. Finally, in column (3), 
we estimate Eq. (3A), the effects of materials on turnout, by effectively scaling the combined 
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results of column (2) by column (1) to estimate the size of the effect (Duflo (2001), de 
Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2018)). We find that a change in receipt of Hard Copy materials 
causes a 3.2 percentage point change in turnout. Moving from Notice to Hard Copy increases 
turnout among Default accounts from roughly 6% to 10%, and moving from Hard Copy to Notice 
decreases turnout among Default accounts from roughly 9% to 6%, for an effect size of roughly 
50%–66%. 
The results indicate that a change to the firm’s choice of materials causes a large change in 
turnout for those accounts who are affected by it. This evidence does not, however, help to 
distinguish whether the change in turnout is driven by a change to information availability or by a 
change in access to voting. We therefore turn to evaluating the reason for the effect of a switch to 
Notice on retail shareholder turnout. A little-discussed provision of the SEC’s Notice and Access 
rule restricts those receiving Notice instead of Hard Copy from voting by mail or telephone. Thus, 
a firm switching information materials also alters the voting methods easily available to Default 
accounts. Prior research has focused solely on the implications of a change to information 
availability for turnout. In what follows, we limit the analysis to firms that used Hard Copy in year 
𝑡 − 1 (and potentially switched to Notice in year 𝑡) and focus on the voting method used by voters 
the year before a firm switch. We begin with Default accounts that voted in year 𝑡 − 1, and 
estimate a difference-in-difference specification comparing the turnout in year 𝑡 across switching 
and non-switching firms and those who voted by internet versus those who voted by non-internet 
in 𝑡 − 1. As a placebo test, we repeat the exercise for non-Default accounts. We display the results 
graphically in Fig. 4. For each group, we estimate the following specification: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 
(4) 
       +𝛾3𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝑎𝑐  
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in which 𝑎 indexes accounts and 𝑐 indexes firms, and 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎 refers to voting 
by methods other than the internet in the year prior. Table 8 contains our estimation results. In the 
left two columns, we regress turnout in 2016, keeping only those accounts that voted in 2015. In 
the right two columns, we regress turnout in 2017, keeping only those accounts that voted in 2016. 
The first and third columns contain Default accounts, who we expect to be affected by firms 
switching from Hard Copy to Notice; the second and fourth columns contain non-Default accounts, 
our placebo test. Standard errors are clustered by meeting and account. 
The results are striking. For Default accounts that voted by mail or telephone in 2015, there 
is a 45 percentage point drop in voting in 2016 when their firm switches from Hard Copy to Notice, 
but there is no drop for Default accounts that voted by internet in 2015. Non-Default accounts see 
no significant differences between switching and non-switching firms or between internet and non-
internet voters, consistent with the fact that they saw no change to their available voting methods. 
We see similar evidence if we limit to 2017 switches instead of 2016. 
We conclude that the effects of Notice and Access are driven by available voting methods, 
not information materials. This finding has several implications. First, it shows that the decision 
to participate is quite cost-sensitive—affected retail shareholders see their turnout drop by as much 
as 45 percentage points. Second, Bach and Metzger (2019) and Babenko, Choi, and Sen (2019) 
have recently documented how management is able to win close votes by changing retail 
participation via the way information is delivered to retail investors. Our evidence suggests that it 
is not the information material per se that shapes participation but rather the access to the voter’s 
preferred voting method. Third, this result appears consistent with Column (6) of Panel B in Table 
6, which suggests that turnout rates are highly correlated with age. This evidence has implications 
for research on political voting studying how electors’ demographics, including age, digital access 
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and literacy, impact their decision to participate and vote (Serdült et al. (2015), Germann and 
Serdült (2017), Goodman et al. (2018)). Finally, the evidence in this section suggests that 
increasing turnout does not require eliminating Notice and Access, but rather modifying it to 
improve voting access. 
B. Potential implications for information and preference-based models 
In this section, we further explore the extent to which our data sheds light on models from 
the political science and shareholder voting literature that attempt to explain non-zero voter 
turnout. 
1. . Information-based models 
As discussed in Section II, political elections feature higher turnout among informed voters 
(see Matsusaka (1995) for a discussion), and several political science papers have theorized 
information-based participation. The main insight in these models is that a voter with a less 
informative signal regarding the candidates can ascertain, conditional on being the pivotal voter, 
that her private signal likely clashes with those of the more informed voters, and she is better off 
abstaining. 
We cannot observe the information set of the shareholders in our sample and, given that 
the accounts are anonymized, we cannot form proxies for shareholder-level informedness. We do, 
however, observe the shareholder’s account value and characteristics measured at the zip code and 
county level, which may serve as proxies for shareholder information. In particular, the 
shareholder zip code-level percentage with a bachelor’s degree and the percentage of employees 
in the county who work in finance or insurance may serve as proxies for the level of informedness 
of shareholders residing in that locality. 
Table 6, Panel B, column (6) shows that, although the portion holding college degrees is 
not significantly related to turnout, the portion of a county that works in finance or insurance has 
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a large positive correlation, potentially consistent with higher turnout among those with greater 
information. Those with larger portfolio values are also significantly more likely to turn out for a 
firm meeting, even controlling for the size of the particular stake in that firm, which could be a 
proxy for informedness. 
2. . Preference-based models 
We next turn to predictions from models that seek to link variation in shareholder 
preferences and turnout. The political science literature features several theories that connect voter 
preferences to participation, such as Myatt (2015). Zachariadis et al. (2020) apply some of these 
insights to a shareholder voting context. In this section, we seek to establish the relationship 
between preferences and turnout. 
Following Zachariadis et al. (2020), we limit the sample of proposals to shareholder 
governance proposals, which have more heterogeneous institutional popularity than other proposal 
types and which are often the most contentious and outcome-uncertain proposals on the ballot. 
Zachariadis et al. (2020) select this subset to minimize information heterogeneity across 
shareholders and proposals. We calculate a shareholder’s preference for governance proposals as 
her average vote on governance proposals in other meetings, which we refer to as her “governance 
score.” As a result, our sample in this section is necessarily limited to accounts that own at least 
two securities and that sometimes turn out. By constructing shareholder preferences in this manner, 
our preference measure is not dependent on turnout on the proposal in question. 
We estimate specifications of the form: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑎,−𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑎,−𝑚𝑋𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡  (4) 
In which 𝑎 indexes accounts, 𝑝 indexes proposals, 𝑚 indexes meetings, −𝑚 denotes meetings 
other than 𝑚, 𝐺 is an account’s governance votes at other meetings, and 𝑋𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 is a vector of 
characteristics about the account, proposal or meeting. Online Appendix Table D.A12 contains 
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results from a regression estimating Eq. (4). We do not find evidence that retail turnout among 
voters who tend to support governance proposals differentially changes with institutional support 
as compared to voters who tend to oppose governance proposals. A shareholder who generally 
supports governance proposals is not significantly more likely to turn out when institutional 
support for the proposal is weak, or vice-versa.  In all, we cannot reject the null of no relation, 
though in all columns the signs are in the direction predicted by Zachariadis et al. (2020). 
VII. Determinants of support for management and shareholder proposals 
In the previous section we examined the individual decision whether to vote, and earlier 
we showed that retail voters, as a bloc, have a substantive effect on voting outcomes. In this 
section, we turn to analyzing retail investors’ support for management and shareholder proposals, 
conditional on casting a ballot, to better understand individuals’ voting decisions and how they 
impact overall outcomes. We first conduct the analysis at the account level to evaluate a given 
retail investor’s decision, and then at the meeting level to address how firm-level variables affect 
the firm’s overall voting outcome. We conclude the section by evaluating how a retail investor’s 
decision to exit a firm is associated with her voting decisions in the previous year. 
A. Account-level evidence 
We estimate the following main specification: 
𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log(𝛼𝑎𝑚𝑐𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝑡 +𝜓𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑 (5) 
      +(𝜙𝑝 + 𝜙𝑚 + 𝜙𝑎𝑡 +𝜙𝑎𝑚 + 𝜙𝑎𝑐 +𝜙𝑎,𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡  ) + 𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡  
where 𝑎 indexes accounts, 𝑝 indexes proposals, 𝑚 indexes meetings, 𝑐 indexes firms, and 𝑡 indexes 
year-months. The dependent variable, 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡, is a binary variable that equals one if the 
account votes in line with management recommendation and zero if it votes against, multiplied by 
100. That is, 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 equals 100 if the account votes for a management proposal or 
against a shareholder proposal. 𝑋𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 is a vector of covariates, including firm-meeting level 
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covariates (log market equity, yearly abnormal return, a binary variable for dividend yield, Tobin’s 
q, return on assets, and special meeting), firm-proposal-level variables (whether ISS’s 
recommendation was in opposition to management’s recommendation), and account-level or zip-
code level variables (log account portfolio value, county 2016 presidential turnout percent, log zip 
code income, zip code fraction of over-65 year-olds, zip code density, zip code fraction with 
bachelors, zip code fraction with post-bachelors). 𝜓𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑, and 𝑡 are proposal category, 
industry, and year-month fixed effects, which are replaced, in different specifications, by 
𝜙𝑝, 𝜓𝑚 , 𝜙𝑎𝑡 , 𝜙𝑎𝑚 , 𝜙𝑎𝑐, and/or 𝜙𝑎,𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡: proposal, meeting, account-year, account-meeting, 
account-firm, and account-proposal category fixed effects, respectively. All standard errors are 
clustered at the meeting and account level, and we weight observations so that each account-year 
has equal weight. 
Table 9 displays the results estimating Eq. (5). Each column includes different fixed effects 
to focus on variation in different independent variables. Column (1) includes only proposal 
category, industry, and year-month fixed effects, and is designed to give a general view of the 
relationship between voting choices and firm, firm-proposal, account, and zip-code level variables. 
In column (2), we include proposal fixed effects—comparing how different accounts vote on the 
same proposal—to provide a more precise estimate of account-level and zip code-level 
coefficients. In column (3), we include account-year fixed effects in addition to proposal category 
and industry fixed effects, focusing exclusively on the comparison between different securities in 
an account’s portfolio to provide our best estimate of firm-level variables. In column (4), we 
include account-meeting fixed effects and account-proposal category fixed effects, which allow us 
to focus on ISS recommendations—how an account votes on an ISS-recommended proposal as 
compared to other proposals at the same meeting (and as compared to how that account generally 
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votes in that proposal category). In column (5), we include account-year and proposal fixed effects, 
to provide a sharp focus on the account’s ownership 𝛼, comparing voting choices against other 
firms held by the account in the same year and against other accounts voting on the same proposal. 
Finally, in column (6), we add to column (5) account-firm fixed effects, to additionally compare a 
given retail investor’s voting choices at meetings of the same firm in different years. 
The intercept in Table 9, column (1), shows that the average support for (opposition to) 
management across accounts with average levels of covariates is 85.5% (14.5%). We draw the 
following three conclusions from Table 9. First, retail voters punish the management of poorly 
performing firms, with a strong sensitivity to abnormal returns, and return on assets. Based on the 
results in column (1), retail shareholders are 1.6 percentage points more likely to oppose 
management (or 11.0% of the 14.5% average opposition) at a firm whose returns are one standard 
deviation below average. They similarly are 1.7 percentage points more likely to oppose 
management (or 11.7% of average opposition) at a firm whose return on assets is one standard 
deviation lower than average. Even when comparing different votes by a single account, a one 
standard deviation lower abnormal return is associated with 0.91 percentage points higher 
opposition to management (column (3)). 
Second, based on column (1), we observe that ISS opposition to management is associated 
with lower retail support for management by 2.7 percentage points (or 18.6% of average 
opposition). Even when comparing the account’s other votes at the same meeting and in the same 
proposal category, the association is 1.5 percentage points, suggesting that there is some 
information regarding proposals that both ISS and retail shareholders observe. However, this 
   
 111 
estimate is far lower than the 25 percentage point influence by ISS reported by Malenko and Shen 
(2016).31 
Third, larger equity stakes tend to vote more in favor of management. A doubling of stake 
size is associated with a roughly 1.1 percentage point increase in support for management (or 7.5% 
of average opposition) as reported in column (1). This is partially driven by across-account 
variation, but also by within-account variation: column (5) shows that an account with multiple 
securities votes significantly more in favor of those securities that it owns more of. However, 
column (6), which includes account-firm fixed effects, shows that shareholders whose stake in a 
firm increases between meetings are no more likely to vote in support of management. 
B. Proposal-level evidence  
All regressions so far have focused on disaggregated account decisions, but we are also 
interested in aggregate proposal results and how they are associated with firm-level variables. We 
therefore aggregate retail votes up to the proposal level so that each meeting is weighted equally 
(rather than weighting each account-year equally), which also permits comparison with non-retail 
voting decisions. For a proposal 𝑝, we define the variable 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 , as follows: 
𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 =
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑎
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑎 + ∑ 𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑎
 
It is the percent of votes that are cast as For votes (on management proposals) or Against votes (on 
shareholder proposals) out of the total votes cast For and Against, multiplied by 100. We estimate 
regressions of the form: 
𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝑡 + 𝜓𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡 + 𝑝𝑐𝑡 (6) 
 
31 Bubb and Catan (2020) conclude that heterogeneity in sensitivity to ISS recommendations is the dimension that 
most explains mutual fund voting. The low observed sensitivity that we document among retail shareholders implies 
that the ideological space of retail shareholders likely differs substantially from those of mutual funds. 
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where 𝑋𝑚𝑐𝑡 is a vector of firm-level variables and 𝑍𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 is a vector of proposal-level variables.  
𝜓𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡 and 𝑡 are proposal category and year-month fixed effects. We weight observations so 
that each firm meeting is weighted equally and cluster at the firm-meeting level.  
Table 10 reports regression results estimating Eq. (6). The first three columns provide 
results for institutions’ voting, and the final three columns contain results for retail voting. 
Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) include industry, proposal category, and year-month fixed effects, 
whereas columns (3) and (6) substitute firm fixed effects for industry fixed effects. The sample for 
these regressions includes director elections and say-on-pay votes, which dwarf other proposal 
types in frequency. Columns (1) and (4) of Table 10 show that for a firm with zero abnormal return 
and average values for all other variables, 88.3% of mutual fund shares and 89.3% of retail shares 
vote with management (as represented by the intercepts). 
As before, we find that retail shareholders’ voting decisions respond to firm performance. 
The estimates in column (4) show that an otherwise average firm experiencing a -37% abnormal 
return (roughly one standard deviation below zero) experiences retail opposition to management 
increasing from 10.7% (the intercept in column (4)) to 12.3%. By contrast, although mutual fund 
votes show some sensitivity to a firm’s performance as measured by its return on assets, its overall 
sensitivity to performance is far less than that of retail voters once ISS recommendations are 
accounted for. The coefficients on ROA or Tobin’s q are not significantly different between mutual 
funds and retail (F-stats 2.07 and 0.14), whereas the coefficients on firms’ abnormal returns are 
highly significantly different (F-stat 76.34). These results are consistent with retail voters serving 
a monitoring role in poorly performing firms. 
An even more striking difference is the sensitivity to proxy advisor opposition. ISS 
opposition to management is associated with a 1.8% difference in retail voting outcomes, but a 
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50.7% difference in institutional voting outcomes. To the extent that retail voters do not observe 
ISS recommendations prior to voting, the negative retail coefficient implies that retail shareholder 
voting decisions are likely driven by the same underlying factors that drive ISS recommendations. 
The larger magnitude of institutional investors’ sensitivity to ISS recommendations reflects the 
strong influence of ISS recommendations on fund voting (Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013), Iliev 
and Lowry (2015), Malenko and Shen (2016)) and is also consistent with retail shareholders not 
having access to as accurate information as that gathered by ISS. We explore this difference more 
in Section VII.C below.32 
C. Retail and institutional voting 
Table 10 reveals a noticeable difference between retail shareholders and institutions: a 
higher sensitivity to ISS recommendations for institutional investors, potentially caused by 
structural differences between the two groups, most notably institutional investors’ potential for 
conflicts of interest in voting and their fiduciary duty to vote. It may also be a result of 
heterogeneity within each group, driven by the attributes of the investor’s portfolio. For example, 
differential access to information or costs of monitoring portfolio firms, as well as variation in 
shareholder time horizons, preferences, and exposure to idiosyncratic risk, could each be 
associated with variation in voting choices. The differences between retail and institutional 
investors in average levels of these factors could produce differences in average voting choices. 
Since our goal is to explain differential voting between retail shareholders and institutional 
shareholders, we consider three portfolio attributes that we can observe for our anonymized retail 
shareholders and for which there are large differences within and across retail and institutional 
 
32 Online Appendix Table D.A13 splits the sample by proposal type into four proposal categories consisting of 
director elections, say on pay, shareholder proposals, and other proposals. The results across proposal categories are 
broadly similar to those in Table 10, though director elections receive more support. Online Appendix Table D.A14 
provides corresponding results comparing retail voting to that of the Big Three fund families. 
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shareholders: the portfolio’s value, turnover ratio, and number of firms. Although these variables 
may not capture structural differences between retail and institutional shareholders—for example, 
no retail shareholders have a fiduciary duty to vote—they may be associated with variation in 
demand for or access to information or, alternatively, preferences related to risk exposure or time 
horizons. If shareholders with higher-valued portfolios have access to or greater willingness to pay 
for more granular information, and they interpret that information as funds would, then we may 
observe that larger retail investors resemble smaller funds in their voting behavior. Similarly, a 
shareholder with a high portfolio turnover may have a different investment horizon and may 
require access to higher frequency sources of information, and so differences in turnover ratios 
between retail and institutional investors may be driving the observed sensitivity to ISS. Finally, a 
shareholder with more firms in her portfolio may have less exposure to idiosyncratic risk and may 
not require detailed information on individual investments in her portfolio. 
We estimate Eq. (5) as in Table 9, column (3), but with the following two modifications. 
We first allocate retail and institutional investors into bins by account value, account turnover, or 
account breadth. Account value bins correspond to one segment of the log 10 scale, turnover bins 
are five equally spaced bins on the unit interval, and log number of firms in an account’s portfolio 
is spaced over the range [1,8). Second, for each of our right-hand side variables, we include the 
interaction of the variable with the account value bins, turnover ratio bins, or number of firm bins, 
respectively. 
The estimated sensitivities of both retail and institutional investors to ISS 
recommendations across account, turnover, and breadth bins are presented in Fig. 5. The top panel 
of Fig. 5 provides the coefficients on ISS opposition to management interacted with each account 
value bin, the middle panel provides the coefficients on ISS opposition to management interacted 
   
 115 
with each turnover ratio bin, and the bottom panel provides the coefficients on ISS opposition to 
management interacted with each bin of log number of firms in the portfolio. Fig. 5 shows that 
retail shareholders, at any level of account value, turnover, or breadth are far less sensitive than 
institutions to ISS opposition to management—that is, the different sensitivity is not a product of 
these observable differences between the shareholders’ portfolios.  
It is plausible that as the value of an account’s portfolio increases, the value of information 
to the shareholder would increase and she would invest in access to more accurate sources of 
information. As a result, retail shareholders with high account values may resemble institutions 
with similar account values in their demand for or access to more granular information on portfolio 
firms. However, to the extent that large retail accounts acquire additional information, our 
evidence shows that that such information does not lead these wealthier shareholders to vote more 
similarly with ISS recommendations. This may be because they do not, in fact, decide to acquire 
information; because any information that they do acquire is uncorrelated with that utilized by ISS; 
or because, to the extent the information they acquire is correlated with that utilized by ISS, they 
may interpret the information differently than institutions. 
We note that retail shareholders also show a much greater sensitivity to recent performance 
than do funds, particularly to lagged yearly abnormal returns. Yearly abnormal returns may be a 
highly salient and cheap form of information for retail investors, in contrast to ISS 
recommendations, that institutions can pay to improve upon. We therefore ask whether retail 
shareholders whose portfolios resemble those of institutional investors may not have such 
sensitivity to past firm performance. We follow the analysis presented in Fig. 5 and report the 
coefficients on the lagged yearly abnormal return interacted with the quintile sorts by account 
value, portfolio turnover, and breadth. Online Appendix Fig. D.B2 shows that retail investors are 
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far more sensitive to yearly returns than funds at any level of account value, turnover ratio, or log 
number of firms in the portfolio. Differences in account value, the extent of portfolio 
diversification, and turnover ratio do not appear to be driving the greater retail sensitivity to yearly 
returns. Retail and institutional shareholders appear to have deeper structural differences in their 
voting choices not captured by variation in these portfolio characteristics. 
As discussed in Section II.B, retail and institutional investors may have different incentives 
with respect to their voting choices. Although either type of shareholder may place weight on the 
social surplus generated by its investments, retail shareholders, investing for their own accounts, 
may place a greater relative weight on maximizing the returns of their portfolios than do 
institutional managers. Retail shareholders’ apparent greater concern for the maximization of 
financial returns is consistent with the evidence in Table 4, Panel C, in which we find that the 
share-weighted retail support for SRI proposals is lower than that of the aggregate shareholder 
base. Online Appendix Fig. D.B3 provides a more direct comparison of retail and institutional 
voting on SRI proposals. We again sort retail shareholders by account value, and, limiting to SRI 
proposals, regress support for the proposal on the intercept for each account value sort.  The 
analysis shows that it would be incorrect to interpret the retail shareholder lower support for SRI 
proposals as reflecting the preferences of a typical retail shareholder. Instead, we document 
substantial heterogeneity, with retail shareholders with small equity stakes providing stronger 
support for SRI proposals than institutions provide. It is the smaller number of larger retail 
shareholders with greater equity stakes that tend to oppose such proposals much more often than 
institutional shareholders, consistent with the notion that investors oppose SRI when it is their 
money at stake. 
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D. Support for management and exit 
We next ask whether an account’s voting decisions in a given year are associated with the 
decision to exit the following year—in particular, whether retail shareholders decide to exit from 
firms where they disagree with the existing management and board of directors. Such an exit would 
be consistent with the idea that retail shareholders actively monitor their portfolio investments. 
To set up the analysis we first remove firm-years in which the firm is not in the data the 
following year, leaving most firms in 2015 and 2016 and none in 2017. Then, for each account-
firm-year in which account 𝑎 owns firm 𝑐 in year 𝑡, we define the dependent variable 
𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 1 if account 𝑎 still owns firm 𝑐 in year 𝑡 + 1. In total, 69% of account-
firm-years own a firm in the following year conditional on the firm being in the data in the next 
year. As explanatory variables, we include whether or how the account voted at the firm’s meeting 
in year 𝑡. We include the account’s log stake value and the firm’s institutional ownership, both 
measured at time t, as explanatory variables. Because the decision to sell is made after the meeting, 
we also include a set of performance-related firm-level variables measured at time t+1. All 
specifications include year-month, industry, and account-year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. 
We present the regression results in Table 11, column (1), by assessing the relationship 
between turnout and retention of one’s stake. We find that an account is more likely to retain a 
security if it had participated in the voting process. The positive coefficient on Tobin’s q indicates 
that accounts are more likely to keep their strong performers. Accounts tend to hold on to the 
largest portfolio firms and are much more likely to retain firms comprising their largest stakes. 
We next ask whether voting choice (conditional on turnout) is associated with retention 
next year. We limit the analysis to account-firm-years that voted at time 𝑡. Aggregating across 
proposals, we measure an account’s percent voting with management, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑡, as the 
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account’s number of votes in line with management recommendations divided by its number of 
votes cast during the firm’s meeting in year t. 
Table 11, columns (2)–(4), presents the regression results. From column (2), we see that 
accounts are more likely to retain securities for which they vote along with management. However, 
since accounts are more likely to oppose management on shareholder proposals than on 
management proposals, just using the overall withMGMT might create a bias for firms with more 
management proposals. We therefore further break retail support down for management proposals, 
defining 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡
 as an account’s number of votes in line with management 
recommendations in a certain proposal category divided by its number of votes cast in that proposal 
category. We calculate this for management-sponsored proposals, shareholder-sponsored 
proposals, and certain subcategories of management-sponsored proposals: director proposals, say-
on-pay-proposals, and other management-sponsored proposals. 
In column (3), we separately estimate retention on support for management proposals and 
shareholder proposals. Within an account-year, the association between supporting management 
and retaining the stock is stronger with management proposals than with shareholder proposals; 
the F-stat and p-value for the difference are 11.6 and 0.001, respectively. In column (4), we further 
break management proposals into subcategories. Column (4) shows that it is not just any 
management proposals connected to exit—votes against directors are strongly predictive of exiting 
the firm. The difference between director proposals and other proposals are all highly significant 
(F-stats of 25.1, 16.9, and 31.0 as compared to shareholder proposals, say on pay proposals, and 
other management proposals, respectively). 
While retail shareholders are more likely to retain securities that they vote on, they express 
their dissatisfaction by voting against directors prior to exiting. They are also more likely to exit 
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when they disagree with management on shareholder proposals; that is, when there are shareholder 
proposals on the ballot that they support. These results are consistent with the evidence in Li, 
Maug, and Schwartz-Ziv (2019), who find that mutual funds are more likely to reduce their stake 
size if their votes are opposed to voting outcomes, and with the notion that retail shareholders 
endogenously select into firms based on agreement with management. The exit results in Table 11 
may reflect trading at the extensive margin whereas the results in Table 9, showing a significant 
correlation between ownership of the firm and support for management, may reflect selective 
trading at the intensive margin. More generally, the evidence in this section is in line with Levit, 
Malenko, and Maug (2020), and Levit, Malenko, and Maug (2021), in whose model trading and 
voting decisions are interconnected.33 
VIII. Conclusions 
In this paper we study U.S. retail shareholder voting using a detailed sample of anonymized 
voting records over the period 2015-2017. We show that retail ownership is sizable: on average, 
aggregate share ownership by retail investors is 35–40% in small firms and 16% in large firms. 
We study the retail turnout decision and find that retail shareholders participate more when a 
portfolio firm underperforms or for special meetings, which serve as proxies for potential benefits 
of winning—especially when they own a larger portion of the firm. Holding constant the portion 
of the firm they own, accounts turn out more for higher-value investments, again consistent with 
a relationship between benefits from winning and turnout. We show that restrictions on a 
shareholder’s access to her preferred voting method cause a large decrease in turnout. Furthermore, 
 
33 We have also looked at the effect of an “adverse voting result” on an account’s propensity to retain the following 
year—for example, if the shareholder voted against a proposal that passed, or vice versa. For retail shareholders, 
these type of voting results on management proposals are highly correlated with opposition to management 
proposals, and adverse voting results on shareholder proposals are highly correlated with support for shareholder 
proposals, that it leads to extremely high standard errors with little power to model account exits. 
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despite the lack of an obvious “civic duty” to vote in shareholder elections, we document non-zero 
turnout even for a shareholder with a very low stake in a firm and thus a negligible likelihood of 
being pivotal, consistent with consumption benefits from voting. This evidence is consistent with 
findings in the political science literature in which turnout in presidential elections is substantial 
and varies with costs and benefits even for voters whose likelihood of being pivotal is low. 
Conditional on the decision to turn out, we study how public information is incorporated 
into retail shareholder voting decisions. We find that retail shareholders punish the management 
of poorly performing firms. Retail shareholders are more supportive of incumbent management of 
firms in which they hold larger stakes, suggesting retail investors select into firms for which they 
approve of the management teams. This latter evidence is buttressed by our results on exit, in 
which we find that retail shareholders are more likely to exit after voting against incumbent 
management, especially in director elections. 
The conventional wisdom on retail shareholders is that, lacking a large stake, they have 
little incentive to monitor firms. To date, however, there has never been an opportunity to 
empirically test the conventional wisdom. Some predictions are borne out by our data—retail 
shareholder participation is quite low compared to non-retail shareholders, who generally have 
some legal obligation to vote on behalf of their clients. On the other hand, we find that retail 
shareholders appear most likely to vote when monitoring is most needed, and their votes are 
informed by firm circumstances. Ultimately, we conclude that in contrast to the common 
caricature of retail shareholder voting as arbitrary and inconsequential, these investors can and 
do provide meaningful feedback to firms through the voting process.






Figures and Tables 
Table 1. Retail investor characteristics 
This table reports information on retail investors covered in the retail dataset. Retail characteristics are generated as follows: first, for each firm 
meeting, we use each account’s holdings on the record date as a “snapshot” of that account’s yearly holdings in the firm. We keep only one meeting 
of each firm per year. Second, for each account, we aggregate the holdings in the portfolio at the account-year level. Number of firms in portfolio is 
defined as the number of firms in a given year for which the account holds shares on the firm’s record date. Account value is defined as the sum of 
an account’s individual firm stake values, where individual stake values are calculated as the product of the number of shares in the firm held by the 
account and the price of the stock at the end of the record date month, as provided by CRSP. Dividend yield is defined as the difference between the 
firm’s buy-and-hold return with dividends and without dividends. The account-year-level composite dividend yield is calculated as the account’s 
dividends received summed over the firms held by that account divided by the account’s total portfolio value. Market abnormal return for an account 
is calculated as the buy-and-hold abnormal return, using the CRSP value weighted index return as a benchmark, on the securities in the account, 
assuming the account held all securities for the past year. Firm purchase rate and sale rate are the portion of portfolio firms that have been added or 
removed in the past year, respectively. To evaluate characteristics of the home area of the accounts in the sample, we obtain adjusted gross income 
data at the zip code level from the IRS website. Zip code mean AGI refers to the mean adjusted gross income in the account’s zip code. Voting rate 
is defined as the number of ballots cast divided by number of voting opportunities. Panel A includes summary statistics by year. In panel B we first 
average each account value over its years in the data and then sort accounts into quintiles by account value. We then report the average of each of 
the characteristics described in panel A. 
Panel A: Retail investor characteristics by year 
 2015 2016 2017 
 Avg. Med. Stdev. Avg. Med. Stdev. Avg. Med. Stdev. 
Num. of firms in portfolio 4.01 2.00 6.94 4.16 2.00 7.18 4.23 2.00 7.71 
Account value 126,740 13,804 7,968,903 122,556 12,979 6,870,664 132,087 13,717 8,136,010 
Dividend yield 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Market abnormal return 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.28 0.02 -0.03 0.33 
Zip code mean AGI 102,502 76,596 87,867 105,404 79,198 89,372 104,148 79,925 83,580 
 
Panel B: Average retail investor characteristics by account value 
 Account value quintile 
 Smallest 2 3 4 Largest 
Num. of firms in portfolio 1.47 1.88 2.54 4.20 9.16 
Account value 588 4,077 13,131 39,814 649,064 
Dividend yield 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Market abnormal return -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Firm purchase rate 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.33 
Firm sale rate 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.33 





101,238 106,746 123,510 






Voting rate 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.15 
Table 2. Retail investor ownership characteristics 
This table reports information on ownership characteristics by retail shareholders. The sample is limited to proposals in the retail dataset that are 
matched with data from ISS Voting Analytics and CRSP. Panel A provides information on the number of investors and aggregate retail ownership 
for the full sample and across firm size quintiles. Panel B provides information on the distribution of individual retail shareholders’ equity stakes 
relative to the company’s shares outstanding. For each firm size quintile and for the full sample, we determine the average retail stake size, as well 
as the 25th, 50th, 75th percentiles. Firm size is calculated as the product of CRSP variables csho and prc, and quintiles are determined using the NYSE 
size breakpoints from Ken French’s website. “# Investors” refers to the number of retail investors in the sample, in thousands, who own shares in 
the firm. “Retail Ownership” is the percentage of outstanding shares of the firm held by domestic retail investors in the sample. 
Panel A: Number of accounts and aggregate ownership 
  2015  2016  2017 












Firm size quintile:  Avg. Median Avg. Median  Avg. Median Avg. Median  Avg. Median Avg. Median 
 Smallest  4 2 40 34  4 2 39 34  5 2 35 33 
 2  8 4 18 14  10 5 19 15  10 5 17 14 
 3  16 9 15 12  16 9 15 12  17 9 15 11 
 4  31 19 14 12  30 18 13 11  34 21 14 11 
 Largest  267 110 16 15  286 118 16 15  297 125 16 14 
Full Sample  35 5 28 20  38 5 27 19  39 5 25 20 
 
Panel B: Distribution of retail stake as a fraction of outstanding shares (in millionths) 
  2015  2016  2017 
Firm size quintile:  Avg. 25th Median 75th  Avg. 25th Median 75th  Avg. 25th Median 75th 
 Smallest  84.17 1.10 5.50 22.49  74.71 0.94 5.09 22.06  72.54 0.53 3.40 16.53 
 2  21.10 0.68 2.51 7.80  18.00 0.29 1.59 5.96  15.93 0.26 1.38 5.27 
 3  10.03 0.35 1.32 3.90  9.27 0.26 1.04 3.37  8.35 0.20 0.98 3.26 
 4  5.48 0.20 0.69 1.89  3.34 0.17 0.61 1.75  5.56 0.16 0.55 1.60 
 Largest  0.61 0.03 0.08 0.26  0.58 0.02 0.08 0.26  0.53 0.02 0.07 0.23 
Full Sample  6.27 0.03 0.13 0.58  5.42 0.03 0.13 0.54  6.11 0.03 0.12 0.52 
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Table 3. Retail voting by meeting 
This table reports voting results at the ballot level. % Cast is the proportion of ballots cast as a fraction of 
the number of shares outstanding. % Voting only with management refers to ballots that entirely match 
management recommendations. % at least one against management refers to ballots with at least one vote 
that deviates from management’s recommendation. The columns with header “Retail votes” are at the 
shareholder vote level while the columns with header “Retail account” are at the retail account level, where 
each account is weighted equally. 
  Retail votes Retail accounts 











% At least 
one against 
mgmt. 
All meetings  32 76 24 11 59 41 
        
Annual meeting  32 76 24 11 58 42 
Special meeting  38 79 21 15 74 26 






Table 4. Retail voting and meeting proposals 
This table reports information on retail voting limiting the sample to retail dataset proposals that are matched with data from ISS Voting Analytics 
and CRSP. Each entry represents the average of all firm votes in the category. “All votes” contains the overall voting results from ISS Voting 
Analytics, with corrections from SharkRepellent and CRSP, as described in Appendix C.A.3. “Retail Votes” contains domestic retail voting results. 
“Retail accounts” weighs domestic retail voting results at the account level. “Cast (%)” refers to the sum of the number of votes cast for and against 
divided by the number of potential votes as reported by ISS Voting Analytics. For and against votes exclude say-on-pay frequency votes and certain 
director votes for which the only retail voting data is on the number of votes cast. “For (%)” is the number of votes for divided by the number of 
votes cast. Panel A shows voting sorted by the identity of the sponsor, management or shareholder. Panel B shows voting by sponsor and firm size 
quintile. Panel C shows retail voting by proposal categories. Panel D shows voting sorted by sponsor and management and ISS recommendations. 
Panel A: Retail voting by proposal sponsor 
  All votes  Retail votes  Retail accounts 
  Cast (%) For (%)  Cast (%) For (%)  Cast (%) For (%) 
All  79 93  31 91  11 87 
Management  79 95  31 93  11 89 
Shareholder  75 30  28 18  11 29 
 
Panel B: Retail voting by firm size quintile 
  All votes  Retail votes  Retail accounts 
  Cast (%) For (%)  Cast (%) For (%)  Cast (%) For (%) 
Management sponsored:          
Size quintile:          
Smallest  73 93  36 90  12 84 
2  83 95  31 94  11 88 
3  83 96  29 94  11 89 
4  83 96  28 95  11 91 
Largest  78 97  27 95  11 92 
          
Shareholder sponsored:          
Size quintile:          
Smallest  70 45  43 39  12 46 
2  81 47  35 26  10 40 
3  82 38  29 22  12 33 
4  79 36  28 22  11 32 
Largest  74 27  27 15  11 26 






Panel C: Retail voting by proposal category 
  All votes  Retail votes  Retail accounts 
  Cast (%) For (%)  Cast (%) For (%)  Cast (%) For (%) 
Management:          
Elect director  78 97  29 95  11 93 
Financial statements/Auditor  87 99  32 97  11 95 
Governance - board and shareholder rights  77 94  33 92  12 88 
Governance - compensation  74 90  32 87  11 76 
Governance - other  77 91  40 90  14 84 
Major transactions - issuance, buyback, distribution, 
stock split, or conversion 
 72 89  32 83  11 74 
Major transactions - M&A  77 98  46 94  18 91 
Other  78 82  34 89  12 87 
          
Shareholder:          
Environmental  73 23  26 13  12 24 
Social  74 19  27 15  11 27 
Governance  77 38  29 21  11 31 
 
Panel D: Retail voting by management and ISS recommendations 
  All votes  Retail votes  Retail accounts 
  Cast (%) For (%)  Cast (%) For (%)  Cast (%) For (%) 
Management-sponsored:          
Management For & ISS For  79 97  30 94  11 89 
Management For & ISS Against  72 76  34 87  10 80 
          
Shareholder-sponsored:          
Management Against & ISS For  76 36  28 17  11 28 
Management Against & ISS Against  73 8  26 14  12 25 
  






Table 5. Impact of retail voting 
This table describes changes in voting outcomes under hypothetical changes in both the decision to vote, changes in retail ownership, and the voting 
preferences of certain groups of shareholders. Panel A provides the number of proposals whose outcome would change if a voting group’s 
participation were set to zero. The sample consists only of proposals for which the voting base is the number of votes cast rather than the number of 
outstanding shares. We exclude routine proposals including auditor ratification and meeting adjournments, as well as director elections. Each row 
in Panel A designates a voting group whose participation is set to zero in the hypothetical. Columns (3) (and (4) reflect the number of proposals 
flipped under the hypothetical, and columns (5), (6), and (7) provide the number of proposals whose final percentage counts move by five, ten, and 
twenty percent, respectively. Panel B provides the number of proposals whose outcome would change if ownership were shifted between retail and 
non-retail shareholders. We use the same sample as in Panel A and change retail ownership by 18.4% which is the standard deviation of retail 
ownership of all firms in the sample. Firms are sorted into quintiles of retail ownership and we ask how an increase (decrease) in ownership for firms 
in the bottom, second, and third (third, fourth, and largest size) quintile impacts vote outcomes. We report the consequences of these ownership 
changes separately for management and shareholder proposals. In Panel C we hold fixed observed shareholder participation and report the number 
of proposals whose voting outcome would change if a voting group’s preferences were altered. The two voting groups whose preferences we alter 
are those of retail shareholders, in the middle two columns, and the Big Three institutional investors, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, in the 
right two columns. Voting choices are altered to the voting choice of the group described in the row header. To ensure a consistent comparison 
across the two voting groups, the number of votes we alter for a proposal is limited to the minimum of the number of retail votes and the number of 
Big Three votes. The sample in Panel C consists of the proposals in Panel A whose final overall number of votes in favor was between 4/5 and 6/5 
of the number of votes required to pass. That is, for a standard proposal which would pass by a majority of cast ballots, Panel C limits to proposals 
that received 40% to 60% in favor. In all panels, columns (1) and (2) (“# passing proposals” and “# failing proposals”) refer to the actual number of 
passing and failing proposals in each of the panel’s samples. In Panel C, columns (3) and (4) reflect the number of proposals whose outcome is 
changed under the hypothetical that retail voters alter their voting preferences, and columns (5) and (6) reflect the number of proposals with changed 
outcomes under the hypothetical that the Big Three voters alter their voting preferences. In all panels, retail votes come from Broadridge and are 
limited to domestic retail shareholders, overall vote totals come from ISS’s Voting Analytics dataset, and mutual fund votes come from a merge of 
Form N-PX, CRSP Mutual Funds, and Thomson Reuters S12 as described in Appendix C.A1. In our counts of Big Three votes, we only include 
votes from N-PX for which we can match the fund to an ownership count for that firm from Form 13-F. 
Panel A: Consequences due to shocks to retail participation 
 Actual count Change if group participation goes to zero 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Group whose participation 







flipped to fail 
# failed 
proposals 
flipped to pass 
# of 5% 
movers 
# of 10% 
movers 
# of 20% 
movers 
Retail voters 11,545 1,392 122 39 1144 465 132 
Big Three 11,545 1,392 59 64 536 120 39 
All non-retail shareholders 11,545 1,392 404 165 7,881 5,032 2,105 






Panel B: Consequences due to shocks to ownership structure 
 Actual count Change due to shocks to retail ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Retail ownership quintile 
whose ownership is either 







flipped to fail 
# failed 
proposals 
flipped to pass 
# of 5% 
movers 
# of 10% 
movers 
# of 20% 
movers 
Management proposals: 
  Bottom quintile, + stdev. 2,297 27 0 3 20 4 0 
  Second quintile, + stdev. 2,236 55 1 10 31 2 0 
  Third quintile, + stdev. 2,141 35 0 9 55 6 0 
        
  Third quintile, - stdev. 2,141 35 12 0 36 2 0 
  Fourth quintile, - stdev. 2,185 32 20 0 77 9 1 
  Top quintile, - stdev. 2,476 30 21 1 247 30 0 
        
Shareholder proposals: 
  Bottom quintile, + stdev. 45 219 3 0 3 0 0 
  Second quintile, + stdev. 48 248 5 0 11 1 0 
  Third quintile, + stdev. 56 355 8 0 22 1 0 
        
  Third quintile, - stdev. 56 355 0 7 14 0 0 
  Fourth quintile, - stdev. 46 325 0 8 32 5 0 
  Top quintile, - stdev. 15 66 0 3 26 9 0 
 
  






Panel C: Consequences due to shocks to retail voting preferences 
 Actual count Retail voters alter vote Big Three voters alter vote 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






flipped to fail 
# failed 
proposals 
flipped to pass 
# passing 
proposals 
flipped to fail 
# failed 
proposals 
flipped to pass 
Management proposals: 
  Group voting decisions to adopt:  
    Retail voters 243 88 0 0 11 23 
    Big Three 243 88 32 4 0 0 
    All non-retail shareholders 243 88 35 0 24 8 
    All in favor 243 88 0 14 0 28 
    All opposed 243 88 84 0 64 0 
 
Shareholder proposals: 
  Group voting decisions to adopt:  
     Retail voters 62 166 0 0 11 4 
     Big Three 62 166 0 9 0 0 
     All non-retail shareholders 62 166 0 17 3 19 
     All in favor 62 166 0 43 0 53 
     All opposed 62 166 1 0 14 0 
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Table 6. Retail shareholder decision to cast a ballot 
This table provides regression results describing retail shareholder turnout decisions. The dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the account casts a ballot and 0 otherwise, multiplied by 100. 𝛼 is defined as the 
account’s number of shares held divided by the firm’s number of shares outstanding as of the record date 
month, from CRSP. Log market equity is the log of market equity, computed as price time shares 
outstanding from CRSP as of the record date month. Yearly abnormal return refers to the firm buy-and-
hold return for the period 13 months to 1 month prior to the record date minus the value weighted market 
return from CRSP. The dividend indicator is a binary variable equal to one if there is a positive difference 
in the firm’s return with dividends and without dividends (ret and retx from CRSP, respectively). Tobin’s 
q is book value plus market equity minus book equity, divided by book value. ROA, return on assets, is 
EBITDA divided by total assets. Special meeting is a binary variable equal to 1 for special meetings. 
Institutional ownership is equal to the number of shares owned by institutions divided by the shares 
outstanding, in the year prior to the meeting, both from Thomson Reuters. SRI on ballot is a binary variable 
equal to one if any proposals at the meeting are shareholder environmental or social proposals. Shareholder 
governance on ballot is a binary variable equal to one if any proposal at the meeting is a shareholder 
governance proposal. Log (Number of proposals on ballot) is the log of the number of proposals on the 
ballot. Log account value is the log of the total value of the account in the calendar year, defined as the sum 
across all firms held by the account of the product of share price and number of shares owned. 2016 county 
presidential turnout is the number of county residents who cast ballots in the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
obtained from CQ Voting and Elections, divided by the number of adult citizens from the Census Bureau. 
Log Zip code AGI is the average adjusted gross income in the prior calendar year in the account’s zip code. 
Fraction over 65 is the fraction of zip code residents above age 65, from the Census, defined as 
(𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010015 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010016 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010017 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010018 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010019)/
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001). Density is the population divided by land area in square meters (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001/
𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷). Fraction with bachelors and fraction with post-bachelors are zip-code level five-year 
averages from the U.S. Census as of 2017. Fraction in Finance/Insurance is equal to the number of employed 
workers in Finance/Insurance divided by all-industries employment, both at the zip code level, from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  In Panel A, columns 1–2 use meeting fixed effects, columns 3–4 use industry 
and account-year fixed effects, columns 5–6 use meeting and account-year fixed effects, and column 7 uses 
meeting, account-year, and account-firm fixed effects. In Panel B, columns 1–3 use no fixed effects, column 
4 uses industry and account-year fixed effects, and columns 5 and 6 use meeting fixed effects. In Panel B, 
columns 1–3, the reference category is accounts with ownership less than or equal to 10−9. In addition, 
column 2 is limited to meetings in which no proposal comes within 30 percentage points of a different 
outcome and column 3 is limited to accounts with account stake values of under $100. Industry fixed effects 
use Fama French industry categories. In Panel A and columns 4–6 of Panel B, all right-hand side variables 
are demeaned, so that the intercept reflects the turnout of an observation with average levels of each 
covariate. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of meetings for the account-year, so that 
each account-year is weighted equally. Standard errors clustered at the account and meeting level are in 
parentheses. Number of clusters refers to the number of distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Retail shareholder turnout decisions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log() 1.751*** 0.890 0.250*** 0.601*** 0.585*** 0.250 0.573*** 
 (0.055) (0.501) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026) (0.250) (0.106) 
Log(ME)    0.470***    
    (0.036)    
Yearly abnormal return    0.187    
    (0.221)    
Dividend indicator    0.139    
    (0.097)    
Tobin’s q    -0.119***    
    (0.032)    
ROA    -0.845**    
    (0.279)    
Special meeting    4.871***    
    (0.427)    
Institutional ownership    -1.047***    
    (0.162)    
Log() × Log(ME)  0.052*    0.021  
  (0.024)    (0.011)  
Log() × Tobin’s q  -0.204***    -0.031*  
  (0.027)    (0.013)  
Log() × ROA  0.384    -0.445***  
  (0.253)    (0.129)  
Log() × Special meet.  1.535***    1.681***  
  (0.251)    (0.220)  
Log() × Inst. owner.  -0.074    -0.209**  
  (0.203)    (0.067)  
Intercept 7.865*** 7.921*** 9.422*** 9.422*** 9.429*** 9.652*** 10.460*** 
 (0.020) (0.045) (0.063) (0.053) (0.001) (0.055) (0.011) 
Industry FE   Yes Yes    
Meeting FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Firm FE       Yes 
N 6,497,253 6,753,702 6,183,205 6,047,147 6,183,191 6,047,134 4,440,020 
Number of clusters 3,153 7,874 8,271 7,880 8,260 7,870 7,644 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.88 
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Panel B: Retail shareholder turnout decisions and consumption benefits of voting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












𝛼 > 10−6  2.448*** 3.134*** 1.157***    
 (0.205) (0.242) (0.332)    
𝛼 > 10−7  2.722*** 2.396*** 0.408    
 (0.126) (0.178) (0.250)    
𝛼 > 10−8  3.007*** 2.702*** 1.328*    
 (0.189) (0.419) (0.542)    
𝛼 > 10−9  0.745*** 0.469 -0.344    
 (0.205) (0.460) (0.535)    
SRI on ballot    0.133   
    (0.082)   
Shareholder governance 
on ballot 
   0.253**   
   (0.086)   
Log(Number of proposals 
on ballot) 
   -0.063   
   (0.103)   
Log()    0.587
*** 1.596*** 1.611*** 
    (0.024) (0.056) (0.055) 
Log(ME)    0.421***   
    (0.039)   
Institutional ownership    -1.237***   
   (0.157)   
Special meeting    4.874***   
    (0.417)   
Log account value     0.371*** 0.369*** 
     (0.009) (0.010) 
2016 county presidential 
turnout 
    1.611***  
    (0.332)  
Log zip code income      -1.184*** 
      (0.097) 
Fraction over 65      14.117*** 
      (0.537) 
Density      -0.000*** 
      (0.000) 
Fraction with bachelors      -0.430 
     (0.518) 
Fraction with post-
bachelors 
     -0.427 
     (0.801) 
Fraction in 
Finance/Insurance 
     20.872*** 
     (2.514) 
Intercept 2.677*** 2.297*** 2.397*** 9.351*** 7.992*** 8.569*** 
 (0.127) (0.179) (0.119) (0.034) (0.025) (0.054) 
Industry FE    Yes   
Meeting FE     Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE    Yes   
N 6,894,960 2,757,938 276,723 6,056,453 6,456,515 6,352,277 
Number of clusters 8,274 6,094 7,556 7,910 8,215 8,214 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.80 0.04 0.04 
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Table 7. Effect of information materials on turnout 
This table reports regression results describing how the availability of information materials shapes 
shareholder turnout decisions. The sample is limited to annual meetings held at firms that switch delivery 
methods a single time over the sample period 2015-2017 (along with 200 additional randomly selected 
firms that did not switch delivery methods). We further restrict the sample to firms and accounts that 
appeared in the data in 2015. The first column presents the estimation of the likelihood of receiving Hard 
Copy Materials (multiplied by 100) on the triple interaction of (i) whether the firm switches its information 
materials choice in the sample period (separated by the direction of the switch), (ii) whether the meeting in 
question is post-switch, and (iii) the proportion of firms in the account’s portfolio in 2015 for which the 
account chose Default information materials. The second column presents the estimation of the likelihood 
of casting a ballot (multiplied by 100) on the triple interaction terms. The third column presents the 
estimation of the likelihood of casting a ballot (multiplied by 100) on the receipt of Hard Copy Materials 
by scaling column 2 by column 1, following Duflo (2001). All regressions include account-firm, account-
year, and firm-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the account and meeting level are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Hard Copy  
Materials × 100 
Cast × 100 Cast × 100 
SwitchHCtoNc × Postct × Defaulta0 -91.657*** -2.554***  
 (0.807) (0.254)  
SwitchNtoHCc × Postct × Defaulta0 89.934*** 4.202***  
 (1.398) (0.849)  
Hard Copy Materialsact   3.248
*** 
   (0.317) 
Account-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,406,262 1,406,262 1,406,262 
Number of clusters 306 306 306 
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Table 8. Effect of available voting methods on turnout  
This table reports regression results documenting how the availability of voting methods impacts 
shareholder turnout decisions. The sample is limited to annual meetings held at firms that switch delivery 
methods a single time over the sample period 2015-2017 (along with 200 additional randomly selected 
firms that did not switch delivery methods). The sample is further limited to firms that selected Hard Copy 
delivery methods in 2015 and to accounts that appeared in the data in 2015. The left two columns are limited 
to accounts that voted in 2015, with voting in 2016 as the dependent variable, and excludes switching firms 
that did not switch in 2016. The right two columns are limited to accounts that voted in 2016, with voting 
in 2017 as the dependent variable, and excludes switching firms that did not switch in 2017. The first and 
third columns contain accounts that selected Default; the second and fourth columns contain accounts that 
did not select Default. The right-hand side variables include i) whether the firm switched delivery methods,  
ii) whether the account, when voting the previous year, voted by internet, and iii) their interaction. Standard 
errors clustered at the account and meeting level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 











Switching firm × Did not vote by internet -44.830*** 1.157 -46.582*** -1.839 
 (2.888) (2.259) (1.853) (2.634) 
Switching firm -0.873 1.169 0.725 0.850 
 (1.567) (1.612) (1.763) (1.696) 
Did not vote by internet -13.772*** 2.913 -15.373*** 3.159 
 (2.603) (1.750) (1.119) (2.160) 
Intercept 76.587*** 71.350*** 78.134*** 74.559*** 
 (1.267) (0.802) (1.172) (0.953) 
N 15,818 55,176 25,230 90,742 
Number of clusters 114 114 122 122 
R2 0.221 0.002 0.291 0.001 
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Table 9. Retail shareholder voting decisions 
This table reports evidence on account-level voting decisions with observations at the account-proposal 
level. The dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if the account voted in line with 
management’s recommendation, and zero if it voted against, multiplied by 100. The analysis is limited to 
account-proposals in which the account voted on the proposal and excludes routine proposals (auditor 
ratification and meeting adjournment). 𝛼 is defined as the account’s number of shares divided by the firm’s 
number of shares outstanding on the record date month, from CRSP. Log market equity is the log of market 
equity computed as price time shares outstanding from CRSP, as of the record date month. Yearly abnormal 
return refers to the firm buy-and-hold return for the period 13 months to 1 month prior to the record date 
minus the value weighted market return from CRSP. The dividend indicator is a binary variable equal to 
one if there is a positive difference in the firm’s return with dividends and without dividends (ret and retx 
from CRSP, respectively). Tobin’s q is book value plus market equity minus book equity, divided by book 
value. Return on assets, ROA, is EBITDA divided by total assets. Special meeting is a binary variable equal 
to one for special meetings. Institutional ownership is equal to the number of shares owned by institutions 
divided by the shares outstanding in the year prior to the meeting, both from Thomson Reuters. ISS against 
management is a binary variable that equals one if ISS has a recommendation other than “For” for a 
management proposal, or a “For” recommendation for a shareholder proposal. Log account value is the log 
of the total account value for that account in the calendar year defined as the sum across all firms held by 
the account of the product of share price and the number of shares owned. 2016 county presidential turnout 
is the number of county residents who cast ballots in the 2016 U.S. presidential election from CQ Voting 
and Elections, divided by the number of adult citizens from the Census Bureau. Log zip code AGI is the 
average adjusted gross income in the prior calendar year in the account’s zip code. Fraction over 65 is the 
fraction of zip code residents above the age 65, from the Census, defined as (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010015 +
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010016 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010017 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010018 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010019)/𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001. Density is the 
population divided by land area in square meters (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001/𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷). Fraction with bachelors 
and fraction with post-bachelors are zip-code level five-year averages from the U.S. Census as of 2017. 
Fraction in Finance/Insurance is equal to the number of employed workers in Finance/Insurance divided by 
all-industries employment, both at the zip code level, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Column 1 
includes proposal category, industry, and year-month fixed effects; column 2 includes proposal fixed 
effects; column 3 includes proposal category, industry, and account-year fixed effects; column 4 includes 
account-meeting and account-proposal category fixed effects; column 5 includes proposal and account-year 
fixed effects; and column 6 includes proposal, account-year, and account-firm fixed effects. Industry fixed 
effects use Fama French industry categories; proposal category fixed effects use the proposal categories set 
forth in Online Appendix C.A1. All right-hand side variables are demeaned, so that the intercept reflects 
the turnout of an account with average levels of each covariate. Observations are weighted by the inverse 
of the number of meetings for the account-year, so that each account-year is weighted equally. Standard 
errors clustered at the account and meeting level are in parentheses. Number of clusters refers to the number 
of distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log() 1.098*** 0.823*** 0.458***  0.238*** -0.350 
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.044)  (0.045) (0.285) 
Log(ME) 1.036***  0.605***    
 (0.116)  (0.063)    
Yearly abnormal return 4.404***  2.469***    
 (0.705)  (0.269)    
Dividend indicator 1.370*  0.107    
 (0.560)  (0.252)    
Tobin’s q 0.334  0.130    
 (0.191)  (0.091)    
ROA 7.027**  3.174**    
 (2.690)  (1.229)    
Special meeting -4.709***  -2.865***    
 (1.143)  (0.763)    
Institutional ownership -1.790  0.836    
 (1.058)  (0.489)    
ISS against management -2.725***  -2.429*** -1.483***   
 (0.483)  (0.373) (0.311)   
Log account value 0.020 0.061**     
 (0.023) (0.022)     
2016 county presidential turnout -1.436 -1.208     
 (1.118) (1.078)     
Log zip code income 1.934*** 1.884***     
 (0.300) (0.292)     
Fraction over 65 6.005*** 5.825***     
 (1.120) (1.101)     
Density -0.000*** -0.000***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Fraction with bachelors -3.491* -0.020     
 (1.553) (0.015)     
Fraction with post-bachelors -7.065** -0.092***     
 (2.563) (2.54)     
Fraction in Finance/Insurance 3.413 5.893     
 (7.613) (7.295)     
Intercept 85.495
*** 85.690*** 86.357*** 87.980*** 86.574*** 86.559*** 
 (0.187) (0.117) (0.046) (0.008) (0.008) (0.055) 
Proposal Category FE Yes  Yes    
Industry FE Yes  Yes    
Year-Month FE Yes      
Proposal FE  Yes   Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE   Yes    
Account-Meeting FE    Yes   
Account-Proposal Category FE    Yes   
Account-Year FE     Yes Yes 
Account-Firm FE      Yes 
N 7,388,040 7,488,217 7,771,765 7,701,840 7,880,494 7,856,887 
Number of clusters 7,239 6,794 7,591 5,056 7,460 6,772 
R2 0.09 0.15 0.58 0.81 0.60 0.65 
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Table 10. Comparison of retail and institutional investors’ decisions 
This table reports regression results on shareholder voting with votes aggregated to the proposal level. The 
dependent variable is the number of votes cast in line with management’s recommendation divided by the 
number of votes cast For or Against, multiplied by 100. Log market equity is the log of market equity 
computed as price time shares outstanding from CRSP, as of the record date month. Yearly abnormal return 
is the firm buy-and-hold return for the period 13 months to one month prior to the record date, minus the 
buy-and-hold value weighted market return from CRSP. The dividend indicator is a binary variable equal 
to one if there is a positive difference in the firm’s buy-and-hold return with dividends and without 
dividends (ret and retx from CRSP, respectively). Tobin’s q is book value plus market equity minus book 
equity, divided by book value. Return on assets, ROA, is EBITDA divided by total assets. Special meeting 
is a binary variable equal to one for special meetings. Institutional ownership is equal to the number of 
shares owned by institutions divided by the shares outstanding in the year prior to the meeting, both from 
Thomson Reuters. ISS against management is a binary variable that equals 1 if ISS has a recommendation 
other than For for a management proposal, or a For recommendation for a shareholder proposal. Columns 
1 through 3 include institutional voting results and columns 4 through 6 contain retail shareholder voting 
results. All columns except 3 and 6 include industry fixed effects and columns 3 and 6 include firm fixed 
effects. Industry fixed effects use Fama French industry categories; time fixed effects are at the year-month 
level; proposal category fixed effects use the proposal categories set forth in Online Appendix C.A1. All 
right hand side variables are demeaned over all observations in the sample, so the intercept reflects the 
average vote for an observation with mean values of those covariates. Observations are weighted so that 
each meeting is weighted equally. Standard errors clustered at the meeting level are in parentheses. Number 
of clusters refers to the number of distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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Vote with management (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(ME) 0.824*** 0.751***  0.527*** 0.527***  
 (0.148) (0.100)  (0.086) (0.086)  
Yearly abnormal return 0.109 -1.105* -0.413 4.369*** 4.396*** 2.853*** 
 (0.764) (0.503) (0.439) (0.424) (0.423) (0.329) 
Dividend indicator 2.096*** -0.396 -3.555** -0.326 -0.437 1.708* 
 (0.496) (0.316) (1.085) (0.284) (0.283) (0.788) 
Tobin’s q 0.282 0.387** 0.609 0.332*** 0.331*** 0.491* 
 (0.181) (0.119) (0.321) (0.098) (0.098) (0.203) 
Return on assets 7.477*** 1.729 -1.382 3.842*** 3.734*** 1.442 
 (1.799) (1.155) (2.148) (0.876) (0.883) (1.312) 
Special meeting -7.769*** -3.603*** -3.032** -1.118 -1.000 -0.234 
 (1.482) (0.904) (1.025) (0.739) (0.742) (0.656) 
Institutional ownership 6.760*** 4.074*** 3.562 2.743*** 2.703*** -0.519 
 (1.037) (0.679) (2.200) (0.581) (0.583) (1.746) 
ISS against management  -50.721*** -46.684***  -1.781*** -1.802*** 
  (0.787) (0.709)  (0.428) (0.330) 
Intercept 88.335*** 88.449*** 88.780*** 89.334*** 89.305*** 89.570*** 
 (0.230) (0.149) (0.148) (0.127) (0.127) (0.106) 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes No 
Proposal Category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE   Yes   Yes 
N 33,116 32,998 32,674 33,392 33,263 32,942 
Number of clusters 7,781 7,771 7,447 7,884 7,873 7,552 
R2 0.14 0.62 0.77 0.17 0.17 0.65 
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Table 11. Retail shareholder voting decisions and exit 
This table describes the relationship between changes in ownership between years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 and firm and 
account characteristics. The data is limited to accounts who, at year 𝑡, hold firms that appear in the data in 
year 𝑡 + 1. The dependent variable, still own next year, is equal to 1 if the account holds the firm in 𝑡 + 1. 
Cast ballot is an indicator variable equal one if the account cast a ballot in 𝑡. 𝛼 is defined as the account’s 
number of shares divided by the firm’s number of shares outstanding as of the record date month, from 
CRSP. Log market equity is the log of market equity computed as price time shares outstanding from CRSP, 
as of the record date month. Yearly abnormal return refers to the firm’s buy-and-hold return for the period 
13 months to 1 month prior to the record date minus the value weighted market return from CRSP. The 
dividend indicator is a binary variable equal to one if there is a positive difference in the firm’s return with 
dividends and without dividends (ret and retx from CRSP, respectively). Tobin’s q is book value plus 
market equity minus book equity, divided by book value. ROA, return on assets, is EBITDA divided by 
total assets. Institutional ownership is equal to the number of shares owned by institutions divided by the 
shares outstanding in the year prior to the meeting, both from Thomson Reuters. Yearly abnormal return, 
the dividend indicator, return on assets, and Tobin’s q are as of year 𝑡 + 1. In columns (2)–(4), we start 
from a random sample of accounts and limit to account-meetings in which the account cast a ballot. 
WithMGMT is the fraction of proposals at year 𝑡 on which the account voted in line with management. We 
also include WithMGMT for the following subcategories of proposals: (i) management-sponsored 
proposals; (ii) shareholder-sponsored proposals, and certain subcategories of management-sponsored 
proposals; (iii) director proposals; (iv) say-on-pay-proposals; and (v) other management-sponsored 
proposals. All columns include year-month, industry, and account-year fixed effects. Industry fixed effects 
use Fama French industry categories. Proposal category fixed effects use the proposal categories in Online 
Appendix C.A1. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of meetings for the account-year, 
so that each account-year is weighted equally. Standard errors clustered at the account and meeting level 
are in parentheses. Number of clusters refers to the number of distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
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 Unconditional Conditional on turnout 
Still own next year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cast ballott 1.112
***    
 (0.153)    
WithMGMT{on all proposals}  1.511***   
  (0.205)   
WithMGMT{on management proposals}   1.466
***  
           (0.282)  
WithMGMT{on shareholder proposals}    0.451
*** 0.473* 
           (0.108) (0.233) 
WithMGMT{on director proposals}    3.306*** 
            (0.535) 
WithMGMT{on say-on-pay proposals}    0.716** 
            (0.264) 
WithMGMT{on other management proposals}    0.006 
            (0.279) 
Log(𝛼𝑡) 0.826
*** 1.388
*** 1.493*** 1.557*** 
 (0.063) (0.066) (0.072) (0.120) 
Log(MEt) 1.662
*** 2.165
*** 2.657*** 3.024*** 
 (0.122) (0.105) (0.212) (0.496) 
Institutional ownershipt -4.558
*** 1.222 3.608* 3.648* 
 (0.874) (0.661) (1.395) (1.548) 
Yearly abnormal returnt+1 -0.113 0.744 -0.969 1.091 
 (0.555) (0.490) (0.879) (1.125) 
Dividend indicatort+1 -0.174 0.661
*** 0.404* 1.076** 
 (0.582) (0.121) (0.198) (0.366) 
Tobin’s qt+1 0.799
*** 0.192 1.065 -10.371
* 
 (0.150) (0.807) (2.121) (4.778) 
ROAt+1 -0.206 -4.114
*** -3.392* -1.135 
 (0.788) (0.735) (1.413) (3.429) 
Intercept 69.848*** 41.001*** 32.002*** 17.895 
 (0.105) (1.817) (5.455) (13.896) 
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,350,339 3,894,466 2,319,325 564,108 
Number of clusters 2,415 2,412 336 125 
R2 0.7651 0.7667 0.7967 0.8146 
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Figure 1. Ownership characteristics by account value and firm size 
This figure graphs retail investor ownership characteristics by account value and firm size. For each firm 
meeting we use each account’s holdings on the record date as a “snapshot” of that account’s holdings in the 
firm. We keep only one meeting of each firm per year. Then, for each account, we aggregate the holdings 
in the portfolio at the account-year level. Account value is the sum of an account’s individual firm stake 
values, where the stake value is the number of shares owned by the account multiplied by the record date 
month share price. Panel A shows, for each account value quintile, the median number of firms in the 
portfolio (left axis) and the average account voting rate (right axis), defined as the number of ballots cast 
divided by number of voting opportunities. Panel B shows, for each firm size quintile, the median retail 
ownership (left axis), defined as the percentage of outstanding shares of the firm held by domestic retail 
investors in the sample, as well as the median number of retail accounts, in thousands, who own shares in 
the firm (right axis). Firm size is calculated as the product of CRSP variables csho and prc, and quintiles 
are determined using the NYSE size breakpoints from Ken French’s website.  
Panel A: Number of firms in the portfolio and voting rate by account value quintile 
 
 
Panel B: Retail ownership and number of accounts by firm size quintile 
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Figure 2. Relation between voter participation and ownership 
This figure graphs the relationship between retail voter turnout and ownership of the firm. We plot a binned 
scatterplot of turnout on stake size, 𝛼, defined as the account’s number of shares held divided by the firm’s 
number of shares outstanding on the record date month, from CRSP. Each dot represents the average turnout 
for accounts whose ownership fraction of the firm falls within the increment of 𝛼. Each of the four colored 
scatterplots provides a different range for share ownership, α. The first describes how turnout varies with 
share ownership in the range of [0 10-4] with increments of 10-6; the second, in the range of [0 10-3] with 
increments of 10-5; the third in the range of [0 10-2] with increments of 10-4; and the fourth in the range of 
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Figure 3. Firm and account choice of information materials and turnout 
The top two subplots show the relationship between the materials an account receives, the account delivery 
method selection, and firm switches in delivery method selection. The y-axis is the percentage of accounts 
that received Hard Copy materials. The bottom two subplots show the relationship between account turnout, 
account delivery method selection, and firm switches in delivery method selection. The y-axis is the fraction 
of accounts that voted, divided by the fraction of accounts that voted in year -1, so all lines are normalized 
to 1 at year -1. In both panels, the x-axis reflects the year of the meeting minus the year of the firm switch, 
with year 0 reflecting the year the firm switched. The sample is limited to annual meetings and firms that 
switch delivery methods a single time over the sample period 2015-2017, as well as to firms and accounts 
that appeared in the data in 2015. Red lines reflect accounts that selected Hard Copy in their first year in 
the data; the green lines reflect accounts that selected Default in their first year in the data; the blue lines 
reflect accounts that selected E-Delivery in their first year in the data. Subplots on the left contain firms 
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Figure 4. Account voting method, delivery method selection, and turnout by 
Default and non-Default accounts 
This figure shows the relationship between account turnout, account voting methods, account delivery 
method selection, and firm switches in delivery method selection. The sample is limited to annual meetings 
held at firms that switch delivery methods a single time, in 2017 (along with 200 additional randomly 
selected firms that did not switch delivery methods). The sample is further limited to firms that selected 
Hard Copy delivery methods in 2015 and to accounts that voted in 2015. The x-axis reflects the meeting 
year. The y-axis is the percentage of accounts that turned out and voted. Red lines reflect firms that did not 
switch delivery methods, and blue lines reflect firms that switched delivery methods in 2017. The subplots 
in the top row provide information on voting only by Default accounts. The subplots in the bottom row 
provide information on non-Default accounts. On the left we report turnout by Default accounts that voted 
by methods other than internet in 2015 whereas on the right we show turnout by Default accounts that voted 





Figure 5. Sensitivity of voting to ISS recommendations 
This figure graphs the sensitivity of voting choice to ISS recommendations by owner type. We estimate the 
following specification for retail accounts: 






+𝛽3𝑍𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝜓𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑝 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑 +𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡  
where 𝑎 indexes accounts, 𝑝 indexes proposals, 𝑚 indexes meetings, 𝑐 indexes firms, and 𝑡 indexes years. 
𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑗 is a binary variable equal one if an account value (or turnover ratio, or log number of firms in portfolio) 
falls within the 𝑗’th bin. Account value bins correspond to six segments of the log 10 scale ([104 105), [105 
106), [106 107), [107 108), [108 109), [109 1010)). Turnover bins are [0 0.2), [0.2 0.4), [0.4 0.6), [0.6 0.8), [0.8 
), where the final bin includes the small group of investors with reported turnover ratios greater than 1, 
and log number of firm bins correspond to seven equally spaced segments ([1 2), [2 3), [3 4), [4 5), [5, 6), 
[6, 7), [7,8)). The dependent variable, 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 , is a binary variable that equals one if the account 
votes in line with management’s recommendation and zero if it votes against, multiplied by 100. 𝑋𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 is 
a vector of covariates including yearly abnormal return, Tobin’s q, return on assets, and whether ISS’s 
recommendation was in opposition to management’s recommendation. 𝑍𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 is a vector of additional 
covariates, including log market equity, a dividend indicator, institutional ownership, and special meeting. 
For additional information on the covariates included in 𝑋𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 and 𝑍𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 see Table 9.  𝜓𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑝, 𝐼𝑛𝑑, 
and 𝜙𝑎𝑡 are proposal category, industry, and account-year fixed effects, respectively. 𝛽1𝑗 and 𝛽3 are each 
vectors of coefficients. We report the retail investor sensitivity to ISS recommendations across account bins 
in Panel A, turnover ratio bins in Panel B, and portfolio breadth bins in Panel C. We repeat the estimation 
as described above for institutional investors. This yields sensitivities to ISS recommendations for both 
types of investors across account, turnover ratio, and breadth bins which we report in the figures below. For 
retail, account value is the total account value for that account in the calendar year, defined as the sum 
across all firms held by the account of the product of share price and number of shares owned. For funds, 
account value is calculated as its portfolio value. For retail, we calculate turnover ratio using CRSP’s 
definition, and take the minimum of purchases and sales divided by account value over the course of the 
year. For funds, turnover ratio comes from CRSP. For retail shareholders, log account number of firms in 
the portfolio is the log of the number of firms held by the account in the retail dataset in a calendar year; 
for funds, it is the log of the fund’s number of N-PX securities in a calendar year. The analysis is limited to 
account-proposals in which the account voted on the proposal and excludes routine proposals (auditor 
ratification and meeting adjournment). For both retail and institutions, we only include bins where there are 
a sufficient number of distinct voters. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of meetings 
for the account-year or fund-year, so that each account-year and fund-year is weighted equally. 95% 
confidence intervals are clustered at the account and meeting level. 
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Panel A: Account value bins 
 
Panel B: Turnover ratio bins 
 






Chapter 3: The Effects of a Selective Tax on Contract Design and 
Tax Timing 
I. Introduction 
High earner tax avoidance is not a solo activity. I show that CEOs and firms use tailored 
contracts to minimize joint tax liability—capping CEO severance pay just below a tax notch—
and that this choice of contract impacts the CEO’s subsequent choice to take notch-shifting 
actions. 
My results, which find a response to differential taxation in the composition of 
compensation, speak to Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2011), who evaluate the extent to which 
tax avoidance explains the rise of executive income over the past half century. Whereas the 
public finance total income elasticity literature focuses on the behavioral response of the worker, 
I find that together, the firm and CEO respond to the tax by adjusting state-contingent 
compensation rates via written contract. 
A firm compensation response is intuitive, since a firm sets executive compensation as 
the solution to its principal-agent moral hazard problem, and is thus motivated to alter the 
composition of compensation in response to changes in tax rates that differentially affect certain 
forms of income. The worker responds as well, shifting timing of taxable income, driven not just 
by the tax itself but also by the compensation contract as affected by the tax. 
My setting is the CEO golden parachute, a severance payment received only if the CEO’s firm is 
acquired. Golden parachute taxes jump discretely at a tax threshold that is tied to the CEO’s 
previous taxable income. I show that tax minimization in this setting is achieved both by firm 
response—altering the severance and non-severance pay—and by worker response—shifting 
money between taxable and non-taxable income. 
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First, I develop a general model in which workers’ contingent bonuses have a higher 
marginal tax rate than their base pay does, potentially via simple progressivity of the tax code, 
and show that firms shift between income types in response. Applying the model to the specific 
case of CEO golden parachutes with a (potentially endogeneous) tax notch, I predict that (i) a 
mass of firms and CEOs will choose to cap golden parachutes at the tax threshold, creating 
bunching at the notch; and (ii) CEOs whose parachutes are capped at the threshold will take 
costly actions for the purpose of increasing their threshold. 
Then, I test my model using a novel hand-coded dataset of golden parachute contracts 
merged with corporate acquisitions and CEO option exercises. I show that one third of golden 
parachute contracts contain language explicitly designed to cap CEO pay at the tax threshold, 
implying bunching at the notch. I also establish that CEOs exercise stock options in order to 
boost their taxable income and thereby boost their tax threshold. For identification, I exploit a 
time discontinuity in the incentives to exercise. Figure 1(a) shows the large spike in CEO option 
exercises in the December prior to the acquisition of her firm, the month she would be 
incentivized to do so by the tax. 
Finally, I show that these option exercises are concentrated in CEOs whose severances 
are contractually capped at the threshold, as the model predicts, confirming that at least some of 
the contractual severance caps are binding and providing additional evidence that the option 
exercises are caused by the tax. By studying contract terms and testing predictions about option 
exercises that would only be true if the contract severance caps were binding, I can empirically 
demonstrate a causal impact of the tax law on CEO severances despite lacking any variation over 




A golden parachute is a payment made to the CEO upon the acquisition of her firm. 
In 1984, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress passed IRC §§ 4999 and 280G, 
imposing a large statutory tax penalty on golden parachutes that exceed three times the CEO’s 
base amount, defined as her average taxable income over the five calendar years prior to the year 
of deal closing. The tax is to both CEO and firm: the CEO must pay 20% of the excess golden 
parachute package, and the excess golden parachute package becomes non-deductible to the 
firm, where the excess package is defined as the golden parachute minus the CEO’s base 
amount. Thus, to go from one dollar below the threshold to one dollar above the threshold is 
highly costly for both CEO and firm. 
Stock options traditionally constitute a substantial part of CEO pay packages. Most CEO 
stock options are untaxed until exercise, at which point the CEO is taxed on the difference 
between the current stock price and exercise price.34 CEOs may time option exercises to delay 
taxation, trading off with other factors such as diversification and market timing. 
Related Literature 
My finding that the state-contingent compensation schedule responds to taxation marries 
the optimal contracting literature with that on tax responsiveness. Prior evidence of a response to 
state-contingent taxation is mixed at best. Rose and Wolfram (2002) find no evidence of a 
change in executive pay-performance sensitivity from the 1993 imposition of a tax penalty on 
CEO base salaries above $1 million that excluded performance pay from the $1 million cap, 
leading them to conclude that “corporate pay decisions have been relatively insulated” from the 
tax intervention.35 Hall and Liebman (2000) find that increases in marginal tax rates (which may 
 
34 “Incentive” stock options have a different tax treatment, but nearly all CEO stock options are “non-qualified”, 
which have the tax treatment described herein. 
35 Perry and Zenner (2001) and Hall and Liebman (2000), on the other hand, do find a substitution of performance 
pay for base salary as a consequence of this tax, though Rose and Wolfram (2002) point out a bias in their 
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slightly advantage equity-based performance pay relative to cash-based compensation) may have 
a modest effect on the composition of executive compensation, but Goolsbee (2000) finds that 
“almost all of the responsiveness” in taxable income to marginal tax rates comes from the worker 
shifting taxable income timing, with little change in base compensation or performance pay. 
My finding that CEOs exercise options to alter the timing of taxable income is consistent with 
the new tax responsiveness literature, which focuses on responsiveness to tax of total taxable 
income. Goolsbee (2000) finds that executives exercise stock options to accelerate taxable 
income prior to an increase in marginal tax rates. More generally, this literature finds that, 
although short run labor elasticity measurements tend to be low, total taxable income tends to be 
quite responsive to tax (see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) for a survey). 
This paper also contributes to the empirical literature on option exercise behavior, and, in 
particular, why CEOs tend to exercise options well prior to expiration. Fos and Jiang (2016) 
survey the extant literature as laying forth, as motivations for exercise, (i) diversification, (ii) 
overconfidence, or (iii) inside information. Fos and Jiang (2016) themselves proffer a fourth 
motive for exercise, increasing CEO control in a proxy battle. This paper follows Goolsbee 
(2000) in demonstrating a fifth motive: controlling the timing of one’s taxes. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the conceptual framework, Section 
3 presents my option exercise results, Section 4 presents my CEO contract results, Section 5 adds 
additional discussion, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
difference-in-difference strategies. A number of other papers have been written about this particular tax (see Murphy 
(2013) for additional discussion). Since section 162(m) created a notch at the round number of 1 million dollars, the 
substantial bunching in base salary at that threshold cannot necessarily be attributed to the increase in tax; the 
threshold in golden parachute taxation, on the other hand, is based on executive taxable income, which does not fall 




In this section I present a model of selectively taxed executive compensation in a simple 
principal-agent framework, which generates shifting between compensation types by the firm 
and costly income-shifting by the agent. Then, to apply the framework to golden parachute 
severances, I have the tax take effect discontinuously at a threshold, and show that: (i) if the 
wedge between the optimal severance and the tax threshold is low relative to the size of the tax 
increase, the firm will set severance at the threshold, creating bunching at the notch, and (ii) if 
threshold-increasing option exercises are available, those CEOs who exercise are the ones whose 
severances equal their tax threshold. 
General Case: Differential Income Taxation 
I model state-contingent bonuses with a two-period principal-agent framework. The agent 
worker’s job is to expend effort to achieve a value-increasing outcome for the firm, which I 
typify as the CEO facilitating a sale of her firm to earn a severance bonus. 





• The firm has value 𝑣 ∈ [0,1) if unsold but would sell for 𝑉 > 𝑣,𝑉 ∈ (0,1]. 
• The firm pays the CEO severance 𝑠 in the event of a sale and in any event pays salary 𝑦. 
The CEO’s outside option provides utility ?̅?. 
• All income faces a proportional tax, 𝑇, and large income faces an additional proportional 
tax, 𝜏, such that the marginal dollar of base income 𝑦 is taxed at 𝑇 and the marginal dollar 
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of severance income 𝑠 is taxed at 𝑇 + 𝜏. This setup includes progressive marginal tax 
codes or taxes on specific income types.36 
 
In period 1, the firm chooses severance 𝑠 and salary 𝑦. In period 2, the CEO chooses effort 𝑒. 
Define ?̃? as the CEO’s post-tax take-home severance if she successfully sells the firm. Since the 
probability of sale is 𝑒, the CEO in period 2 (given 𝑠 and 𝑦) chooses 𝑒 ∈ [0,1] to maximize 
expected utility: 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑒, 𝑦; 𝑠)] = 𝑒 ∗ ?̃? + (1 − 𝑇)𝑦 −
1
2
𝑒2    (1) 
It follows that the CEO will choose:37 
𝑒∗ = ?̃?       (1𝑏) 
The risk-neutral firm chooses 𝑠 and 𝑦 to maximize expected profits 
𝐸[Π(𝑠, 𝑦)] = 𝑒 ∗ (𝑉 − 𝑠) + (1 − 𝑒) ∗ 𝑣 − 𝑦    (2) 
subject to 
𝑒 ∗ ?̃? + (1 − 𝑇)𝑦 −
1
2
𝑒2 ≥ ?̅?    (2𝑏) 
Defining ?̃? as the average tax rate on the severance, the firm’s choice of severance is: 
𝑠 =
(1 − 𝑇 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝑇)
(1 − 𝑇 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝑇) + (1 − ?̃?)𝜏
(𝑉 − 𝑣) 
The firm’s choice of severance is below 𝑉 − 𝑣, which would be its choice of severance if 
the tax rate were flat, i.e. if 𝜏 = 0. By contrast, the firm’s choice of base income 𝑦, calculated via 
Equation 2(b), is strictly increasing in 𝜏. This framework illustrates a simple proposition: 
 
36 To maximize generality, I momentarily leave unspecified the precise details of the tax, beyond the restrictions that 
𝜏 takes effect above the maximum possible base salary and below the minimum possible salary plus severance. 
37 For ease of exposition, I omit corner solutions in which 𝑒∗ = 0 or 𝑒∗ = 1. 
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differential tax rates induce the firm to shift from dispreferred income types to preferred income 
types. In the case of a progressive tax code, the firm shifts compensation from performance 
bonus to base salary to reduce the portion of income subject to the higher marginal rate. 
Exogeneous Tax Notch 
Unlike most workers, CEOs are not likely to face higher marginal tax rates for bonuses 
from the progressivity of the tax code, but they may face tax code provisions that differentially 
treat different types of income. I now adapt the previous illustration to the tax treatment of 
golden parachute contracts. Specifically, there is a direct tax on severances, 𝜏1{𝑠>𝑘0}, that kicks 
in discontinuously at a threshold 𝑘0. If the pre-tax severance 𝑠 is larger than the threshold 𝑘0 ∈
[0,1], then the CEO only keeps (1 − 𝑇 − 𝜏)𝑠. 
 The CEO’s post-tax severance payment may now be written as  ?̃? ≡ (1 − 𝑇 − 𝜏) ∗
𝑠1{𝑠 > 𝑘0}. The agent’s problem and solution and the firm’s problem remain as before and are 
given by Equations (1), (1b), (2) and (2b). 
The firm’s no-severance-tax optimal severance is 𝑉 − 𝑣. Faced with 𝜏 > 0 and a threshold 𝑘0 
below its optimal choice of severance 𝑉 − 𝑣,38 the firm can choose to either (i) trigger the 
severance tax, in which case it would optimally choose 𝑠∗ ≡
1−𝑇
1−𝑇+𝜏
(𝑉 − 𝑣), or (ii) set severance 
low enough to avoid the severance tax, in which case it would choose 𝑠 = 𝑘0, the highest 
possible severance without triggering the tax. 
The firm will constrain its severance to the threshold 𝑘0 iff 𝐸[Π(𝑠 = 𝑘0)] ≥ 𝐸[Π (𝑠 =
1−𝑇
1−𝑇+𝜏
(𝑉 − 𝑣))], which is equivalent to: 
 
38 For 𝑘0 ≥ 𝑉 − 𝑣, the firm will choose optimal 𝑠 = 𝑉 − 𝑣 and the tax will have no effect. I focus on the more 








1 − 𝑇 + 𝜏
≡ ?̅?𝜏       (3) 
The left hand side of Condition (3) is the tax wedge, the extent by which the no-
severance-tax optimal severance 𝑉 − 𝑣 exceeds the threshold 𝑘0. The right hand side is a 
concave increasing function of the severance tax 𝜏.39 
Condition (3) provides a simple condition on the tax wedge and severance tax to 
determine whether the firm will set severance at the unconstrained optimum or at the threshold.40 
All firms with tax wedge 𝑊 ∈ [0, ?̅?𝜏] will set their severance 𝑠 to the threshold 𝑘0 to avoid the 
tax, whereas firms with 𝑊 > ?̅?𝜏 will choose to pay 𝑠 > 𝑘0 and incur the tax.
41 
If tax wedge 𝑊 is smoothly distributed across firms, then we should thus see a sharp 
discontinuity at 𝑘 in a histogram of severance 𝑠. The solid line in Figure 2 (labeled “infinite cost 
of option exercise” because option exercises are infeasible at this stage in the model) shows the 
progression of severance across levels of deal premium 𝑉 − 𝑣, which can be interpreted as the 
degree to which the firm would desire a large golden parachute in a tax-free world. 
 
39 The CEO’s cost of effort function, 
1
2
𝑒2, assumes for tractability a net-of-tax labor elasticity of 1. If I generalize to 
cost of effort function 
1
1+1/𝜂
𝑒1+1/𝜂, where  is the net-of-tax labor elasticity, then the maximum tax wedge at which 
the firm cuts back to the tax notch is still a concave increasing function of the severance tax 𝜏, where the function 
becomes infinitely concave as → 0 and becomes linear as → ∞. The intuition is that firms are less willing to cut 
back the severance of CEOs who are more responsive to incentive pay. 
40 Because the CEO always receives the utility equivalent of her outside option, the firm’s problem is tantamount to 
maximizing the total utility of firm and CEO. Another standard form of the executive principal agent problem is a 
limited liability model, in which the compensation is bound below not by the CEO’s outside option but by a zero 
lower bound on base salary and severance. In this framework, the firm does not maximize total utility, but rather sets 
severance lower than the mutually optimal level because it does not need to compensate the CEO, only to 
incentivize her. The firm’s no-tax optimum severance is 𝑠 =
1
2
(𝑉 − 𝑣), and severance is cut back to the threshold if 
the tax wedge 𝑊 is lower than √
𝜏
1−𝑇
, which is less than √2
𝜏
1−𝑇+𝜏
, the threshold from my main model. In other 
words, if it has no compensating salary requirement, the firm more aggressively cuts back severance to the threshold 
than is mutually optimal for the firm and CEO. 
41 For convenience, I do not tie the tax threshold 𝑘0 to base salary 𝑦. Doing so would not fundamentally change the 
analysis, but would create more cases. In particular, in addition to the two current cases—severance set at the 
threshold with a binding participation constraint, and severance set above the threshold with a binding participation 
constraint—there would be a third case, in which severance is set at the threshold and the participation constraint is 
non-binding (because the firm would increase 𝑦 to elevate the threshold). 
 
 154 
Endogeneously Determined Tax Notch 
In this section, I allow for an endogeneous tax notch. As above, I impose a tax 𝜏 on 
severances weakly greater than threshold 𝑘1, but the CEO now has the ability to increase the 
threshold through costly income shifting: 𝑘1 = 𝑘0 + 𝑥, where 𝑘0 is reinterpreted as the “natural” 
threshold that would occur if the CEO does not shift income. Shifting 𝑥 in income costs the CEO 
𝜓(𝑥), with 𝜓(0) = 0, 𝜓′(𝑥) > 0, 𝜓″(𝑥) > 0. In the case of a progressive tax code, income 
shifting could entail smoothing income over time; in the scenario at hand, it consists of 
exercising options that generate taxable income of 𝑥.42 
The sequence of events is as follows: in period 1, the firm chooses severance 𝑠 and salary 
𝑦. In period 2, the CEO chooses effort 𝑒 and option exercise 𝑥. 
I now write the CEO’s utility given the firm’s choice of severance 𝑠 and salary 𝑦 as: 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑒, 𝑥; 𝑠, 𝑦)] = 𝑒 ∗ ?̃? + 𝑦 −
1
2
𝑒2 − 𝜓(𝑥)    (1′) 
The CEO simultaneously chooses effort 𝑒 and option exercises 𝑥. As before, the CEO 
will choose effort 𝑒 = ?̃? ≡ (1 − 𝑇 − 𝜏1{𝑠>𝑘1})𝑠. For options, the CEO will choose either not to 
exercise or will exercise just enough to avoid the severance tax, since any other amount of 
exercise is strictly dominated. 
Given severance 𝑠, the CEO chooses to exercise options if and only if the benefit of 
avoiding the severance tax (left-hand side) exceeds the option cost (right-hand side): 
1
2
𝑠2((1 − 𝑇)2 − (1 − 𝑇 − 𝜏)2) > 𝜓(𝑠 − 𝑘0)   (4) 
 
42 In Section 4, I include a brief model on option exercise timing, in which I show that the CEO’s options exercise 
decision can be captured in a single one-shot exercise decision, which also matches my empirical findings. 
Appendix E.A derives a general expression for convex 𝜓(𝑥) from this timing model. 
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Define 𝑠1, the CEO’s indifference point, as the severance which equalizes Condition (4). 
The CEO will exercise her options iff her severance 𝑠 exceeds 𝑠1.
43 
The firm again maximizes its expected profits given by Equation (2), now subject to 
𝑒 ∗ ?̃? + (1 − 𝑒) ∗ 𝑦 −
1
2
𝑒2 − 𝜓(𝑥) ≥ ?̅?     (2𝑏′) 
The firm will either choose to set severance to its full-tax optimum 𝑠∗ =
1−𝑇
1−𝑇+𝜏
(𝑉 − 𝑣) or 
it will set the severance to some lower amount to avoid the severance tax. Suppose the firm 
chooses to set the severance to avoid the tax. Taking the derivative of firm profits with respect to 
𝑠, I define 𝑠2, the firm’s indifference point, by (1 − 𝑇)(𝑉 − 𝑣 − 𝑠2) = 𝜓′(𝑠2 − 𝑘0): the point at 
which the benefits to the firm from an additional dollar of severance (left-hand side) equal the 
added cost to the firm in additional base salary to compensate the CEO for extra options exercise 
(right hand side). The firm will set severance to 𝑉 − 𝑣 as long as 𝑉 − 𝑣 ≤ ?̂? ≡ min (𝑠1, 𝑠2). For 
𝑉 − 𝑣 above ?̂?, the firm would set severance to ?̂?. To summarize, one option for the firm is to 
trigger the tax by choosing the optimal severance of 𝑠∗, which will exceed the threshold and will 
not induce option exercises. Alternatively, a severance in [𝑘0, ?̂?] will induce option exercises that 
would push the final threshold 𝑘1 (determined post-option exercises) to the severance amount. 
As in Condition (3), the firm’s choice can be reduced to a condition on the “tax 
wedge”—the gap between the no-tax optimum severance 𝑉 − 𝑣 and the effective threshold that 




𝑉 − 𝑣 ≤ ?̂?
𝑉 − 𝑣 > ?̂?
} rather than 𝑠∗ if and only 
if: 
 
43 I assume that the right hand side of Condition (4) grows faster in 𝑠 than does the left hand side so that there is a 
single well-defined 𝑠1. I also assume that the full-tax optimal severance, 𝑠
∗, exceeds 𝑠1 i.e., the CEO would choose 
to exercise options and avoid the tax if the severance were 𝑠∗. 
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    𝑊𝜓(∙) ≡




1 − 𝑇 + 𝜏
−
1
(1 − 𝑇)2(𝑉 − 𝑣)2
𝜓(𝑠 − 𝑘0) ≡ ?̅?𝜏,𝜓(∙)     (3′) 
So if 𝑊𝜓(∙) ∈ [0, ?̅?𝜏,𝜓(∙)], then the severance will be set to the final threshold 𝑘1, as boosted 
by options exercises. 
The dashed line in Figure 2 shows the optimal severance when option exercises are feasible 
(i.e. there is a finite cost to options exercise). My model, including Section 4 on option exercise 
timing, makes the following testable predictions: 
1) There will be a mass of firms with severance equal to the tax threshold 𝑘 and a missing 
mass right above it. If I assume a smooth distribution of tax wedge 𝑊, any discontinuity 
in severance 𝑠 across threshold 𝑘 can be attributed to the tax notch. 
2) CEOs will exercise extra options to boost their golden parachute tax thresholds. 
3) Those option exercises will be concentrated entirely in the final December before deal 
closing. If I assume a smooth “natural” distribution of option exercises across that 
December, any spike in CEO exercises can be attributed to boosting their golden 
parachute tax thresholds. (From Section 4). 
4) CEO option exercises will be concentrated in those CEOs whose severances equal the 
final threshold. 
III. Empirical Results: Option Exercises 
I begin by evaluating options exercises around firm acquisitions. 
Data 
My main data source for options exercises is Thomson Reuters Insiders Table II, which 
contains all exercises by public firm CEOs. I aggregate all exercises at the month level, and 
import tenure data from Execucomp (supplemented by Thomson Reuters Insiders and additional 
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scrapings from Def 14A filings to obtain tenure data where Execucomp has no coverage) so that 
I have CEO exercises in each month of each CEO’s tenure. I add firm-level data from Compustat 
and CRSP. For each firm, I match to deals in which the firm was acquired using data from 
Securities Data Corporation.44 The resulting dataset has 910,308 CEO-month level observations 
for 18,818 CEOs at 12,151 firms. Table 1 contains summary statistics. 
My main outcome variable is “exercise share”, the number of shares exercised divided by 
the number of outstanding shares of the firm, i.e. the portion of the firm acquired by the CEO. 
Due to the volatility of exercises, I windsorize at the 90th percentile of CEOs with an exercise.45 
Exercise timing 
I begin by presenting a new stylized fact about options exercises after a deal signing. 
Figure 3 shows a binned scatterplot of exercises as a share of the firm by CEOs whose firms will 
be acquired. After dipping prior to signing, exercises distinctively increase upon signing. 
Though a jump in exercises upon signing could have many explanations, I show that 
most of the increase can be attributed to tax boosting. I exploit the fact that tax-based option 
exercises should be entirely concentrated in the December prior to closing, as explained below. 
My empirical analysis is a piecemeal difference-in-difference bunching approach, outlined here, 
which I expound upon in the remainder of the section. I first show that in the final December 
prior to closing—in which there is a discontinuity in incentives to exercise—there is a large 
spike in exercises, and this spike appears only in deals which straddle the calendar year (which 
 
44 As discussed in more detail in Section 4, I also hand-code the tax treatment of the golden parachute 
packages for 607 firms that were targets in deals that closed. 
45 The results are fully robust to a very wide range of windsorization, including no windsorization. Since 
fractional outcome variables can be “spiky” based on the denominator, I also use an alternative outcome variable, 
“relative option exercise”—the number of shares exercised divided by the CEO’s average exercise (set to 0 for 
CEOs who never exercise)—with the same numerator and different denominator as exercise share. As an additional 
outcome variable, I use a simple binary of whether or not the CEO exercised at all. All of my results are fully 
consistent across these outcome variables, though the effects are somewhat muted with the binary outcome variable. 
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have parallel pre-trends in exercises with non-straddling deals). In the following section, 
zooming in on straddling deals, I separate into CEOs with and without cutback contracts 
(cutback contracts are those that contain text restricting the CEO’s pay based on the severance 
tax threshold), show that they have parallel pre-trends in option exercises, and again show that 
they significantly and substantially diverge only in the December prior to closing. 
I begin with the relationship between the timing of the deal and CEO incentives. I 
observe that there should only be incentive to exercise to boost one’s taxes by exercising post-
signing if the deal straddles the calendar year. Figure 4 contains an illustration. Figure 5(a) and 
5(b) compare side-by-side a binned scatterplot of post-signing exercises in deals that straddle the 
calendar year and those that don’t. The figures make it clear that there is at most a small jump 
post-signing in deals that do not straddle the calendar year (possibly from delayed exercises, as 
CEOs are unlikely to exercise when anticipating a deal-related price jump), whereas there is a 
large jump post-signing in deals that do. 
Of course, deals that straddle the calendar year are unlikely to be identical to those that 
do not—deals that take longer may be more complex. Appendix Table E.B.1 contains summary 
statistics on target firms. Firms whose deals straddle the calendar year are larger and have 
longer-tenured CEOs, raising the possibility that their CEOs differ in ways that correlate with 
different option exercise incentives. 
To mitigate such concerns, I focus on the discontinuity in timing in CEO exercise 
incentives. Following the final December prior to closing, for a CEO whose severance is 
bounded by the golden parachute threshold, there is a discontinuous drop in her incentive to 
exercise. Furthermore, if a CEO is exercising options earlier than she otherwise would to 
increase her taxable income before the new year, she gains no additional benefit from exercising 
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prior to December instead of waiting until the end of the old year. I would thus expect to see the 
bunching of exercises concentrated in the time immediately prior to the new year.  
A simple model demonstrates this point. Suppose that CEO i chooses month t to exercise option j 
to maximize benefits 𝜋𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖𝑗(𝑡) + 𝛺𝑖𝑗 ∗ 1{𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖}, where 𝑓, a single-peaked function, is 
the CEO’s net benefits (other than golden parachute benefits) from exercising in month 𝑡. 𝛺≥0 is 
any golden parachute benefit from exercising prior to 𝑀, the last month of the calendar year prior 
to closing. If there were no golden parachute benefit (i.e., 𝛺 = 0), the CEO would choose 𝑡 to 
maximize f, and the distribution across CEOs of option exercise timing would be the distribution 
of the global maxima of their f curves. If some options had a golden parachute benefit 𝛺𝑖𝑗 > 0 
for exercises prior to 𝑀𝑖, then I would expect bunching in month 𝑀 (from acceleration of some 
exercises that would have happened after M because their f curves are on their upslope) but 
exercises before M should be no more or less frequent. Appendix E.A ties this framework to my 
main model in Section 2 by deriving the cost-of-exercise function 𝜓(𝑥). 
Figure 1 shows binned scatterplots of exercises on the y-axis and month relative to the 
final December prior to deal closing on the x-axis. I first note that there is no seasonality effect—
the distribution of option exercises is smooth through each prior December. Figure 1(b) shows 
non-straddling deals; for these deals, in the final December prior to the closing, the deal has not 
yet been signed. Figure 1(a), which I consider along with Figure 6 the critical figures in the 
paper, shows straddling deals, in which the deal has been signed in or before the December prior 
to closing. The figures show that there is a large spike exclusively in the December prior to 
straddling deals, as predicted by the discontinuity in incentives.46 If the difference in exercise 
 
46 In Appendix E.B, I include these figures with alternative outcome variables. Using a CEO’s relative exercise or 
binary exercise looks nearly identical in all respects. 
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between CEOs with straddling and non-straddling deals were not due to tax reasons, then I 
would not expect such a discontinuity. 
To test formally, I run the following regression specification: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 ∗ 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑇𝑜𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1 ∗ 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2
∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑇𝑜𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 . 
where i indexes CEO, t indexes month, Gap refers to the period that begins at signing and ends 
the month before closing, and DecemberPriorToClosing is a binary variable that equals one in 
the final December prior to firm i’s closing. γ measures the increase in exercises after a deal has 
signed while in the calendar year prior to closing. 
The results are shown in Table 2. The coefficient in the first row and first column shows 
that CEOs acquire 2.5 basis points per month more in their firms through option exercise in the 
December after signing and prior to closing. (Separately, I find no evidence that CEOs exercise 
options prior to public announcement, presumably because they anticipate a price increase). Of 
course, these results do not preclude the possibility that deals straddle the calendar year 
intentionally to allow for options exercise. 
IV. Empirical Analysis: CEO Golden Parachute Contracts 
To evaluate the responsiveness of severance packages to tax, I follow an extensive 
literature in using bunching at the notch and missing mass to demonstrate a behavioral response. 
In my setting, however, I cannot observe taxable income, which determines the notch, or 
severance amounts, the choice variable. Instead, I study the written structure of CEO contracts 
themselves, which by their terms create bunching at the notch and missing mass. 
Golden parachute severance contracts tend to offer a “notional” severance, based on a 
formula, the value of which is difficult to appraise at the time of contracting (and difficult to 
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compare with taxable income, which is also unknown at the time of contracting). As documented 
by Wolk (2001), contracts often include one of two tax provisions which alter the notional 
severance: the cutback provision, which reduces severances to the threshold if the notional 
severance exceeds the threshold, and the gross-up provision, which pays the CEO’s severance 
tax to ensure she receives her full notional amount after-tax even if she exceeds the threshold. A 
mass of cutback provisions that are binding—that is, in which the notional severance exceeds the 
threshold—would effectuate bunching at the notch and a missing mass above it. 
I hand-code the tax treatment provision in the CEO’s parachute contract. I limit to CEOs 
whose firms were acquired in deals that straddle calendar years. Beginning with 790 deals that 
straddle calendar years, my final sample contains 606 deals after removing those that were 
bankruptcy reorganizations, those in which the tax treatment could not be identified, and those in 
which closing occurred more than one calendar year after signing. 
Column (1) of Table 3 contains the breakdown of the contract types in the sample. 
Roughly one-third of contracts contain a cutback provision. A cutback provision could be a 
“pure” cutback, or, alternatively, a “best after-tax” cutback that leaves the CEO her promised 
payment only if she would be better off paying the tax, but otherwise cuts her severance to the 
threshold. Contracts without cutbacks generally have gross-ups, which promise the CEO the full 
notional payment after tax. Appendix E.C includes a typical real example of each provision. 
Some contracts are silent on the tax; the vast majority of these are cases where the CEO has no 
special contingent payment in the event of an acquisition and therefore will not trigger the tax 
(since typical non-contingent severance payments are comparatively quite low). 
The mere existence of cutback provisions does not by itself establish bunching at the tax 
threshold because these provisions have no effect for CEOs whose notional severances are below 
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the threshold. If that were the case for all CEOs with cutback provisions, then there would be no 
bunching and the distribution of severances would be smooth through the threshold. 
However, the options exercise results from the previous section demonstrates that some CEOs 
are incentivized to increase their threshold. To test the null hypothesis that the cutback 
provisions are not binding, and to provide further support for my causal claim of the previous 
section that options exercises are driven by the golden parachute tax, I examine the relationship 
between cutback provisions and December-prior-to-closing options exercises.  
For a CEO with a cutback provision and a promised notional amount in excess of the 
threshold, boosting her taxable income by one dollar boosts her actual golden parachute by three 
fifths of a dollar, thus incentivizing her to increase her taxable income—but only in the five 
calendar years prior to the year of closing.47 Those with gross-ups or notional severances below 
the threshold have no incentive to do so. 
Table (2) shows that CEOs with cutback provisions are more likely to exercise in the 
December prior to a deal. To formally test the association between having a cutback provision 
and exercising options in the December prior to a deal, I run the following Logit specification: 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖 ∗ 𝜅 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽)    (5) 
in which i indexes CEO, DecemberExercise represents the share of firm obtained via exercise in 
the December prior to closing, and cutback means having a cutback provision in one’s golden 
parachute. The results are shown in Panel A of Table 4; those with a cutback provision are much 
more likely to exercise in the December before closing, by roughly 4 basis points (10 percentage 
points). The results are fully robust to (and usually strengthened by) alternative specifications, 
 
47 The CEO’s base amount (average taxable income over the past five years) would increase by one fifth of one 
dollar, and the threshold at which the parachute is triggered (three times the base amount) would increase by three 
fifths of one dollar. 
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including (i) exclusion of the “Other” category, (ii) restriction of cutbacks to only “pure” 
cutbacks, and (iii) the alternative outcome variables featured in Appendix Figure E.B. 
 To ensure that those with cutback provisions are not generally more likely to exercise, in 
Table 4(B) I re-estimate equation (5) for each month prior to and subsequent to the December 
immediately prior to closing. As also shown graphically in Figure 6, the coefficients are near or 
below 0 other than in the December immediately prior to closing. 
In Appendix Table E.B.2, I include results from a regression estimating the following 
specification: 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
which includes CEO and year-month fixed effects. The coefficient on the interaction term 
𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 captures a CEO’s exercises as compared to the same CEO in different 
months and other CEOs in the same calendar month. Again, I see strong and significant results. 
 The results support a causal interpretation. CEOs with contractual provisions 
incentivizing them to exercise options at a precise period of time (December before closing) 
under certain circumstances (a deal straddling calendar year) exercise those options at that 
precise time and only under those circumstances, with parallel trends before and afterwards. Of 
course, the CEO influences the timing of the deal and whether it straddles the calendar year. I 
lack sufficient power to determine if there is a discontinuity in year-end deal timing for 
executives with cutback contracts as compared to other contracts. Regardless, even if CEOs were 
manipulating deal timing, and the differences between straddling and non-straddling that would 
not undercut my causal conclusion that the tax provision interacting with the contract were 





How might we understand the welfare impact of both the contractual golden parachute response 
and the CEO option exercise response? 
I return to the model from Section 2, and begin with the case where options are 
unavailable. A distortionary severance tax 𝜏 > 0 creates a positive deadweight loss. The size of 
the deadweight loss depends on the tax wedge 𝑊 ≡
(𝑉−𝑣)−𝑘
𝑉−𝑣









(1 − 𝑇)((𝑉 − 𝑣) − 𝑘)
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How does the introduction of option exercises affect the deadweight loss? Note that if the 
firm is better off inducing options exercise as compared to setting severance at the initial 
threshold 𝑘0, then deadweight loss must also be reduced (since the government receives no 
severance tax money in either event; and since the CEO receives her outside option ?̅? in any 
event). Thus, the options exercises may serve to unwind some of the distortion created by the 
tax. On the other hand, the possibility of options exercises reduces the threshold ?̅?𝜏 below which 
the firm cuts back severances. Since cutbacks carry more deadweight loss, the overall effect of 
the options exercises is ambiguous. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, I show that CEO contracts and tax timing respond to selective taxation. 
CEO golden parachute contract terms create bunching at a tax penalty notch, and I use a 
discontinuity in option exercise timing incentives to further show that those whose contracts bind 
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their payout to their taxable income are far more likely to shift exercise timing to boost taxable 
income. 
My paper can also be interpreted as an analysis of endogeneous tax notches. As a 
consequence of the tax, executive severance compensation is shifted from the level it would be 
with no tax. But, in my setting—because the tax trigger is not fixed but rather a function of 
taxable income—the CEO has the capacity to partially undo the distortion. Or, put another way, 
given multiple means by which to reduce tax liability—altering severance or altering taxable 
income, in this case—firms and workers use both. 
In his literature review on bunching, Kleven (2016) observes that the empirical bunching 
literature tends to find much larger bunching at tax kinks and notches among the self-employed 
than among salary earners, “consistent with the larger scope for evasion and avoidance among 
the self-employed.” Although executives are salaried employees, I find that they bunch at the 
notch as well, speaking to the unusual capacity of those at the top of the income distribution to 
have tailored contracts that allow them to optimally avoid taxes. To the extent the tax code has 
discontinuous notches, I believe my work may suggest that those discontinuities may be more 
distortive near the top of the income distribution than elsewhere. 
I note also that CEOs with tax gross-ups—that is, whose tax penalty is reimbursed by the 
firm—scarcely increase their option exercises to avoid the tax penalty (see Table 3). Avoiding 
tax penalties appears to be a one-way street: CEOs do not do it if their firm has contracted to pay 
the tax penalty on their behalf.
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Exercised Share of Firm On Relative Month to Final December 
Prior to Closing 
 
Sample consists of CEO-months for CEOs whose firms were acquired. Panel (A) contains firms for 
which the deal was announced and closed in different calendar years; panel (B) contains cases in which 
the deal was announced and closed in the same calendar year. The x-axis contains the relative month to 
the final December prior to the closing. The y-axis contains the share of the firm the CEO acquired 
through exercise, in basis points. Point size represents the share of CEOs who exercised any options in 








Figure 2. Severance with Respect to Deal Premium 𝑽 − 𝒗 
Severance 𝑠 from the model plotted across a range of deal premium 𝑉 − 𝑣 ∈ (0,1]. Cost of exercise 
function is 𝜓(𝑥) =
1
2






Figure 3 – Exercised Share of Firm On Relative Month to Signing 
Sample consists of CEO-months for CEOs whose firms were acquired. The x-axis contains the relative 
month to the announcement of the deal. The y-axis contains the share of the firm the CEO acquired 





Figure 4 – Illustration of Timing of Non-Straddling and Straddling Deals 
(A) TIMING IN NON-STRADDLING DEAL 
 
(B) TIMING IN STRADDLING DEAL 
 
Note: Graphical illustration of the timing of non-straddling versus straddling deals. Non-straddling deals sign and 
close in the same calendar year; straddling deals are those that sign and close in different calendar years.  
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Note: Sample consists of CEO-months for CEOs whose firms were acquired. Panel (A) contains firms for which the 
deal was announced and closed in different calendar years; panel (B) contains cases in which the deal was 
announced and closed in the same calendar year. The x-axis contains the relative month to the announcement of the 
deal. The y-axis contains the share of the firm the CEO acquired through exercise, in basis points. Point size 
represents the share of CEOs who exercised any options in that month.  
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Figure 6 – Coefficient of Option Exercise in Given Month on Golden 
Parachute Cutback 
 
Note: Sample consists of CEO whose firms were acquired, in which the deal was announced and closed in different 
calendar years. The x-axis contains the relative month to the final December prior to the closing. The y-axis contains 
the coefficient of a linear regression on the share of the firm exercised in that month on whether the CEO has a 
golden parachute cutback. A cutback means that the CEO’s golden parachute payment is explicitly cut back to the 






Table 1—Summary Statistics 
  N 
A. CEO-Firm Relationship   
Average time for CEO in dataset (months) 48.4 18,818 
   
Average number of CEOs per firm 1.55 12,151 
   
Probability of CEO firm being acquired (percent) 12.4 18,818 
   
B. Option Exercise Behavior   
Probability CEO exercises option in a given month (percent) 3.56 910,308 
   
Probability CEO exercises option at any point in tenure 
(percent) 
31.86 18,818 
   
C. Conditional on Exercise in a Given Month   
Median number of options exercised 37,200 32,410 
   
Mean number of options exercised 126,150 32,410 
   
Median portion of firm acquired via exercise (percent) 0.0689 32,410 
Notes: Option exercises are from Thomson Reuters Insiders from 2001-2016. CEO tenure is from merged datasets 
from Execucomp, Thomson Reuters Insiders, and scraping of Def 14A filings. Deals are from Securities Data 
Corporation. Outstanding firm holdings data is from CRSP.  
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Table 2—Exercises After Signing in December Prior to Closing 
 (1) (2) (3) 






Gap*DecemberPrior 2.518*** 1.998*** 0.0718*** 
 (0.455) (0.352) (0.0139) 
    
Gap 0.199** 0.171** -0.0088* 
 (0.0794) (0.0584) (0.00355) 
    
DecemberPrior -0.0218 -0.0087 0.0008 
 (0.126) (0.0895) (0.0059) 
    
Observations 108,451 108,949 108,949 
    
Clusters 2,241 2,252 2,252 
Note: All observations are the CEO-month level. The first column uses the number of shares exercised divided by 
the number of outstanding shares of the firm. The second column uses a CEO’s exercises relative to that CEO’s 
average number of exercises (with a 0 in all months for a CEO who never exercises). The third column uses a simple 
binary for whether the CEO exercised in that month. Gap refers to the period beginning the month of signing and 
ending the month prior to closing. DecemberPrior refers to the final December prior to closing. All specifications 
include fixed effects for individual, year, and number of years of CEO tenure, as well as the following lagged 
Compustat variables: market value of equity, debt, book leverage, and profitability (defined as earnings divided by 
book assets). Standard errors (clustered at CEO level) in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 
0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.  
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Table 3—Breakdown of Tax Treatments and Exercise 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Tax Treatment N Likelihood of 
December Exercise 
(Percent) 
Mean Portion of Firm 
Acquired (Basis Points) 
“Pure” Cutback 83 18.1 8.1 
    
“Best After-Tax” Cutback 127 15.0 5.2 
    
Gross-up 215 8.3 2.8 
    




Note: Data consists of 606 hand-coded golden parachute contracts for CEOs whose firms were acquired in straddling 
deals. “Likelihood of December Exercise” is the probability that a CEO exercises at least one option in the December 
immediately prior to closing.  
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Table 4—Golden Parachute Cutbacks on December Exercises 
PANEL (A): EXERCISES IN DECEMBER BEFORE CLOSING 
 Logit  OLS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Cutback 1.034** 1.074**  4.558** 4.597** 
 (0.316) (0.332)  (1.403) (1.427) 
Year & CEO Tenure FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Compustat Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 516 509  535 528 
 
PANEL (B): EXERCISES IN MONTHS OTHER THAN DECEMBER BEFORE CLOSING 
 Logit  OLS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Cutback -0.0216 0.166  -0.0426 0.0352 
 (0.169) (0.171)  (0.120) (0.119) 
Year & CEO Tenure FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Compustat Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 13,805 13,673  13,805 13,673 
Clusters 535 528  535 528 
Note: All observations are at the CEO-firm-month level. Sample is drawn from CEOs whose firms are acquired in 
straddling deals. Dependent variable is the share of firm acquired in basis points. Cutback refers to a CEO whose 
golden parachute payment is explicitly cut back to the IRC §280G limit (or cut back to the limit if the CEO would 
be better off after taxes). Panel A includes only the December before closing; Panel B includes months -30 to -1. 
Columns (1) and (2) use a Logit model. Columns (3) and (4) use OLS. All columns include fixed effects for 
calendar year and the number of years of CEO tenure. Columns (2) and (4) contain the log of market value of equity, 
the log of book assets, and debt as controls variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust in Panel A; 
standard errors are clustered at the CEO level in Panel B. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 
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Chapter 1 Data Appendix 
In this Data Appendix, I describe in greater detail the cleaning and merging of mutual fund 
ownership data from Broadridge. 
 
Overview 
The Broadridge mutual fund dataset consists of observations at the account-mutual fund meeting 
level. Each observation contains the CUSIP of fund mutual fund, a code identifying the meeting, 
the meeting date, the record date, an anonymized account identifier, and anonymized broker 
identifier (each of which identities are anonymous with non-anonymous data retained by 
Broadridge), the account’s number of shares, and the account’s 5-digit zip code.48 
Hand-cleaning of meeting codes 
Each mutual fund shareholder meeting (that is, a shareholder meeting held by the mutual fund, as 
opposed to one that the mutual fund is participating in as an owner) is identified by a Broadridge 
code. Multiple meeting codes frequently refer to the same meeting. An account that owns shares 
of the mutual fund might be recorded as owning shares for one meeting code of a fund and not 
the others. This multiplicity of meeting codes arises because meetings sometimes require 
separate mailings to different shareholders, or because mutual fund shareholder elections are 
frequently extended or delayed. I classify multiple Broadridge meeting codes as a single meeting 
if their meeting date is within 6 months of each other and if their accounts have less than 2% 
overlap. Using this method reclassifies nearly 9,000 meetings. All but a small handful of 
reclassified meetings have no account overlap with the meetings they are re-categorized into. 
 





I merge mutual fund shareholder meetings from Broadridge to CRSP open-end mutual funds 
(crsp.fund_names) by 9-digit CUSIP, limited to matches in which the meeting date of the 
shareholder meeting is within the date range for which the CRSP CUSIP is valid. For those funds 
where there is no match, I obtain additional matches (generally cases where the CUSIP has 
changed over time) by hand-matching funds based on information from public filings. 
I merge to CRSP monthly total net asset values and net asset value per share 
(crspq.fund_summary) using the CRSP fund number, matching the last monthly CRSP record 
prior to the shareholder meeting’s record date, so long as the monthly CRSP record is within 35 
days of the shareholder meeting’s record date. CRSP fund numbers refer to a share class of the 
fund, not the fund itself (referred to as the “portfolio” within CRSP); therefore, to determine a 
fund’s size, I aggregate across share classes within a fund. 
For closed-end mutual funds, which have a single share class and trade on securities markets, I 
match to CRSP’s monthly securities update by 9-digit CUSIP, and hand-code to add additional 
matches and correct mistaken matches. 
I merge at the fund level to ISS fund voting results. I use the ISS-CRSP match from Brav et al. 
(2020) for the open-end funds, with additional hand-coded matches, and hand-match the closed-
end funds. 
As in Brav et al. (2020), I match the direct ownership of equities data with CRSP monthly 
securities and Compustat. I obtain information on proposals from FactSet SharkRepellent and 
ISS Voting Analytics, the latter of which I also obtain open- and closed-end fund votes disclosed 
on Form NPX. 
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I match by zip code with zip code-level Internal Revenue Service data, zip code-level Census 
data, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data on educational attainment. Each of these sets is used in 
Brav et al. (2020) and merging procedures are described in detail therein. 
I use 2016 county presidential election results from MIT’s election lab, then map counties to zip 
codes. 
I add in zip-code longitude and latitude from the U.S. Census Bureau via CivicSpace Labs. 
Key Variables 
I calculate an account’s mutual fund stake value by multiplying the account’s number of shares 
at the time of the mutual fund’s meeting by the share price at the same time. If the fund has 
multiple meetings, I average the account’s stake value across meetings. 
To identify index funds, I use the flag from CRSP’s Open-End fund dataset, counting funds with 
flag “D” or “B” as an index fund. I identify closed-end funds as non-index funds. 
To identify ESG funds, I start with the 235 funds identified in a Morningstar report from January 
2018 (Hale (2018)), which “defined the U.S. sustainable funds universe as those open-end funds 
and exchange-traded portfolios that, by prospectus, state that they incorporate ESG criteria into 
their investment processes, or indicate that they pursue a sustainability-related theme, or seek 
measurable sustainable impact alongside financial return.” To those I add funds with the word 
“Sustainable”, “ESG”, “Social”, or “Clean Energy” in the name, as well as funds from five 
institutions that are explicitly mission-driven: Calvert, Pax, Parnassus, Trillium, and Praxis. 
I obtain ISS recommendations from ISS Voting Analytics, as is standard. For Glass Lewis 
recommendations, I modify a procedure set forth in Bubb and Catan (2020). The procedure uses 
a dataset from ProxyInsights that contains, for each mutual fund, the percentage of time it agrees 




Most mutual funds are organized as Maryland corporations or Delaware or Massachusetts 
business trusts.49 Open-end funds, including exchange-traded funds, do not hold annual 
shareholder meetings unless required by their charter documents.50 Therefore, the dataset only 
includes ownership and votes in open-end mutual funds that happened to hold a shareholder 
meeting in the three-year period 2015-2017, generally due to a proposed change in the 
shareholder advisory agreement. Those funds that do not have a meeting in the three-year period 
generally did not have one because they had no proposed changes to the shareholder advisory 
agreement, because they had a majority shareholder, or because they had an exemptive order 
from the SEC allowing them to alter subadvisory agreements without a shareholder vote. 
Data Appendix, Table 1, Panel A shows coverage of open-end mutual funds that appear in the 
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Open-End Mutual Fund Database. In total, I have 29.8% of open-end 
funds in CRSP (and a greater portion of large open-end funds), constituting $32.4T in assets, 
slightly more than half of total assets in the CRSP open-end mutual fund dataset. 
Only mutual funds that own and vote on equities file form NPX, so only a subset of CRSP funds 
appear in ISS. Data Appendix, Table 1, Panel B shows the universe of CRSP fund share classes 
that I successfully matched to ISS’s fund-level NPX dataset. This intersection comprises my 
main sample. I successfully match 32.8% of funds in this sample. 
Unlike open-end funds, closed-end funds are required to hold annual meetings. I designate a 
closed-end fund in CRSP as one with share code 14 or 44. Data Appendix Table 1, Panel C show 
coverage in my dataset of closed-end mutual funds.  Coverage is nearly comprehensive, with 
 
49 K&L Gates 2013 
50 K&L Gates 2013, Investment Lawyer 2015 p. 7. Closed-end funds are required to hold regular director elections. 
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94.7% of CRSP closed-end funds appearing in the retail dataset. Panel D shows the subset that 
match to ISS’s NPX dataset—I have 100% coverage of such funds. 
Finally, in Data Appendix, Table 1, Panel E,  I evaluate what portion of funds in the individual 
mutual fund ownership dataset from Broadridge are usable (by being matched to CRSP fund data 
and ISS voting data).  Because the retail dataset is at the CUSIP level, which corresponds to a 
share class, I can only evaluate the portion of matching share classes, not the portion of matching 
funds. I successfully match the vast majority of funds in the Broadridge dataset to CRSP mutual 
funds. Because many of those funds do not own and vote on U.S. equity securities, only a 
smaller fraction is matched to ISS. 









Data Appendix, Table 1. Coverage Statistics 
Panel A. Coverage of CRSP Open-End Mutual Fund Set by Broadridge Retail Dataset 
 
  Share Classes  Funds  Value (in billions) 
Size 
Quintile: 
 Number of 
CRSP Share 
Classes 
Number of Share 
classes in CRSP 






Number of Funds 












Smallest  8860 1879 21.2 3583 617 17.2 74 15.6 21.1 
2  7856 2366 30.1 2802 777 27.7 441.6 127.6 28.9 
3  7436 2237 30.1 2679 809 30.2 1585.2 479.6 30.3 
4  7193 2348 32.6 2615 906 34.6 5137.9 1827.2 35.6 
Largest  7101 2746 38.7 2579 1141 44.2 56510.9 30023.1 53.1 
Total  38446 11576 30.1 14258 4250 29.8 63749.5 32473.1 50.9 
 
Panel B. Coverage of CRSP Open-End Mutual Fund Set/NPX Overlap by Broadridge Retail Dataset 
 
  Share Classes  Funds  Value (in billions) 
Size 
Quintile: 
 Number of 
CRSP Share 














Funds in CRSP, 













Smallest  4883 1155 23.7 968 205 21.2 23.9 5.8 24.3 
2  4584 1521 33.2 1136 310 27.3 181.2 50.6 27.9 
3  4268 1394 32.7 1189 363 30.5 705.8 215 30.5 
4  4437 1534 34.6 1271 451 35.5 2535 931.4 36.7 
Largest  4615 1900 41.2 1354 611 45.1 30617.9 16108.1 52.6 
Total  22787 7504 32.9 5918 
 











Panel C. Coverage of CRSP Closed-End Mutual Fund Set by Broadridge Retail Dataset 
 






Number of Funds 









to Retail  
Coverage 
Percent 
Smallest  136 130 95.6 9.8 9.4 95.9 
2  128 118 92.2 20.5 18.9 92.2 
3  125 120 96 33.2 32 96.4 
4  121 113 93.4 60.5 56.9 94 
Largest  114 110 96.5 190.9 187 98 
Total  624 591 94.7 314.9 304.2 96.6 
 
Panel D. Coverage of CRSP Closed-End Mutual Fund Set/NPX Overlap by Broadridge Retail Dataset 
 
   Funds  Value (in billions) 
Size Quintile:  Number of 
CRSP Funds 
in NPX 
Number of Funds 










to Retail  
Coverage 
Percent 
Smallest  57 57 100 4.5 4.5 100 
2  59 59 100 9.5 9.5 100 
3  64 64 100 17.3 17.3 100 
4  71 71 100 37.8 37.8 100 







Total  317 317 100 143 143 100 
 
Panel E. Coverage of Retail-Owned Funds by CRSP Open-End and Closed-End Mutual Fund  
      
Number of Accounts 
Quintile: 




Number of Share Classes 
in Retail Set and CRSP 
Open-End Dataset 
Number of Share 
Classes in Retail Set and 
CRSP Closed End 
Coverage 
Percent 
Number of Share 
Classes in Retail Set, 
CRSP, and ISS 
Coverage 
Percent 
Fewest  2742 2267 195 89.8 1454 53 
2  2706 2366 16 88 1464 54.1 
3  2716 2474 60 93.3 1542 56.8 
4  2721 2326 302 96.6 1737 63.8 
Most  2720 2399 259 97.7 2014 74 
Total  13605 11832 832 93.1 8211 60.4 
 
Table 2. Numbers of Observations 











Number of Unique Accounts 46,686,015 13,414,912 80,209,211 13,414,912 113,480,314 
Number of Unique Accounts Matched to 
CRSP 
41,886,035 12,110,222 78,800,757 13,298,142 108,666,339 
      
Percentage of Accounts Owning Retail 100 100 16.7% 100 41.1% 









Table B.A1. Relationship Between Fund and Individual Characteristics 
This table contains regression estimates regarding the relationship between a fund characteristic (on the left 
hand side) and individual investor account and zip code level characteristics. In Panel A, for each fund, the 
account-level characteristics are averaged for all accounts in the fund, and results are at the fund level. In 
Panel B, a random sample of 10 million individual-fund level observations were drawn. Thus, a one point 
shift in a right hand side variable reflects, in Panel A, a one point shift in the fund’s average of that variable, 
whereas, in Panel B, it reflects a one point shift in a single individual’s level of that variable. Zip code AGI 
is the average adjusted gross income in the prior calendar year in the account’s zip code, in millions of 
dollars. 2016 county presidential turnout is the number of county residents who cast ballots in the 2016 
U.S. presidential election obtained from CQ Voting and Elections, divided by the number of adult citizens 
from the Census Bureau. Fraction with Bachelors Degree and fraction with Post-Bachelors Degree are zip-
code level five-year averages from the U.S. Census as of 2017. Fraction over 65 is the fraction of zip code 
residents above age 65, from the Census, defined as (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010015 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010016 +
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010017 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010018 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010019)/𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001). Zip Code Black/Hispanic Share 
is the fraction of zip code residents who are Black or Hispanic, from the Census. Density is the population 
divided by land area in square meters, divided by 1,000,000 (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001/𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷/1000000). 
Stake Value is the account’s number of shares of the specific fund multiplied by share value as of the month 
of the ownership snapshot. Account Value is the sum of the account’s Stake Values. In both Panels, all 
right-hand-side variables are demeaned over the regression sample, so that the intercept term reflects the 
average value of the dependent variable in the sample (no other coefficient is affected). In Panel A, standard 
errors clustered at the fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses; in Panel B, standard errors 
clustered at the fund shareholder meeting and account level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Fund-Level Results 
 ESG fund Index Fund Closed End 
Fund 
ETF Muni Bond 
Fund 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Zip Code AGI ($Mil) -427.349* -264.533** -8.639 -235.170** 273.207*** 
 (166.553) (88.410) (90.690) (83.769) (54.487) 
County 2016 Political Turnout 
Fraction 
-21.830 -104.919* 78.450 -133.404** 28.987 
(14.918) (51.136) (47.474) (48.011) (51.659) 
Zip Code Fraction with Bachelors 
Degree 
-18.608 413.042** 357.153*** 417.273*** -225.190** 
(35.468) (126.445) (69.835) (122.771) (78.941) 
Zip Code Fraction with Post-
Bachelors Degree 
331.212* -340.215** -517.159*** -336.032** 325.112* 
(133.595) (126.143) (102.258) (113.199) (156.157) 
Fraction over 65 -22.938 -400.177*** 2083.715*** -173.683 522.347*** 
 (29.893) (112.900) (156.236) (111.720) (110.271) 
Zip Code Black/Hispanic Share 21.188 -19.835 225.800*** -60.859 50.806 
 (15.571) (39.006) (28.323) (32.652) (28.329) 
Zip Code Density (Population per 
million square meters) 
1356.209 -382.241 34.508 -421.819 -1.6e+03** 
(728.070) (636.482) (792.570) (522.714) (624.051) 
Geometric Mean of Log Account 
Value for Account Holders 
0.317 3.074 3.059** 3.711 0.289 
(0.241) (2.925) (1.030) (3.062) (0.790) 
Geometric Mean of Log Stake Value 
for account holders 
-0.293 -8.266 -5.124*** -9.233* 2.777** 
(0.319) (4.325) (1.240) (4.590) (0.850) 
Constant 1.512** 16.128** 13.992*** 11.104 8.359*** 
 (0.503) (5.369) (1.733) (5.716) (1.020) 
𝑅2 0.106 0.087 0.403 0.113 0.131 
 
 195 
N 4,048 4,048 4,036 4,048 4,048 
Num. Clusters 993 993 991 993 993 
 
Panel B. Individual Level Results 
 ESG fund Index Fund Closed End 
Fund 
ETF Muni Bond 
Fund 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Zip Code AGI ($Mil) -1.958* -4.013 10.969*** -0.024 5.482** 
 (0.989) (2.800) (2.620) (1.466) (2.112) 
County 2016 Political 
Turnout Fraction 
0.475 5.285** -4.512*** 1.705 -1.405* 
 (0.353) (1.691) (0.913) (0.880) (0.628) 
Zip Code Fraction with 
Bachelors Degree 
-0.001 16.993** 8.584*** 13.294* 1.451* 
 (0.339) (5.392) (2.216) (5.325) (0.675) 
Zip Code Fraction with 
Post-Bachelors Degree 
2.057 -5.259 -6.678*** -6.224 0.695 
 (1.141) (3.844) (1.775) (3.538) (1.924) 
Fraction over 65 -0.360 -13.063* 43.435*** -3.203 8.621*** 
 (0.240) (5.979) (7.220) (1.826) (2.352) 
Zip Code Black/Hispanic 
Share 
0.270** 3.362** 5.253*** 1.849* 1.248** 
 (0.099) (1.297) (1.341) (0.888) (0.443) 
Zip Code Density 
(Population per million 
square meters) 
11.318 144.851*** 31.388 86.871** 10.684 
 (6.631) (37.912) (27.687) (27.030) (17.166) 
Log Account Value -0.023 -3.999* -1.423* -4.258* 0.297 
 (0.034) (2.000) (0.575) (2.123) (0.229) 
Log Stake Value 0.038 4.186 2.458** 4.227 0.182 
 (0.048) (2.207) (0.803) (2.322) (0.389) 
Constant 0.613* 24.530* 10.856*** 14.658 1.793*** 
 (0.291) (9.974) (2.484) (7.621) (0.469) 
𝑅2 0.001 0.023 0.025 0.031 0.006 
N 8,846,274 8,846,274 8,844,753 8,846,274 8,846,269 




Table B.A2. Relationship Between Ideology and Individual Characteristics 
This table contains regression estimates regarding the relationship between a SRI percent in favor and 
individual investor account and zip code level characteristics. The sample is limited to individuals who own 
both mutual funds and equities and who voted on at least one SRI proposal. Column 2 further limits to 
individuals with at least 10 votes on SRI proposals. The dependent variable is defined as the account’s 
number of votes in favor of SRI divided by its number of votes on SRI proposals, multiplied by 100. Zip 
code AGI is the average adjusted gross income in the prior calendar year in the account’s zip code, in 
millions of dollars. 2016 county presidential turnout is the number of county residents who cast ballots in 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election obtained from CQ Voting and Elections, divided by the number of adult 
citizens from the Census Bureau. Fraction with Bachelors Degree and fraction with Post-Bachelors Degree 
are zip-code level five-year averages from the U.S. Census as of 2017. Fraction over 65 is the fraction of 
zip code residents above age 65, from the Census, defined as (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010015 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010016 +
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010017 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010018 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010019)/𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001). Zip Code Black/Hispanic Share 
is the fraction of zip code residents who are Black or Hispanic, from the Census. Density is the population 
divided by land area in square meters, divided by 1,000,000 (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001/𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷/1000000). 
Account Value is the sum of the account’s stake values. All right-hand-side variables are demeaned over 
the regression sample, so that the intercept term reflects the average value of the dependent variable in the 
sample (no other coefficient is affected). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
Account SRI Percent Any SRI Votes 10+ SRI Votes 
 (1) (2) 
Zip Code AGI ($Mil) -23.695*** -22.225*** 
 (0.487) (0.664) 
County 2016 Political Turnout Fraction 9.526*** 11.318*** 
 (0.409) (0.582) 
Zip Code Fraction with Bachelors Degree -5.619*** -12.265*** 
 (0.557) (0.795) 
Zip Code Fraction with Post-Bachelors Degree 29.577*** 39.177*** 
 (0.965) (1.388) 
Fraction over 65 -9.098*** -7.365*** 
 (0.396) (0.547) 
Zip Code Black/Hispanic Share 3.846*** 2.193*** 
 (0.218) (0.312) 
Zip Code Density (Population per million 
square meters) 
315.226*** 356.959*** 
 (8.659) (13.349) 
Log Account Value -1.144*** -0.818*** 
 (0.017) (0.026) 
Constant 29.556*** 25.479*** 
 (0.031) (0.044) 
𝑅2 0.008 0.008 
N 1,555,065 565,653 
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Table B.A3. Target Retirement Date Account Holders 
These tables present estimates of regressions connecting fund and firm characteristics to the imputed age 
of the account-holder. The sample is limited to accounts that own a mutual fund with the word “Target” in 
its name, excluding funds with the word “Maturities” or “Fund”. For each account, I impute their age as 
65 − (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 2015), in which 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 is the target retirement year in the fund name. In Panel 
A, the imputed age is the left hand side variable, regressed against a series of zip code and account portfolio 
variables, and each observation is at the individual level. In Panel B, the imputed age is the right hand side 
variable. In the first 5 columns of Panel B, each observation represents one account-fund pairing, where the 
actual target retirement fund is excluded, and the left hand side represents the fund characteristics. In 
column 6 of Panel B, each observation represents an account. Dependent variables on the left hand side of 
Panel B are multiplied by 100 for to be interpreted as a percentage. Zip code AGI is the average adjusted 
gross income in the prior calendar year in the account’s zip code, in millions of dollars. 2016 county 
presidential turnout is the number of county residents who cast ballots in the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
obtained from CQ Voting and Elections, divided by the number of adult citizens from the Census Bureau. 
Fraction with Bachelors Degree and fraction with Post-Bachelors Degree are zip-code level five-year 
averages from the U.S. Census as of 2017. Fraction over 65 is the fraction of zip code residents above age 
65, from the Census, defined as (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010015 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010016 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010017 +
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010018 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010019)/𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001). Zip Code Black/Hispanic Share is the fraction of zip 
code residents who are Black or Hispanic, from the Census. Density is the population divided by land area 
in square meters, divided by 1,000,000 (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001/𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷/1000000). Stake Value is the 
account’s number of shares of the specific fund multiplied by share value as of the month of the ownership 
snapshot. Account Value is the sum of the account’s Stake Values. In Panel A, robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. In Panel B, columns 1 through 5, standard errors clustered at account and fund shareholder 
meeting level are in parentheses; in column 6, standard errors clustered at the account level are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) 
 Imputed Age Imputed Age 
Fraction over 65 20.534*** 13.937*** 
 (0.157) (0.170) 
Zip Code AGI ($Mil)  3.718*** 
  (0.147) 
County 2016 Political Turnout Fraction  2.291*** 
  (0.087) 
Zip Code Fraction with Bachelors Degree  -6.629*** 
  (0.126) 
Zip Code Fraction with Post-Bachelors Degree  3.988*** 
  (0.210) 
Zip Code Black/Hispanic Share  -0.263*** 
  (0.041) 
Zip Code Density (Population per million 
square meters) 
 -194.731*** 
  (1.723) 
Log Stake Value  -0.132*** 
  (0.008) 
Log Account Value  2.074*** 
  (0.008) 
Constant 38.805*** 22.329*** 
 (0.021) (0.074) 
𝑅2 0.007 0.119 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ESG fund Index Fund Closed End 
Fund 
ETF Muni Bond 
Fund 
SRI Percent 
Imputed Age -0.000 -0.245*** 0.044* -0.050** 0.013** -0.415*** 
 (0.003) (0.063) (0.020) (0.016) (0.005) (0.057) 
Constant 1.140* 53.864** -0.374 14.169*** -0.109 60.164*** 
 (0.577) (17.479) (0.379) (3.584) (0.152) (2.889) 
𝑅2 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.012 
N 1,524,993 1,524,993 1,524,333 1,524,990 1,524,990 4,564 




Table B.A4. Logit Estimation of Probability of Being an Equity Voter 
This Table presents estimations of logit regressions estimating whether the individual appears in the dataset 
as a voter. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is whether the account owns equity and votes on at 
least one equity proposal; in columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is whether the account owns equity 
and votes on at least ten equity proposals. Both panels use a random sample of 15 million accounts. Zip 
Code Republican 2 Party Share is the fraction of the two-party voting share earned by Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential Election.  
 
 Any SRI Votes Any SRI Votes 10+ SRI Votes 10+ SRI Votes 
Dep Variable: SRI Voter (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Zip Code Republican 2 Party 
Share 
0.356*** 0.332*** 0.441*** 0.363*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) 
Account Log Average Fund 
Stake 
0.258*** 0.259*** 0.321*** 0.316*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log Number of Funds 0.654*** 0.414*** 0.766*** 0.524*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Log Zip Code AGI  -0.110***  -0.144*** 
  (0.007)  (0.011) 
Zip Code Political Turnout  -0.017  -0.016 
  (0.025)  (0.040) 
Zip Code Percent Over 65  0.158***  0.065 
  (0.036)  (0.058) 
Fraction of Zip Code with 
Bachelors Degree 
 0.240***  0.487*** 
  (0.056)  (0.090) 
Fraction of Zip Code with 
Bachelors Degree 
 1.885***  1.755*** 
  (0.023)  (0.035) 
Zip Code Black/Hispanic Share  -0.165***  -0.171*** 
  (0.013)  (0.022) 
Zip Code Density  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Fraction of Fund Portfolio in 
Muni Bonds 
 1.645***  1.812*** 
  (0.015)  (0.024) 
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Fraction of Fund Portfolio in 
Index Funds 
 -0.016  -0.137*** 
  (0.012)  (0.021) 
Fraction of Fund Portfolio in 
Income Funds 
 -0.376***  -0.280*** 
  (0.012)  (0.022) 
Fraction of Fund Portfolio in 
Equity Funds 
 -0.303***  -0.317*** 
  (0.009)  (0.016) 
Fraction of Fund Portfolio in 
Money Market Funds 
 0.837***  1.015*** 
  (0.012)  (0.020) 
Fraction of Fund Portfolio in 
ETFs 
 1.421***  1.594*** 
  (0.013)  (0.023) 
Fraction of Fund Portfolio in 
CEFs 
 2.296***  2.366*** 
  (0.009)  (0.015) 
Constant -6.868*** -6.193*** -8.674*** -7.620*** 
 (0.013) (0.072) (0.021) (0.115) 
𝑅2 0.057 0.137 0.068 0.143 










Table B.A5. Representation with Inverse Probability Weighting 
This table presents robustness checks using inverse probability weighting. Each subpanel corresponds to inverse probability weights generated using 
the logit regressions in Online Appendix Table B.A4. For each logit regression in the columns of Online Appendix Table B.A4, I predict the 
probability of a given observation being in the sample,  ?̂? and calculate its inverse probability weight as 
1
?̂?
. For example Panels A1 and B1 correspond 
to column 1 in Online Appendix Table B.A4. 
Panel A presents a regression of fund ideology on the mean ideology of its underlying individual investors. Specifically, I estimate: 






In which 𝑓 indexes funds, 𝑎 indexes individual accounts, Θ𝑓 is the set of accounts at fund 𝑓, ?̅?𝑓 is fund 𝑓’s fraction of SRI proposals voted in favor, 
and ?̅?𝑎 is account 𝑎’s fraction of SRI proposals voted in favor. Observations are at the fund level, with accounts aggregated within a fund. The 
sample is limited to funds and individuals with at least 10 SRI votes, and to funds with at least 15 qualifying individual investors. Below the table, 
I include the impact on 𝛽1 of including coefficients, along with standard errors, calculated using the b1x2 STATA function created in Gelbach 
(2016). Standard errors clustered at fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 
0.001 levels, respectively. 
Panel B estimates the relationship between ownership and the match between individual and fund ideology. Specifically, I estimate account 𝑎’s 
decision whether to own fund 𝑓 as follows: 
𝑄𝑎𝑓 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1(?̅?𝑓 − ?̅?𝑎)
2
+ 𝜅2𝑋𝑎𝑓 +𝜙𝑓 + 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑓 
In which 𝑄𝑎𝑓 equals 1 (multiplied by 100) if account 𝑎 owns fund 𝑓, 𝑋𝑎𝑓 is a vector of additional variables concerning the match between 𝑎 and 𝑓, 
𝜙𝑓 is fund fixed effects and 𝑎 is account fixed effects. 𝑋𝑎𝑓 is distance between individual and fund headquarters. I select, for each account, twenty 
control group funds at random that it does not own, and calculate the sampling weight as the inverse of the probability of being selected multiplied 
by the inverse probability weight. Standard errors clustered at the account and fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 









 Funds Weighted Equally Funds Weighted by Number of Accounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
For % on SRI 
Props, Fund 
Mean Owner 
0.664* -0.213 -0.061 0.040 0.035 -0.877 0.027 0.088 
(0.267) (0.186) (0.168) (0.184) (0.600) (0.479) (0.389) (0.289) 
ESG Indicator  0.632*** 0.593*** 0.571***  0.829*** 0.683*** 0.726*** 
  (0.089) (0.080) (0.082)  (0.084) (0.054) (0.051) 
Index Indicator   -0.113* -0.096   -0.121*** -0.104** 
   (0.047) (0.054)   (0.030) (0.039) 
Intercept 0.022 0.256*** 0.240*** 0.200*** 0.134 0.377** 0.167 0.128 
 (0.081) (0.053) (0.054) (0.059) (0.156) (0.126) (0.107) (0.079) 
Fund Type FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
𝑅2 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.29 
N 800 800 800 671 800 800 800 671 





 0.877*** 0.823***   0.912** 0.752*  




  -0.098    -0.744**  









 Funds Weighted Equally Funds Weighted by Number of Accounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
For % on SRI 
Props, Fund 
Mean Owner 
0.895*** 0.006 0.158 0.221 0.495 -0.703 0.312 0.210 
(0.256) (0.192) (0.176) (0.189) (0.649) (0.528) (0.405) (0.283) 
ESG Indicator  0.573*** 0.534*** 0.522***  0.806*** 0.646*** 0.710*** 
  (0.092) (0.085) (0.088)  (0.085) (0.058) (0.050) 
Index Indicator   -0.117* -0.099   -0.127*** -0.105** 
   (0.047) (0.054)   (0.028) (0.037) 
Intercept -0.039 0.195*** 0.181** 0.151* 0.011 0.326* 0.093 0.096 
 (0.077) (0.053) (0.055) (0.060) (0.167) (0.136) (0.111) (0.082) 
Fund Type FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
𝑅2 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.29 
N 800 800 800 671 800 800 800 671 





 0.888** 0.829***   1.198** 0.960**  




  -0.092    -0.776*  









 Funds Weighted Equally Funds Weighted by Number of Accounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
For % on SRI 
Props, Fund 
Mean Owner 
0.589* -0.182 -0.037 0.051 -0.076 -0.871 0.025 0.068 
(0.255) (0.171) (0.152) (0.170) (0.565) (0.448) (0.354) (0.278) 
ESG Indicator  0.621*** 0.586*** 0.569***  0.822*** 0.684*** 0.729*** 
  (0.087) (0.078) (0.080)  (0.079) (0.049) (0.048) 
Index Indicator   -0.113* -0.097   -0.121*** -0.103** 
   (0.047) (0.054)   (0.030) (0.039) 
Intercept 0.041 0.249*** 0.234*** 0.196*** 0.165 0.379** 0.168 0.133 
 (0.079) (0.051) (0.051) (0.058) (0.148) (0.118) (0.097) (0.077) 
Fund Type FE 0.02 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.29 
𝑅2 800 800 800 671 800 800 800 671 
N 291 291 291 193 291 291 291 193 





 0.772** 0.728**   0.795** 0.661*  




  -0.102    -0.763**  









 Funds Weighted Equally Funds Weighted by Number of Accounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
For % on SRI 
Props, Fund 
Mean Owner 
0.580* -0.242 -0.098 0.012 -0.070 -0.874 -0.039 0.077 
(0.259) (0.177) (0.157) (0.174) (0.560) (0.444) (0.366) (0.283) 
ESG Indicator  0.640*** 0.603*** 0.578***  0.829*** 0.692*** 0.727*** 
  (0.088) (0.079) (0.080)  (0.080) (0.051) (0.051) 
Index Indicator   -0.112* -0.096   -0.119*** -0.104** 
   (0.047) (0.054)   (0.030) (0.039) 
Intercept 0.045 0.265*** 0.250*** 0.207*** 0.163 0.378** 0.184 0.131 
 (0.079) (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.147) (0.118) (0.101) (0.077) 
Fund Type FE 0.02 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.29 
𝑅2 800 800 800 671 800 800 800 671 
N 291 291 291 193 291 291 291 193 





 0.822** 0.775***   0.804** 0.671*  




  -0.097    -0.702**  






(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Fund SRI Fraction - Account SRI 
Fraction)2 
0.004 0.011 0.003 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
ESG Indicator × Account SRI 
Fraction  
 0.062*** 0.050** 0.055** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Index Indicator × Account SRI 
Fraction  
  0.057*** 0.053*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Log Distance in Miles    -0.011** 
    (0.003) 
Intercept 0.179*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.258*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) 
Account Fixed Effects 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Fund Fixed Effects 7,665,554 7,665,554 7,665,554 6,364,951 
𝑅2 346 346 346 308 
N 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.004 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Fund SRI Fraction - Account SRI 
Fraction)2 
-0.000 0.009 0.001 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
ESG Indicator × Account SRI 
Fraction  
 0.076*** 0.064** 0.073** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) 
Index Indicator × Account SRI 
Fraction  
  0.053** 0.050* 
   (0.020) (0.021) 
Log Distance in Miles    -0.011* 
    (0.004) 
Intercept 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.189*** 0.274*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.030) 
Account Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
N 7,544,769 7,544,769 7,544,769 6,352,825 







(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Fund SRI Fraction - Account SRI 
Fraction)2 
0.004 0.011 0.002 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
ESG Indicator × Account SRI 
Fraction  
 0.061*** 0.048*** 0.053** 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
Index Indicator × Account SRI 
Fraction  
  0.058*** 0.055*** 
   (0.015) (0.016) 
Log Distance in Miles    -0.010** 
    (0.003) 
Intercept 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 0.243*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.022) 
Account Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 7,665,554 7,665,554 7,665,554 6,364,951 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Fund SRI Fraction - Account SRI 
Fraction)2 
-0.001 0.008 0.000 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
ESG Indicator × Account SRI 
Fraction  
 0.072*** 0.060** 0.069** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
Index Indicator × Account SRI 
Fraction  
  0.053* 0.050* 
   (0.021) (0.022) 
Log Distance in Miles    -0.010* 
    (0.005) 
Intercept 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.177*** 0.258*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.030) 
Account Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
N 7,544,769 7,544,769 7,544,769 6,352,825 








Table B.A6. Relationship Between Zip Code Ideology and SRI Percent in Favor 
This table reports information on the relationship between an account’s votes on SRI proposals and the political voting of the account’s zip code. 
Observations are at the account level. The sample is limited to individuals with SRI votes who own at least one mutual fund and for whom I observe 
their zip code and that zip code’s 2016 Presidential Election results. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
Dep. Variable: SRI Percent in Favor (1) (2) 
 All Accounts with SRI Votes All Accounts with 10+ SRI Votes 
Zip Code Democrat 2-Party Share 0.160*** 0.165*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.210*** 0.167*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
𝑅2 0.004 0.005 









Table B.A7. Representation on Management and Governance Proposals 
This table presents a regression of fund ideology on the mean ideology of its underlying individual investors for different proposal types. Specifically, 
I estimate: 
?̅?𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∑ ?̅?𝑎
𝑎∈Θ𝑓
+ 𝜈𝑓 
In which 𝑓 indexes funds, 𝑎 indexes individual accounts, Θ𝑓 is the set of accounts at fund 𝑓, are at the fund level, with accounts aggregated within 
a fund. ?̅?𝑓 and ?̅?𝑎 are fund 𝑓’s and account 𝑎’s voting results. In Panel A, they represent the fraction of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals 
voted in favor; in Panel B, the fraction of management-sponsored proposals voted in favor; and in Panel C, the fraction of all proposals voted in line 
with management (which is to say, in favor of management-sponsored proposals and opposed to shareholder-sponsored proposals). The sample is 
limited to funds and individuals with at least 10 votes in the category, and to funds with at least 15 qualifying individual investors. Below the table, 
I include the impact on 𝛽1 of including coefficients, along with standard errors, calculated using the b1x2 STATA function created in Gelbach 
(2016). Standard errors clustered at fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 









Panel A. Governance Proposals 
 Funds Weighted Equally Funds Weighted by Number of Accounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




0.525** 0.164 0.423* 0.349 0.285 -0.021 0.899 0.212 
(0.185) (0.198) (0.170) (0.179) (0.501) (0.516) (0.494) (0.526) 
ESG Indicator  0.291*** 0.234*** 0.255***  0.373*** 0.243*** 0.401*** 
  (0.072) (0.065) (0.062)  (0.082) (0.067) (0.083) 
Index Indicator   -0.134*** -0.157***   -0.113** -0.129** 
   (0.027) (0.034)   (0.043) (0.039) 
Intercept 0.310*** 0.406*** 0.364*** 0.403*** 0.297* 0.378** 0.161 0.369** 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.127) (0.132) (0.128) (0.129) 
Fund Type FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
𝑅2 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.36 
N 915 915 915 776 915 915 915 776 





 0.361* 0.290*   0.306* 0.200  




  -0.188*    -0.814**  









Panel B. Management-Sponsored Proposals 
 Funds Weighted Equally Funds Weighted by Number of Accounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




0.234 0.010 0.072 0.187 0.189 0.122 0.198 0.472** 
(0.127) (0.103) (0.103) (0.114) (0.115) (0.112) (0.111) (0.156) 
ESG Indicator  -0.155** -0.154** -0.150**  -0.108 -0.105 -0.102 
  (0.055) (0.054) (0.051)  (0.084) (0.084) (0.076) 
Index Indicator   0.018** 0.019*   0.008* 0.014 
   (0.007) (0.009)   (0.004) (0.007) 
Intercept 0.737*** 0.947*** 0.886*** 0.777*** 0.793*** 0.856*** 0.783*** 0.525*** 
 (0.119) (0.095) (0.096) (0.107) (0.105) (0.103) (0.102) (0.145) 
Fund Type FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
𝑅2 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.23 
N 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,274 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,274 





 0.212 0.209   0.067 0.065  




  -0.059    -0.074  









Panel C. All Proposals 
 Funds Weighted Equally Funds Weighted by Number of Accounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




0.366* 0.010 0.135 0.197 0.115 -0.070 0.367* 0.463* 
(0.177) (0.128) (0.111) (0.117) (0.200) (0.175) (0.146) (0.187) 
ESG Indicator  -0.176*** -0.169** -0.165**  -0.159* -0.136 -0.142* 
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.050)  (0.074) (0.071) (0.063) 
Index Indicator   0.032*** 0.030**   0.031*** 0.028*** 
   (0.009) (0.010)   (0.005) (0.008) 
Intercept 0.604*** 0.925*** 0.807*** 0.751*** 0.845*** 1.011*** 0.613*** 0.528** 
 (0.161) (0.116) (0.100) (0.105) (0.180) (0.158) (0.131) (0.169) 
Fund Type FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
𝑅2 0.02 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.29 
N 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,281 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,281 





 0.359* 0.343*   0.186 0.160  




  -0.109    -0.411***  










Table B.A8. Alternative Specification - Representation 
This table presents a regression of fund ideology on the mean ideology of its underlying individual investors. Specifically, I estimate: 
∑ ?̅?𝑎
𝑎∈Θ𝑓
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̅?𝑓 + 𝜈𝑓 
In which 𝑓 indexes funds, 𝑎 indexes individual accounts, Θ𝑓 is the set of accounts at fund 𝑓, and ?̅?𝑓 and ?̅?𝑎 are fund 𝑓’s and 
account 𝑎’s fractions of SRI proposals voted in favor. Observations are at the fund level, with accounts aggregated within a fund. The 
sample is limited to funds and individuals with at least 10 SRI votes, and to funds with at least 15 qualifying individual investors. 
Below the table, I include the impact on 𝛽1 of including coefficients, along with standard errors, calculated using the b1x2 STATA 
function created in Gelbach (2016). Standard errors clustered at fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 








 Funds Weighted Equally Funds Weighted by Number of Accounts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fund Fraction in 
Favor of SRI 
Proposals 
0.054* 0.000 0.006 0.011 0.007 -0.009 0.004 0.004 
(0.023) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
ESG Indicator  0.268*** 0.264*** 0.264***  0.134* 0.130* 0.132* 
  (0.043) (0.041) (0.044)  (0.054) (0.053) (0.051) 
Index Indicator   0.019*** 0.019***   0.021*** 0.018*** 
   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.003) (0.002) 
Intercept 0.269*** 0.273*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.269*** 0.261*** 0.265*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fund Type FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
𝑅2 0.05 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.00 0.20 0.32 0.40 
N 800 800 800 671 800 800 800 671 





 0.054* 0.053*   0.016* 0.015*  




  -0.005    -0.012*  











Table B.A9. Number of Funds Available 
This table presents regressions of fund ideology on the ideology of individual investors, interacted with the number of available options within a 
category. Specifically, I estimate: 
?̅?𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̅?𝑎 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑓 + 𝛽3?̅?𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑓 + 𝑎𝑓  
In which 𝑓 indexes funds, 𝑎 indexes individual accounts, ?̅?𝑓 and ?̅?𝑎 are fund 𝑓’s and account 𝑎’s fractions of SRI proposals voted in favor, and 𝑁𝑓  
is a vector containing the number of funds in the fund’s CRSP objective code and the number of funds in the fund’s institution. Observations are at 
the fund level, with accounts aggregated within a fund. The sample is limited to funds and individuals with at least 10 SRI votes, and to funds with 
at least 15 qualifying individual investors. Standard errors clustered at fund shareholder meeting level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 










 Funds Weighted Equally 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
For % on SRI Props, Fund Mean Owner 0.965* 0.167 1.024** 0.305 
(0.373) (0.278) (0.324) (0.207) 
Number of Funds in CRSP Objective 
Code 
0.000 0.000   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
For % on SRI Props, Fund Mean Owner × 
Number of Funds in CRSP Objective 
Code 
-0.000 -0.000   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
Number of Funds in Institution   -0.003 -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.001) 
For % on SRI Props, Fund Mean Owner × 
Number of Funds in Institution 
  0.001 -0.000 
   (0.006) (0.004) 
ESG Indicator  0.568***  0.481*** 
  (0.092)  (0.083) 
Intercept -0.088 0.122 0.018 0.196** 
 (0.108) (0.081) (0.097) (0.071) 
Fund Type FE No No No No 
𝑅2 0.07 0.16 0.19 0.25 
N 677 677 677 677 









Table B.A10. Equity Ownership – Leave-One-Out SRI % 
This table presents estimates designed to capture whether features of an individual’s firm holdings predict her ideology.. I estimate 
?̅?𝑎(−𝑐) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑐 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
In which 𝑎 indexes accounts, 𝑡 indexes years, 𝑐 indexes firms, ?̅?𝑎(−𝑐) is account 𝑎’s fraction of SRI proposals voted in favor excluding all votes from 
firm 𝑐 meetings, and 𝑋𝑐 is a vector of industry categories. Standard errors clustered at the account and firm level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Variable: SRI 
Percentage of 
Holder 
     
      
Fossil Fuels -1.31***  -1.44***  -1.70*** 
 (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.31) 
Renewable Energy 8.27**  8.60**  8.72*** 
 (2.54)  (2.66)  (2.59) 
KLD SRI Score  -0.09* -0.10*   




   -0.27** -0.31** 
    (0.09) (0.09) 
Constant 27.36*** 27.49*** 27.49*** 27.63*** 27.69*** 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 3,131,666 2,726,918 2,726,918 2,726,918 2,726,918 




Table B.A11. Alternative Specification—Wealth and Ideology 
This table presents regressions of fund ideology on the ideology of individual investors, interacted with the 
investor’s stake amount. Specifically, I estimate: 
?̅?𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̅?𝑎 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑓 + 𝛽3?̅?𝑎 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎𝑓  
In which 𝑓 indexes funds, 𝑎 indexes individual accounts, ?̅?𝑓 and ?̅?𝑎 are fund 𝑓’s and account 𝑎’s fractions 
of SRI proposals voted in favor, and 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 represents the log stake value of account 𝑎 in fund 𝑓.  
In columns 3 and 4, I add interaction of ?̅?𝑎 with the account’s (log) number of SRI votes cast. Observations 
are at the individual fund-pairing. The sample is limited to funds with at least 10 SRI votes, and to funds 
with at least 15 qualifying individual investors. Standard errors clustered at fund shareholder meeting level 
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Account Percent in Favor -0.045 -0.047* -0.047* -0.049* 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
Log Stake Value -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Account Percent in Favor 
× Log Stake Value 
0.005* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ESG Fund  0.672*** 0.672*** 0.672*** 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
ESG Fund × Log Stake 
Value 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Account SRI Votes   0.000  
   (0.000)  
Account Percent in Favor 
× Account SRI Votes 
  0.000  
  (0.000)  
    0.001 
Log Account SRI Votes    (0.003) 
    0.001 
Account Percent in Favor 
× Log Account SRI Votes 
   (0.001) 
0.267*** 0.265*** 0.264*** 0.262*** 
Constant (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) 
 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.09 
𝑅2 795,607 795,607 795,607 795,607 
N 341 341 341 341 










Table B.A12. Relationship Between Vote Frequency and Ideology 
This table presents estimations of the relationship between vote frequency and ideology. Panel A presents regressions of an account’s support for 
SRI proposals on turnout rate, conditional on turning out. The left hand side variable is the account’s fraction of SRI proposals voted in favor. Panel 
B presents regressions of an account’s zip code two-party voting share earned by Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election on turnout 
rate (unconditionally). Turnout rate is defined as the number of shareholder ballots cast divided by the number of shareholder ballot opportunities. 
In both panels, observations are at the account level. I also include, on the right-hand side, the account’s log total equity stake portfolio value, 
calculated as the sum of the account’s individual stake values. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 
0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
Dep. Variable: SRI Fraction in 
Favor 
(1) (2) (3) 
 All Accounts with SRI Votes All Accounts with SRI Votes All Accounts with 10+ SRI Votes 
Voting Rate -0.094*** -0.109*** -0.113*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log Equity Portfolio Value  -0.028*** -0.027*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.356*** 0.698*** 0.686*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
𝑅2 0.006 0.025 0.018 










Dep. Variable: Zip Code 
Republican 2 Party Share 
(1) (2) 
Voting Rate 2.416*** 1.349*** 
 (0.040) (0.061) 
Log Equity Portfolio Value  -0.281*** 
  (0.012) 
Constant 45.039*** 49.205*** 
 (0.011) (0.147) 
𝑅2 0.002 0.002 









Table B.A13. Support for SRI Proposals 
In this table, I calculate the support for SRI proposals among all mutual fund holders, using a series of imputation strategies to impute 
the support. Each column contains estimates of a regression of SRI support on the intercept. All regressions are drawn from a sample 
of 15 million accounts that own mutual funds. The dependent variable is the percent of SRI proposals that the account is in favor of. In 
column 1, I limit the sample to individuals with direct equity votes. In column 2, I again limit the sample to individuals with direct 
equity votes, but weight each observation by its inverse probability weight, with weights calculated using the logit regression in the 
Online Appendix. In column 3, I estimate a regression of SRI support on account portfolio and zip code variables using the subsample 
with equity votes, which I show in the Online Appendix, and use this regression to predict the SRI percentage for all accounts in the 
sample, regardless of whether they actually have equity votes. I then use the imputed SRI percentage as the dependent variable. In 
column 4, for all accounts in the data, I calculate the zip code mean SRI support, and then, for the sample of 15 million accounts, 
estimate support for SRI using the account’s zip code mean SRI as a proxy for the account’s support. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
SRI Percent in Favor 
Equal-Weighted IPW-weighted Instrumental Variable Zip Code Means 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 29.562*** 31.465*** 31.922*** 30.678*** 
 (0.070) (0.151) (0.001) (0.002) 







Figure B.B1. Relationship Between Zip Code Ideology and SRI Percent in 
Favor 
This figure displays a binned scatterplot of the relationship between zip code-level voting results and 
account-level fraction of SRI proposals voted in favor. The y-axis variable is the fraction of SRI proposals 
that the account is in favor of. The x-axis variable is the account’s zip code two-party voting share earned 
by Hillary Clinton in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. The sample consists of accounts with votes on 
SRI proposals. 
Panel A. All Accounts with SRI Votes 
 





Figure B.B2. Replication of Figure 3 with Zip Code Ideology 
This figure plots fund votes and the aggregate zip code ideology of the individuals who own the 
fund. Observations are at the fund level. Zip code Democrat share is calculated as the two-party 
share earned by Hillary Clinton in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. The sample is limited to 
funds with at least 100 qualifying accounts and 15 votes on SRI proposals. Fund Votes on SRI 
proposals refers to the fund’s percentage of the time voting in favor of SRI proposals; Fund’s 
Account Mean Zip Code Democrat Shares refers to the average, across investors in the fund, of 







Figure B.B3. Points in Fund Distribution 
This figure plots fund votes and the aggregate votes of the individuals who own the fund. 
Observations are at the fund level. The sample is limited to individuals with at least 10 votes on 
SRI proposals and funds with at least 10 qualifying accounts and 15 votes on SRI proposals. 
Fund Votes on SRI proposals refers to the fund’s percentage of the time voting in favor of SRI 
proposals; Fund’s Account 𝑗th Percentile Votes on SRI Proposals refers to the 𝑗th percentile, 
across investors in the fund, of their percentage of the time voting in favor of SRI proposals. 
 
Panel A. 10th Percentile 
 






Panel C. 50th Percentile 
 











Figure B.B4. Distribution of fund ideology by fund type 
This figure shows the distribution of fund ideologies, within certain fund types. Fund types are based on 
CRSP object codes, clockwise from upper left: EDYG, EDYB, EDCS, EDCM. Each plot is a histogram of 






Figure B.B5. Sample Form N-PX 
This Figure presents excerpts from public fund filings. Panel A contains page 28 of 423 of the 
Form N-PX filing of TFS Capital Investment Trust, available at 
https://sec.report/Document/0001398344-17-011346/fp0027623_npx.htm. Panel B contains page 














Figure B.B6. Voters and Nonvoters 
In this Table, I show evidence related to the ideology of non-voters. Panel A shows how votes in favor of 
SRI associate with turnout rate. Panel A is limited to equity owners who turn out at least once, and who 
have the right to participate in at least five meetings. Panel B shows how zip code ideology associates with 
turnout rate. Zip code ideology is the number of votes for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Election divided by the total number of votes for Trump and Hillary Clinton. Panel B is limited to equity 
owners who have the right to participate in at least five meetings. 
 













Appendix B.C. NOMINATE Estimation 
In this appendix I describe the method by which I estimate NOMINATE. 
I start by restricting to individuals who own equities, and who vote on at least 20 SRI 
proposals. I sample 5,000 individaul investor accounts at random. Elsewhere in the paper, I restrict 
to those with votes on at least 10 SRI proposals, but dimension reduction requires greater input 
(see, e.g., Bolton et al. (2020), which uses a minimum of 50 votes). I restrict to SRI proposals, as 
elsewhere in the paper. I use R’s wnominate function, minimum 20 votes. 
The intention here is different from that in Bolton et al. (2020). Whereas Bolton et al. 
(2020) sought to describe the entire dimensional space of shareholder voting, I focus on a single 
type of proposal, chosen because it is ideologically coherent. Thus, my aim is simply to show, via 
unsupervised learning, that an investor’s percentage voting in favor of SRI proposals is a suitable 
stand-in for her ideological position. 
First, I show that the bulk of information from SRI proposals is contained within a single 
dimension. In dimension reduction, “scree plots” are used to determine an appropriate number of 
dimensions. The scree plot contains the eigenvalue of each dimension, representing the portion of 
variation that the dimension captures. Researchers use dimensions up to the point there is a “kink” 
in the scree plot. Figure C1 displays the scree plot of my NOMINATE estimation. The first 
dimension captures the bulk of variation, and there is a pronounced kink following the first 
dimension. 
Next, I show that there is a clear orientation in the dimension. Figure C2 displays the 
distribution across proposals of the proposal’s dimension 1 spreads, where a negative spread 
corresponds to a high score in dimension 1. Virtually all proposals have negative spreads, implying 
that a vote against consistently moves a voter’s score down and a vote in favor consistently moves 
a voter’s score up. 
Finally, I show that one’s percentage in favor of SRI proposals serves as a reasonable proxy 
for one’s ideology in this space. Figure C3 shows a scatterplot, for the 5,000 accounts in the 
sample, their dimension 1 score and their percentage in favor. Dimension 1 score is monotonically 
increasing in percentage in favor of SRI. Throughout the text, I use percentage in favor of SRI 
proposals as a representation for individual ideology with respect to SRI proposals, since it is easy 





Figure B.C1: Scree Plot of NOMINATE Dimensions 
 





Figure B.C3: Scatterplot of Percentage in Favor of SRI Proposals on 






Appendix B.D. Imputation of Glass Lewis Recommendations 
 In this Appendix, I describe how I impute Glass Lewis recommendations for shareholder 
meetings in the years 2011–2017.  
The procedure is inspired by Bubb and Catan (2020), who impute Glass Lewis 
recommendations based off the method of Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal (2015). The basic 
methodology is as follows: Proxy Insights provides a list of institutional investors and their 
percentages voting in agreement with Glass Lewis on management proposals and (separately) on 
shareholder proposals. The votes of institutions with high rates of agreement with Glass Lewis 
are then used to infer Glass Lewis recommendations. 
The goals of this document are as follows: (i) to make explicit a methodology for 
imputing recommendations; (ii) to ground the imputation process in probability calculations, 
including making assumptions explicit; (iii) to describe how simple imputations face a trade-off 
between the portion of proposals a method is able to impute and bias in imputation, which can be 
corrected by iteratively incorporating additional information. In particular, simpler methods 
could be biased towards consensus—more likely to correctly designate a Glass Lewis 
recommendation if it agrees with the management and with ISS recommendations. Bubb and 
Catan (2020) likely avoided such bias by limiting to institutions with very high rates of 
agreement with Glass Lewis (my imputations have a high rate of agreement with imputations 
created using their method), with the trade-off that they lack sufficient qualifying votes for most 
proposals (Bubb and Catan (2020) note that they are able to impute 34% of proposals). 
The rest of this Appendix is organized as follows. First, I describe the data. Next, I show 
probability calculations, including describing sources of bias and how they can be eliminated. 
Next, I describe my methodology in detail. Finally, I present some statistics. 
 
Data 
 Following Bubb and Catan (2020), from Proxy Insights, I collect, for each institution, the 
percentage of management proposals and the percentage of shareholder proposals on which the 
institution votes with Glass Lewis.  I view the percentages as approximations, since 
ProxyInsights does not specify the time span over which the data is collected. 
Next, I do a text merge by institution name with ISS Voting Analytics to obtain the votes by 
funds associated with that institution, starting with a fuzzy text match using the STATA function 
reclink and then hand-checking all algorithmically matched names.  In total, I use the votes of 
361 matched institutions. 
For each proposal, I remove institutions for which their funds do not all vote the same way, since 
the Proxy Insights data is at the institution level.  That leaves a single vote for each institution on 
the proposal in question. I remove votes of “None”, “Did Not Vote”, and “Split”. I remove Say-
on-Pay frequency votes, since those do not have For or Against votes. I code “For” votes as 1 
and “Against” Votes as 0. 
ProxyInsights reports the number of votes for each institution-sponsor pairing. I drop institutions 
for which the number of votes reported by Proxy Insight is less than 1/5 the number of votes I 
observe from ISS Voting Analytics. 
 
Methodology 
The probability of a Glass Lewis recommendation on a given proposal, conditional on the 
observed votes, is: 
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Pr(𝐺 = 1|𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠) =
Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺 = 1)
Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺 = 1) 𝑔 + Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺 = 0) (1 − 𝑔)
∗ 𝑔    (1) 
In which 𝐺 is the Glass Lewis recommendation on the proposal, 𝑔 ≡ Pr (𝐺 = 1) is the 
unconditional probability of a For recommendation, and 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 are the observed votes by 
institutions. 
 
Assumption 1. Each institution’s conditional probability of voting in favor of a given proposal is 
independent of other institutions’ conditional probability of voting in favor of the proposal. 
 
Assumption 1 allows me to re-write Pr (𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺) as the product of each institution’s individual 
vote probability. (The assumption will weaken in future iterations as I add information to the 
conditioning set of the probability). From ProxyInsights, I observe 𝛼𝑗 ≡ Pr (𝑣𝑗 = 𝐺), institution 
𝑗’s unconditional probability of voting in line with the Glass Lewis recommendation. For each 
institution, the percentage is given separately for management-sponsored and shareholder-
sponsored proposals, so I treat the two separately as well. For clarity, I omit the 𝑠 subscript 
designating the sponsor in all equations, as well as the subscript 𝑝 designating the proposal. I can 
now re-write the numerator of Equation (1) as: 
 




Where 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 index the set of institutions that voted on the proposal in equation and 𝛼𝑗1 ≡
Pr (𝑣𝑗 = 𝐺|𝐺 = 1), institution 𝑗’s probability of a vote in line with Glass Lewis, conditional on a 
Glass Lewis recommendation in favor. Pr (𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺 = 0) is defined similarly to Pr (𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺 =
1), using 𝛼𝑗0 ≡ (𝑣𝑗 = 𝐺|𝐺 = 0). 
 
First Iteration. 
Although an institution may have different probabilities of agreeing with Glass Lewis when it 
votes For or Against, I do not observe such probabilities separately. Thus, for the first iteration, I 
make an additional assumption. 
 
Assumption 2. 𝛼𝑗1 = 𝛼𝑗0∀𝑗. Each institution’s probability of voting with Glass Lewis is the same 
for a recommendation in favor or opposed. 
 
In other words, I assume, for iteration 1: 
 





To reduce the effect of the assumptions, for this first iteration, I restrict the institutional space 
only to strong followers of Glass Lewis, with 𝛼𝑗 > .98 (for management proposals) or 𝛼𝑗 > .96 
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(for shareholder proposals).51 This restriction limits the effect of violations of the assumptions. 
For example, suppose an institution has a 99% agreement rate with Glass Lewis, and Glass 
Lewis votes in favor of 80% of management proposals. Then αj1 − αj0 is at most 5%. Here and 
for the rest of the process, I cap 𝛼𝑗 at 0.01 and 0.99, to prevent any single institution from being 
too powerful in the imputation. I estimate Equations (1) and (3) to generate, for each proposal, 
Pr(𝐺 = 1|𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠). I provisionally designate a Glass Lewis recommendation for proposals that 
have a probability greater than 0.999 or less than 0.001. 
 
I note that this method is, in practice, highly similar to Bubb and Catan (2020). Like them, I limit 
to “followers” of Glass Lewis by restricting to funds with extremely high rates of agreement. In 
practice, a proposal with a single voter (no matter how high her 𝛼𝑗) is not enough to reach the 
0.002 or 0.998 threshold necessary to earn a provisional designation, but two strong followers, or 
three of four, is. The only substantial difference is that they deem two out of three sufficient for 
an imputation, whereas with this method, two out of three strong followers would not produce a 
high (or low) enough probability to generate a provisional imputation.52 
 
In the results section, I show that these provisional imputations are very close to the final 
imputations, but I only generate numbers for roughly 27.5% of the proposals due to the tight 





Having obtained an initial set of provisional imputations, I can now begin to weaken 
assumptions using data obtained from the first imputation. 
 
For these iterations, I use the results from the first iteration to calculate, for a given institution, 
separate probabilities of voting with Glass Lewis when it recommends in favor and when it 
recommends against. (As before, the imputation is split, for each institution, by proposal 
sponsor). I discuss the intuition behind this split first. Then, for institutions for which there is 
enough data in all four combinations of Glass Lewis recommendations and ISS 
recommendations for a sponsor, I further split into separate probabilities of the institution voting 
in favor when ISS recommends in favor and when it recommends against. I discuss this second 
split below. 
 
Separate agreement rates for Glass Lewis recommendations in favor and against 
I initially assumed 𝛼𝑗 = αj1 = αj0, but now I can remove Assumption 2 and adjust 𝛼𝑗1 and 𝛼𝑗0 
upwards or downwards based on their observed empirical ratio to each other. Assumption 2 
creates a bias towards “consensus.” On management-sponsored proposals, most institutions are 
more likely to deviate from Glass Lewis when it opposes management rather than supports it, 
causing this method to overestimate Glass Lewis’s propensity to follow management unless I 
 
51 I use a lower threshold for shareholder proposals since fewer institutions vote with a near-100% agreement rate on 
shareholder proposals, and since agreement with Glass Lewis on shareholder proposals is more “informative” than 
voting with Glass Lewis on management proposals. 
52 For example,with 𝑔 = 0.8, a single institution with the maximal 𝛼𝑗 = 0.99 voting in favor would generate 
Pr (𝐺 = 1) of 0.997, whereas two institutions with 𝛼𝑗 = 0.98 voting in favor would generate Pr (𝐺 = 1) of 0.9999. 
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limit to a small group of close followers. Instead, I can use 𝛼𝑗1 and 𝛼𝑗0 separately, where the 
strength of an institution’s signal is captured by 𝛼𝑗1 + 𝛼𝑗0. 
 
This method sharpens predictions by increasing the signal strength of a vote against 
management. Consider a proposal with a single voter that has a 92.4% agreement rate with Glass 
Lewis, and assume Glass Lewis’s percentage voting with management is 𝑔 = 0.8. Using 
Equation 3, a no vote by the institution corresponds to a 24.8% chance of Glass Lewis in favor 
and a yes vote corresponds to a 98.0% chance of Glass Lewis in favor. If I exploit the fact that 
the voter agrees with Glass Lewis 98% of the time on For recs and only 70% on Against recs 
(commonly observed numbers), then a no vote corresponds to a 10.3% chance of Glass Lewis in 
favor and a yes vote corresponds to a 92.9% chance of Glass Lewis in favor. By eliminating 
Assumption 2, the no vote becomes more informative than the yes vote. 
 
Eliminating Assumption 2 also reduces the signal strength of a voter whose 𝛼 is high only 
because it tends to vote with management. Consider two institutions with 𝛼𝑗 = 0.8, again 
assuming 𝑔 = 0.8. The first always agrees with management, so 𝛼𝑗1 = 1 and 𝛼𝑗0 and 0. The 
second agrees with GL equally on recommendations for and against, 𝛼𝑗′1 = 𝛼𝑗′0 = 0.8. With 
Assumption 2, these institutions would be treated equally. Instead, using Equation 2, a vote in 
favor or opposed by the first institution each correspond to a posterior probability of 0.8, 
unchanged from the prior probability—no information. For the second institution, a vote in favor 
corresponds to a posterior probability of 94.1 and a vote against corresponds to a posterior 
probability of 50.0%. The second institution is far more informative about recommendations. 
 
To estimate 𝛼𝑗1 and 𝛼𝑗0, I solve for 𝛼𝑗0 in the equation: 
𝛼𝑗 = 𝜐𝑗𝛼0𝑗𝑚𝑗 + 𝛼0𝑗(1 −𝑚𝑗) 
Where 𝛼𝑗 is institution 𝑗’s agreement rate from Proxy Insight, 𝜈𝑗 is 𝑗’s observed empirical ratio 
of 𝛼𝑗1 to 𝛼𝑗0 from the first iteration, and 𝑚𝑗 is the fraction of 𝑗’s proposals in the first iteration 
that Glass Lewis recommended in favor of. I do it this way, rather than simply estimate 𝛼0𝑗 from 
the data, because the initial iteration may have produced a bias slate of recommendations; this 
method tethers 𝛼𝑗 to ProxyInsight’s number. I calculate 𝛼𝑗1 and 𝛼𝑗0 only for institutions with 
votes on at least 200 proposals where Glass Lewis (provisionally) recommended for and 200 
where it (provisionally) recommended against; otherwise, I continue to use 𝛼𝑗1 = 𝛼𝑗0 = 𝛼𝑗. 
 
Separate agreement rates for ISS votes in favor and votes against 
 
Next, for institutions with enough votes, I weaken the strength of the independence assumption, 
Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺) = ∏Pr (𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒|𝐺), by incorporating additional information. We should expect 
Assumption 1 to be false when funds have a reason, not totally captured by the Glass Lewis 
recommendation, to vote a certain way. Of course, there are any number of plausible reasons, but 
ISS recommendations loom large: conditional on a positive Glass Lewis recommendation on a 
management proposal, institutions with high Glass Lewis agreement rates are far more likely to 
vote against a proposal that ISS opposes as compared to one that it supports. After the estimation 
above, I can adjust for ISS variation among those with sufficient votes: 𝛼𝑗𝐺
𝐼 ≡ Pr (𝑣𝑗 = 𝐺|𝐺, 𝐼) 
 
Consider the following GL-ISS tabulation matrix: 
 
 240 
  Glass Lewis 
 For Against Total 
ISS 
For 70 10 80 
Against 10 10 20 
Total 80 20 100 
 
And now consider an institution 𝑗 that follows ISS without regards to Glass Lewis’s 
recommendation. Without accounting for ISS, I would estimate 𝛼𝑗1 = 87.5 and 𝛼𝑗0 = 50.0, a 





𝐼=0 = 0, and I accurately capture that there is no signal as to Glass 
Lewis’s recommendation. 
 
The final equation estimates 
Pr(𝐺 = 1|𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠; 𝐼) =
Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺 = 1; 𝐼) 𝑔𝐼
Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺 = 1; 𝐼) 𝑔𝐼 + Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺 = 0; 𝐼)𝑔𝐼
    (1′) 
 
Where 
Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠|𝐺; 𝐼) =∏({𝑣𝑗 = 1}𝛼𝑗𝐺





𝐼 ≡ 𝑃𝑟(𝑣𝑗 = 𝐺|𝐺 = 1, 𝐼) and 𝛼𝑗0
𝐼 ≡ 𝑃𝑟(𝑣𝑗 = 𝐺|𝐺 = 0, 𝐼), I start by fixing overall 




𝐼=0 and ?̂?𝑗𝐺 as the fraction of institution 𝑗’s proposals with 
imputed vote 𝐺 that have ISS in favor. Then I can solve ?̂?𝑗𝐺 = ?̂?𝑗𝐺𝛼𝑗𝐺
𝐼=0?̂?𝑗𝐺 + 𝛼𝑗𝐺
𝐼=0(1 − ?̂?𝑗𝐺) for 
𝛼𝑗𝐺
𝐼=0.  
I only separately estimate 𝛼𝑗𝐺
𝐼=1 and 𝛼𝑗𝐺
𝐼=0 for institutions with at least 200 observations for each 
of the four permutations of ISS recommendations and imputed Glass Lewis recommendations 
(50 for shareholder-sponsored proposals). Otherwise, I use a single value, 𝛼𝑗𝐺
𝐼=1 = 𝛼𝑗𝐺
𝐼=0 = 𝛼𝑗𝐺, as 
calculated above. 
As in the first iteration, I round off the edges of 𝛼𝑗1and 𝛼𝑗0 at 0.01 and 0.99, and I limit to 
institutions with sufficiently strong signals, 𝛼𝑗1 + 𝛼𝑗0 > 1.4 if I use the single-split or 𝛼𝑗1
𝐼 +
𝛼𝑗0
𝐼 > 1.2 if I use the double-split (i.e. splitting by ISS recommendations). 
As before, I use a 0.2% and 99.8% threshold to impute observations. As an alternative, I could I 
set the final thresholds at 1% and 99% probability to minimize missing observations, which may 







In this section, I display a handful of metrics. First, I show the degree to which each iteration 
changes iterations. In the second iteration, I impute a much greater number of proposals than in 
the first iteration. In the following table, I show that there is a 99.99% agreement rate between 
iterations; the change from first iteration to second iteration is almost entirely due to capturing 









Change From First to Second Iteration 
 All Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals 
Iteration Number of 
Proposals Imputed 




Number of Votes 
Imputed 
1 65,396 (27.5%) 3,054,302 (46.7%) 1,644 (35.2%) 106,091 (53.7%) 
2 118,289 (49.7%) 4,643,102 (75.4%) 3,062 (65.6%) 162,093 (82.0%) 
2 (99% standard) 174,829 (73.5%) 5,693,894 (92.6%) 3,346 (71.6%) 171,464 (86.8%) 
Total in Data 237,792 6,150,408 4,670 197,594 
 
 
Agreement Rate Between First Iteration and Second Iteration, Proposal-Level 
 Iteration 2 
Iteration 1 Against For 
Against 4,889 0 
For 4 59,797 
 
 Iteration 2 (99% Standard) 
Iteration 1 Against For 
Against 5,081 0 







Chapter 2 Data Appendix 
C.1 Data sources and construction of variables  
For securities data, we use data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
For each month 𝑡, we calculate a firm’s lagged annual return for the one-year period ending in 
month 𝑡 − 1 by compounding one-month holding period returns over the 12-month period. We 
calculate annual abnormal returns for that same period as the annual return minus the value-
weighted annual return from CRSP. The variable yearly abnormal return used in our analyses is 
the buy-and-hold abnormal return measured as of one month prior to the record date. The one-year 
dividend yield is calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold return including dividends 
and the buy-and-hold return excluding dividends. The difference between returns including and 
excluding dividends used to compute the dividend yield is described on the CRSP website as the 
“Income Return,” and is available at: http://www.crsp.org/products/documentation/crsp-
calculations. Market equity is computed as price time shares outstanding from CRSP, measured as 
of the record date month. Some of the descriptive statistics and analyses rely on allocating firms 
into market capitalization quintiles. The market capitalization breakpoints we use for these sorts 
are from Ken French’s website at Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
We calculate book equity as the difference between stockholders’ equity and preferred 
stockholders’ equity, with certain substitutions in the case of missing variables, as described in 
Daniel and Titman (2016). We slightly alter the code provided on the WRDS website, available at 
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/support/applications/risk-and-valuation-




missing, the sum of Total Common Equity (CEQ) and Preferred Stock Par Value (PSTK) or, if 
either of those are missing, total assets (AT) minus liabilities (LT) minus minority interest (MIB). 
Book equity is defined as (i) stockholder’s equity, minus (ii) preferred stockholder’s equity, which 
is equal to preferred stock redemption value (PSTKRV) or, if missing, preferred stock liquidating 
value (PSTKL) or, if missing, preferred stock carrying value (PSTK), plus (iii) if not missing, 
balanced sheet deferred taxes (TXDITC), minus (iv) if not missing, the FASB106 adjustment 
(PRBA from the Compustat Pension Annual dataset).  
Tobin’s q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets (AT), where the 
market value of assets is defined as the sum of book value of assets (AT) and the market equity 
minus the book equity, as in Bhojraj et al. (2017). ROA is the ratio of EBIDTA to assets (AT), as 
in Brav et al. (2020). We winsorize Tobin’s q, ROA, and dividend yield at the 1% and 99% levels. 
We also use Total q from Peters and Taylor (2016), available on WRDS. Bartlett and Partnoy 
(2018) argue that Tobin’s q is not adopted properly in empirical work and recommend as a 
potential alternative the Total q from Peters and Taylor (2016). We repeat the analyses in Sections 
6 and 7 using Total q instead of Tobin’s q, and find substantially similar results. See Online 
Appendix Table D.A16. 
We obtain county vote totals for the 2016 presidential election from CQ Voting and 
Elections and the count of voting eligible adult population from the Census Bureau available 
at: https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/voting-
rights/cvap.2016.html. We compute the 2016 county presidential turnout as the number of county 
residents who cast ballots in the 2016 U.S. presidential election divided by the number of adult 
citizens. For county level variables, we merge to zip codes using the USPS ZIP Code Crosswalk 




(PD&R). Zip code-level demographic information is from the Census Bureau. Fraction over 65 is 
the fraction of zip code residents above age 65, defined as (DPSF0010015 + DPSF0010016 + 
DPSF0010017 + DPSF0010018 + DPSF0010019) / DPSF0010001). Density is calculated as the 
zip code population divided by land area in square meters, (DPSF0010001 / AREALAND). 
Fraction with bachelors and fraction with post-bachelors are zip-code level five-year averages 
from the U.S. Census as of 2017. Zip code employment is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We 
construct the variable fraction in Finance/Insurance by dividing the number of employed workers 
in Finance/Insurance by all-industries employment, both at the zip code level. Adjusted gross 
income data at the zip code level is from the IRS website available at: 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-statistics-zip-code-data-soi. 
The variable we use in our analyses denoted Zip code AGI is the average adjusted gross income 
in the prior calendar year in the account’s zip code.  
Information on whether a meeting was regular annual meeting or a special meeting is from 
ISS Voting Analytics. We construct an indicator variable equal to one for special meetings. The 
recommendation on the proposal by the proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) is from ISS Voting Analytics. The variable ISS against management as a binary variable that 
equals one if ISS has a recommendation other than “For” for a management proposal, or a “For” 
recommendation on a shareholder proposal. Institutional ownership is equal to the number of 
shares owned by institutions divided by the shares outstanding in the year prior to the meeting, 
both from Thomson Reuters.  
Table A1 below provides descriptive statistics on variables used in our analyses. Firm-
meeting variables are weighted at the firm-meeting level; firm-proposal variables are weighted at 




Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
 Average Stdev. 25th perc. Median 75th perc. 
Firm-meeting variables      
   Market equity (millions) 7,461 28,383 199 962 3,846 
   Yearly abnormal return -0.02 0.37 -0.22 -0.02 0.17 
   Dividend Yield Binary 0.48 0.50    
   Tobin’s q 1.96 1.44 1.06 1.43 2.23 
   ROA 0.03 0.24 0.02 0.08 0.14 
   Special meeting  0.08 0.27    
   Institutional Ownership 0.69 0.29 0.51 0.77 0.91 
      
Firm-proposal variables      
   ISS against management  0.10 0.31    
      
Zip code variables      
   2016 presidential turnout 0.63 0.08 0.58 0.63 0.68 
   Zip code income 11.35 0.56 10.95 11.26 11.64 
   Over 65 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.16 
   Density 1,829 4,898 224 716 1,509 
   Portion with Bachelors 0.45 0.19 0.30 0.44 0.59 
   Portion with Post-Bachelors 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.25 
   Portion in Finance/Insurance 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 
C.2. Matching of retail voting sample to ISS Voting Analytics 
C2.1. Overview 
To combine the proposals in the ISS Voting Analytics database with those in the retail 
shareholder set, we merge the ISS Voting Analytics database at the meeting level with the retail 
shareholder data by 6-digit CUSIP, meeting date, and record date. 
We merge at the proposal level using the order of the proposals within a meeting and their 
textual descriptions from the retail shareholder voting data and ISS Voting Analytics, which we 
describe in greater detail in Appendix C.A2.2. Within matched meetings, the retail voting sample 
and ISS Voting Analytics have roughly identical proposal slates, with one important exception: 
for 72% of meetings with director elections, the retail voting dataset reports the number of returned 
votes on the director elections but not the choices on individual directors. As a result, we exclude 




minor inconsistencies are in how the two sources treat withdrawn proposals, other minor items 
that appear on the proxy ballot (for example, some ballots include checkboxes for shareholders to 
indicate that they have no conflict of interest), as well as a handful of proposals that appear to be 
erroneously missing from ISS Voting Analytics. Appendix C.A.3 provides additional information 
regarding erroneous ISS Voting Analytics data that we corrected in the course of matching the 
retail voting proposal data to ISS Voting Analytics. 
Next, we merge additional proposal-level information from SharkRepellent. Unlike ISS 
Voting Analytics and the retail voting data, SharkRepellent proposals are unordered, so we match 
proposals by voting results and, using text matching, by proposal categories. We merge the retail 
shareholder voting data with CRSP at the 6-digit CUSIP-month level, matching the record date 
month in the shareholder voting data to the data month for CRSP. We restrict the analysis to firms 
in CRSP with share codes 10 or 11 and with a valid share price and shares outstanding information 
as of the record month. Following the merging with CRSP and ISS Voting Analytics, the final 
dataset has 4,725,390,872 account-proposal level observations. 
Using linking procedures from the Compustat/CRSP Merged Dataset, which links 
Compustat gvkeys to CRSP permnos, we merge at the firm level with Compustat, so that each 
meeting merges with the last Compustat fiscal year that ended on or before the record date. We 
merge the IRS zip code income data with the retail shareholder data at the zip code-calendar year 
level, lagging the zip code data by one year. 
Online Appendix Table D.A3, Panel A describes the portion of firms in the retail sample 
that we are able to match to CRSP in each year of the three-year sample period. We achieve 
coverage of 86% in 2015, 89% in 2016, and 90% in 2017, with higher coverage for larger firms, 




the intersection of ISS Voting Analytics and CRSP. The overall coverage is high, at 96% in 2015, 
99% in 2016, and 98% in 2017, with higher coverage for larger firms. Of the firms in CRSP that 
do not match to our retail voting data, most are small firms that also do not appear in ISS Voting 
Analytics; many of the remainder are unmatched because our retail data exclude meetings with 
record dates in 2014. We also report on institutional ownership in the firms covered in the retail 
data. To this end, we merge the retail voting data with institutional 13F ownership data from 
Thomson Reuters at the 6-digit CUSIP-year level, lagged by one year. Online Appendix Table 
D.A3, Panel C provides the coverage of retail voting firms in CRSP by institutional ownership 
quintile. For the subset of firms in CRSP that also appear in the Thomson Reuters 13F data, we 
achieve coverage of 95%, 96%, and 97%, respectively, in each of 2015–2017. 
C.2.2. Details on merging 
This section of the appendix provides the methodology for the proposal-level merger of 
the ISS Voting Analytics and retail voting datasets. The two datasets include slightly different 
samples of firms: of the 7,606 unique 6-digit CUSIPs in ISS Voting Analytics and the 6,782 unique 
6-digit CUSIPs in the retail voting data, 5,849 are in both. Nearly all of the 1,757 firms that appear 
in  only ISS Voting Analytics are investment funds. Nearly all of the 933 firms that appear only in 
the retail voting data are non-public firms. 
The retail voting sample data come in the form of two separate datasets: one at the firm-
meeting-account level, in which each row contains a string of votes representing the votes of an 
account for all proposals at that meeting (or is blank, if the account did not vote); and one at the 
proposal level, in which each row contains the text of a single proposal at a meeting. Both datasets 
include meetings from 2015 to 2017, although the proposal-level set excludes meetings with 2014 
record dates. The string of shareholder votes in the retail voting data is ordered as the proposals 




lettered, some have roman numerals or identifying tags). The retail voting dataset lacks any 
proposal-level identifying information other than the within-meeting order of votes. Thus, the 
proposal-level merge between the retail voting data and ISS Voting Analytics requires a three-way 
merge between retail voting data, retail proposal data, and ISS Voting Analytics. 
We begin by ordering the proposals in the retail proposal set so that they properly reflect 
the actual ballot order. From 90,964 proposals spanning 17,937 meetings in the original retail 
proposal set, there are 90,787 remaining once we remove proposal slates which are overall 
duplicates in CUSIP, meeting date, record date, proposal text and number of proposals (we retain 
one of the proposal slates). We remove meetings from the retail proposal set for which the meeting 
ID does not appear in the retail voting dataset. Following this step, we match these retail proposals 
to ISS Voting Analytics prior to matching to the other retail voting dataset so that we can use this 
match to correct any mis-orderings that remain. 
Meetings with multiple types of securities or multiple share classes may have different 
slates of proposals. For example, preferred stockholders may elect a different set of directors but 
otherwise vote for the same ballot items as common stockholders. Meetings in ISS Voting 
Analytics and the retail voting sample are defined slightly differently when there are multiple 
proposal slates. ISS Voting Analytics treats different proposal slates as separate meetings; the retail 
voting dataset labels the slates differently within the same meeting. Thus, a proposal that is voted 
on as part of two different proposal slates will appear as a duplicate. For consistency, we adopt the 
convention of reporting as a “meeting” a unique CUSIP-meeting date-record date. 
To match proposals across the ISS Voting Analytics and retail voting data, we begin by 
matching meetings by 6-digit CUSIP, meeting date, and record date. Of 18,925 meetings in the 




and 17,731 meetings in the retail voting data (of which 15,683 have CUSIPs which appear in ISS 
Voting Analytics), 14,587 meetings are in both datasets. There are several hundred meetings which 
match by CUSIP but not by meeting date and record date. Many appear to be due to simple 
discrepancies in the record date between the datasets, whereas others may be due to incorrect 
CUSIP matches. Finally, 89 are due to the fact that proxy contests are not in the retail voting data.  
Because ISS Voting Analytics lists multiple proposal slates as separate meetings, for the 
622 cases in which ISS Voting Analytics has multiple meetings by the same firm on the same day 
(166 of which are in the retail voting data), we separately hand-match their proposals to proposals 
from corresponding meetings. We also hand-match the 21 additional meetings with multiple 
profiles that are in ISS Voting Analytics but not in the previous group of 622. 
Next, for all of the remaining meetings, we match using the number of proposals at the 
meeting and the order of proposals. In both datasets, proposals within a meeting appear in the order 
in which they appear on the ballot. However, various discrepancies arise between the two datasets, 
in which both do not include precisely the same proposals in precisely the same order. Sources for 
these discrepancies include: (i) the retail voting data frequently condense multiple director election 
proposals into a single row with proposal text “#DIRECTOR” rather than a separate proposal for 
each director with the actual proposal text; (ii) the retail voting proposals are ordered 
unsystematically, with a mix of lexicographic and other kinds of ordering; (iii) there are some 
proposals about which the firms take different approaches, such as proposals to permit “other 
business,” check boxes to indicate whether the voter has a conflict of interest in the vote, and 
withdrawn proposals; (iv) ISS Voting Analytics is missing several hundred proposals from its 




within ISS Voting Analytics but one of the numbers is missing); and (v) for many meetings, ISS 
Voting Analytics, apparently erroneously, lists each proposal twice.  
To deal with these issues, for those meetings matched on CUSIP, meeting date, and record 
date, we provisionally match their constituent proposals in order, then use additional factors to 
properly merge the datasets proposal by proposal, including the proposal’s text description given 
in each dataset. ISS Voting Analytics proposals have a brief item description of the proposal 
produced by ISS Voting Analytics. For each proposal, the retail voting data have the first several 
hundred characters of the proposal text directly from the proxy statement. Starting from our match 
at the meeting level, we match at the proposal level in a series of stages. If two matched meetings 
have the same number of proposals, then we provisionally match the proposals in order. Because 
both ISS Voting Analytics and the retail voting data list their proposals in the order they appear on 
the proxy ballot, this should accurately match the two in most cases. As an added check, we 
conduct a text match to flag potentially mismatched proposals, that we later hand-check.  
Our text match is designed as follows. First, for each pair of meetings that are matched by 
6-digit CUSIP, record date, meeting date, and number of proposals, we calculate the string distance 
between the text description for all combinations of each of the ISS Voting Analytics proposals 
and each of the retail voting proposals within the matched meeting. The string distance we use is 
the Jaccard distance, which is the number of shared 5-character strings divided by the total number 
of 5-character strings. This generates, for a meeting with n proposals, an nxn matrix of Jaccard 
distances, in which (j,k) represents the ISS Voting Analytics proposal in the j’th spot’s distance 
from the retail dataset proposal in the k’th spot, and in which the diagonal represents the distances 
from the proposals “across from them” in the other dataset. We calculate a score for the meeting 




where a score of 1 indicates that each of the proposals match up better to the proposals across from 
them in the provisional match than they do to any other proposal in the meeting. For those meetings 
with scores below 0.99 or flagged for another reason, we check all proposals in the meeting by 
hand. Matches may be flagged if either (i) there is only one proposal in the meeting, but the 
proposal text in the retail data is not “#DIRECTOR,” or (ii) there are multiple ISS Voting Analytics 
proposals with “Elect Director” in the item description but one of the retail proposal texts is 
“#DIRECTOR”, implying that director elections for that meeting were condensed in the retail data. 
If an ISS Voting Analytics meeting and a retail dataset meeting that matched on CUSIP 
and meeting and record date do not have the same number of proposals, then, since the most likely 
reason is that the retail dataset frequently condenses multiple director elections into a single 
“#DIRECTOR” proposal, we similarly “condense” the ISS Voting Analytics meeting by removing 
all but one “Elect Director” proposal. If, after this process, the two matched meetings have the 
same number of proposals, then we repeat the process described above: we provisionally merge 
each “condensed” ISS Voting Analytics meeting to its corresponding retail dataset meeting on 
number of proposals, and, if they match, generate a match score and hand-check those with scores 
below 0.99 or flagged for another reason as described above. If matched meetings still have a 
different number of proposals, then we manually hand-match their proposals. 
Following this process, from the original 14,587 matched meetings we manually hand-
match the proposals at 303 meetings (2,112 proposals), for which we find a match from the retail 
dataset to ISS Voting Analytics on at least one proposal for 301 meetings (1,919 matched 
proposals). These are cases in which ISS Voting Analytics has duplicate meetings on the same day 
or the ISS Voting Analytics and retail dataset meetings do not have the same number of proposals 




the number of proposals is the same, but the match score is below 0.99, or they are flagged for 
other reasons, for which we find a match from the retail dataset to ISS Voting Analytics on at least 
one proposal for 759 meetings (3,215 proposals). We algorithmically match, and do not further 
check, the proposals at 13,524 meetings (68,048 proposals). Proposals that are algorithmically 
matched belong to meetings that match on CUSIP, meeting date, meeting day, and number of 
proposals, have a text match score greater than or equal to 0.99 on the ISS Voting Analytics Item 
Description and retail proposal text. Last, we remove three meetings because we cannot confirm 
from their constituent proposals that the meetings themselves were correct matches. 
As a final check on our matching process, we verify with the subset of hand-checked 
meetings that the match score we generate is a strong predictor of proper matching and that scores 
above 0.99 have a low chance of being incorrectly matched. For the 593 hand-checked proposals 
with match scores below 0.95, just 170 (28.7%) were properly provisionally matched, but for the 
2,350 proposals with scores between 0.95 and 0.99, 2,346 (99.8%) were properly provisionally 
matched. An additional 274 proposals had scores above 0.99 but were flagged for other reasons; 
270 (98.5%) of these were properly provisionally matched. Finally, we also hand-checked 1617 
proposals that were not flagged for any reason; all were properly provisionally matched. 
The merge of the retail proposal dataset with ISS Voting Analytics generally confirms the 
proper order of the retail proposals and permits a merge to the retail voting dataset. For those that 
we hand-code, we also use the manually-checked original retail proposal order and re-order 
appropriately to ensure that we can properly merge with the retail voting dataset. We then merge 
the combined ISS Voting Analytics-retail proposals set with the retail voting dataset. Starting with 
89,850 proposals in the original retail proposal set, we remove 78 that are duplicates, leaving 




are duplicates in CUSIP, meeting or record date, and number of proposals, but which are not 
identical in proposal text (we remove all copies of such proposal slates, since we have no way to 
properly identify them). Of these, 89,571 proposals properly match to the retail voting set by 
CUSIP, meeting date, record date, number of proposals at the meeting, and sequence number. 
73,084 of these proposals (14,578 meetings) match to ISS Voting Analytics. 
We run two additional checks using variables that we did not use for our merges. First, 
although the retail voting dataset has no identifying information to distinguish proposals at a 
meeting other than the votes themselves, votes on the annual frequency of say on pay are uniquely 
distinguishable from other votes using the retail voting dataset because the votes are 1’s, 2’s, and 
3’s instead of For’s or Against’s. Of 2,483 proposals for which the retail voting dataset votes are 
1’s, 2’s, and 3’s and for which there was a meeting match to ISS Voting Analytics, 2,479 were 
properly matched to a retail proposal dataset frequency of say-on-pay proposal, a success rate of 
99.8%. Second, both the retail voting dataset and the ISS Voting Analytics dataset include 
proposal-level management recommendations, so we can use these to cross-compare our results. 
Of 73,084 proposals, the management recommendations differ in 70. From spot-checking, these 
appear to be cases in which the proposals are properly matched but the ISS and retail datasets differ 
in their recorded management recommendations (generally because the proposal was withdrawn). 
We subsequently merge this sample with CRSP, leaving 54,876 proposals. We then merge 
with SharkRepellent to correct certain ISS Voting Analytics numbers (as reported in Appendix 
C.A.3 below), though we do not drop observations that do not match to SharkRepellent. We hand-
correct 42 entries where both ISS Voting Analytics and SharkRepellent incorrectly report 0 votes 
For and Against. We drop proposals where the number of votes outstanding is reported incorrectly 




the results of that proposal in the original 8-K or the proposal was withdrawn prior to voting), and 
where For votes were reported but not Against, leaving a final sample of 53,952 proposals. 
C.3 Correction to ISS Voting Analytics information and match to Shark Repellent 
In the course of matching the retail voting proposal dataset to ISS Voting Analytics, we 
found that ISS Voting Analytics reports erroneous numbers of outstanding shares and vote counts 
in a portion of its observations. This error affects observations in 2017. In this subsection, we 
describe how we correct these erroneous entries. 
For all meetings in year 2017 for fields with more than 9 digits for outstanding shares, 
votes for, votes against, votes abstained, or say on pay frequency votes, we find that ISS Voting 
Analytics dataset cuts off the final digits of the number. For example, a share count of 
‘123,456,789’ would be reported in ISS Voting Analytics as ‘12,345,678.’ We correct the errors 
using data from SharkRepellent, which contains information on outstanding shares, votes for, votes 
against, votes abstained, and say on pay frequency votes. We first match SharkRepellent to ISS 
Voting Analytics at the meeting level (by CUSIP, record date, and meeting date) and proposal 
level (by votes for, votes against, and votes abstained). 
For those observations that do not match with SharkRepellent and are candidates to have 
digits cut off, we identify observations in 2017 that ISS Voting Analytics report as having 8 digits 
and CRSP reports at least 80,000,000 outstanding shares, and we hand-code the correct numbers 
using public filings. For a small handful of observations where (i) we do not have shares 
outstanding numbers from SharkRepellent and (ii) shares outstanding from the record date month 
from CRSP is approximately 100 or 1,000 times the ISS Voting Analytics number, we multiply 




In total, we correct 20,037 entries across 11,629 proposals with digits cut off, inappropriate 
zeros, or other inconsistencies. We also run further diagnostics to confirm that ISS Voting 
Analytics numbers are accurate other than the issue described here. Note that we choose to 
continue to use the ISS Voting Analytics proposal data rather than SharkRepellent despite the 
errors because it can be matched at the proposal level with the voting data, as detailed in Appendix 
C.C2.2, whereas SharkRepellent cannot be, and ISS Voting Analytics has larger coverage. 
C.4 Construction of the mutual fund voting records 
We use four data sources to form the mutual fund voting dataset. For fund voting 
information, we use filings on Form N-PX filed with the SEC. Form N-PX is required of all 
registered management investment companies. We obtain Form N-PX via the Mutual Fund Vote 
Records dataset within the ISS Voting Analytics Database. The dataset contains the voting 
decision for each fund on each proposal for each firm that it owns. We also use the CRSP US 
Mutual Fund Database, which contains whether a fund is index-based or not and the 13F 
institutional share ownership via the Thomson Reuters S12 dataset, which indicates the ownership 
of each firm by each fund among 13F filers at the time of the quarterly filing. The fourth dataset 
is the WRDS Mutual Fund Links (MFLINKS), which is designed to link funds in the CRSP Mutual 
Fund dataset to the Thomson Reuters Mutual Funds (S12) dataset. 
The ISS Mutual Fund Vote Records cannot be directly merged to the Thomson Reuters 
S12 share ownership dataset since the two have no shared identifier and they write fund names 
differently. We therefore construct our dataset as follows. First, we use text matching to match ISS 
Mutual Fund Vote Records with the CRSP Mutual Fund dataset by fund name. Of the 11,208 




then use the STATA matchit function for fuzzy matching, hand-check each match, and conduct 
additional hand-coding. Following this process, we match 9,244 (82.48%) funds to CRSP. 
Next, starting from the CRSP dataset, we use the MFLINKS dataset to match each CRSP 
fund to a linking identifier by fund. We use that linking identifier to match to Thomson S12 by 
fund. Finally, we match the ISS Mutual Fund Vote Records to the Thomson Reuters S12 via our 
links. We match by fund, firm CUSIP, and date. For ISS, the relevant date is the record date of the 
meeting; for Thomson Reuters, the relevant date is the report date of the 13F filing. We limit to 
matches in which the record date of the meeting is within 180 days of the record date of the 13F 
filing. Generally, there is more than one 13F record date within 180 days of a meeting record date 
for a given fund and firm; we keep only the 13F closest chronologically to the meeting record date. 
In total, the ISS Voting Analytics Database contains 15.7 million unique fund proposals 
that match to proposals in our dataset. Of those, 13.5 million (85.9%) match to a CRSP fund, and 
8.7 million (55.4%) match to a Thomson Reuters S12 fund-firm 13F filing, where the record date 
of the meeting is within 180 days of the record date of the 13F filing. 
In our counts of mutual fund share-weighted votes, we only include votes from Form N-
PX where we can retrieve the shares held by the fund from the CRSP Mutual Fund Dataset. Thus, 
we somewhat underestimate the ownership by mutual funds. The term Big Three refers to 
Vanguard, Blackrock, and State Street. For the proposals in this sample, 78% of Big Three funds 
(and 70% of Blackrock funds) for which there is N-PX voting data are matched to share numbers 
from Thomson Reuters; this is likely an underestimate of our true coverage of Big Three 






Chapter 2 Online Appendix 
Table D.A1. Categorization of ISS Voting Analytics proposals 
The ISS Voting Analytics dataset contains two fields that we use to categorize shareholder proposals. The 
first, Item Description, is a description of the proposal on the proxy statement. The second, Agenda General 
Description, is a standardized and more concise description, e.g., “Approve Political Donations.” The 
proposals in the ISS Voting Analytics dataset are captured by only 310 distinct Agenda General 
Descriptions as compared to 46,343 distinct Item Descriptions. We allocate each of the Agenda General 
Descriptions into twelve broad categories designed to capture the diversity of these proposals. For proposals 
with insufficient information in their Agenda General Descriptions, we use the Item Description to assign 
them into one of our twelve categories. We use string matches (e.g., “Elect Director”) to assign the bulk of 
these proposals into categories, and then hand-match the remaining proposals. The table below reports the 
twelve categories. 
Categories of Proposals: 
1 Directors Elect director 
   
2 Accounting Financial statements/Auditor 
   
3 
Governance 
Board and shareholder rights 
4 Compensation 
5 Say on Pay frequency 
6 Other 
   
7 
Major transactions 
Issuance, buyback, distribution, stock split, or conversion 
8 M&A 
   
9 Shareholder environmental Climate change, sustainability, etc. 
   
10 Shareholder social Diversity, lobbying, etc. 
   
11  Shareholder governance  
   









Table D.A2. Management and shareholder proposals in the retail voting dataset 
This table reports information on the content of proposals in the retail voting dataset. The sample is limited to retail dataset proposals that were 
matched with data from ISS Voting Analytics and CRSP. The table reports the number of proposals of each type. Proposal categories are based on 
item descriptions from ISS Voting Analytics (see Online Appendix Table D.A1). Sponsor, management recommendation, and ISS recommendation 
are from ISS Voting Analytics. In the rows pertaining to ISS recommendations, we exclude proposals regarding the frequency of Say on Pay votes 
for which do not have “For” or “Against” recommendations.  
 2015  2016  2017 
All Proposals 16,583  17,502  19,847 
      
Management:      
Elect director 8,620  9,161  9,682 
Financial statements/Auditor 2,976  3,016  3,001 
Governance - board & shareholder rights 221  263  216 
Governance - compensation 3,515  3,681  3,900 
Governance - other 160  211  228 
Governance - Say on Pay frequency 118  127  1,812 
Major Transactions - issuance, buyback, distribution, stock split, or conversion 270  295  330 
Major Transactions - M&A 146  196  200 
Other 43  42  41 
      
Shareholder:      
Environmental 76  91  83 
Social 115  131  129 
Governance 323  288  225 
      
Management: 15,951  16,865  17,598 
Management For & ISS For 14,680  15,434  16,013 
Management For & ISS Against 1,268  1,425  1,574 
      
Shareholder: 514  510  437 
Management Against & ISS For 387  345  298 









Table D.A3. Coverage of the retail voting sample in CRSP and ISS Voting Analytics 
This table reports information on the proportion of firms in the CRSP and ISS Voting Analytics datasets contained in the retail voting sample.  The 
CRSP universe is limited to those firms with non-missing information on price or number of shares and have share codes 10 or 11. The retail dataset 
is limited to those firms for which we have both proposal data and matching shareholder voting data. Panel A reports, for each size quintile by year, 
the number of firms (by 6-digit CUSIP) in CRSP and the subset of those CRSP firms that are in the retail data and have a meeting in that year.  Firm 
size is calculated as the product of CRSP variables csho and prc, and quintiles are determined using the NYSE size breakpoints from Ken French’s 
website.  Panel B reports, for each size quintile by year, the number of firms (by 6-digit CUSIP) that are in both ISS Voting Analytics and CRSP 
and the subset of those firms that are in the retail data and are matched to at least one meeting in the ISS Voting Analytics dataset in the given year. 
Panel C reports, for each institutional ownership quintile by year, the number of firms in CRSP (by 6-digit CUSIP) and the subset of those CRSP 
firms that are in the retail data and have a meeting that year. Institutional ownership quintiles are calculated using data from Thomson Reuters, and 
Panel C is limited to those firms that have institutional ownership reported by Thomson Reuters. 
Panel A: Number of firms relative to the CRSP universe, by size quintile 
  2015  2016  2017 
Size 
quintile: 












Smallest  1,964 1,629 82.94  1,909 1,616 84.65  2,001 1,734 86.66 
2  752 645 85.77  701 641 91.44  607 558 91.93 
3  455 408 89.67  467 435 93.15  450 419 93.11 
4  392 346 88.27  387 357 92.25  362 346 95.58 
Largest  343 314 91.55  336 323 96.13  329 318 96.66 









Panel B: Number of firms relative to the CRSP and ISS Voting Analytics universes, by size quintile 
  2015  2016  2017 
Size 
quintile: 





















Smallest  1,614 1,556 96.41  1,596 1,569 98.31  1,646 1,606 97.57 
2  655 626 95.57  610 599 98.2  569 561 98.59 
3  409 396 96.82  419 418 99.76  434 421 97 
4  371 356 95.96  361 360 99.72  375 371 98.93 
Largest  327 313 95.72  322 321 99.69  316 309 97.78 
Total  3,376 3,247 96.18  3,308 3,267 98.76  3,340 3,268 97.84 
 
Panel C: Number of firms relative to the CRSP and institutional ownership universes, by institutional ownership quintile 

























Smallest  646 600 92.88  654 602 92.05  657 623 94.82 
2  645 608 94.26  654 624 95.41  657 628 95.59 
3  646 611 94.58  654 635 97.09  657 640 97.41 
4  645 620 96.12  654 635 97.09  657 642 97.72 
Largest  645 614 95.19  654 641 98.01  657 644 98.02 




Table D.A4. Ownership of brokerage accounts from the 2016 Survey of 
Consumer Finances 
This table reports probit regression results predicting the ownership of a brokerage account using the 2016 
Federal Reserve Board’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is a nationally 
representative cross-sectional survey of U.S. households. See the documentation available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm. The dependent variable, Brokerage Account, is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the household has a brokerage account (SCF variable X3923). Household 
demographics include Age (SCF variable X8022), which is based on six categories: < 30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-
60, 60-70, and >70. The first age category, <30, is the omitted group in the estimation below. Female-
headed household (SCF variable 8021) is a dummy variable equal to one for female-headed households and 
zero otherwise. Household size (SCF variable X7001) is the number of people in the primary economic 
unit, which takes the values 1 through 12. Education (SCF variable X5931) is the highest level of school 
completed or highest degree received, split into three categories: below high school, high school, and 
college degree or higher. The high school category is the omitted variable in the estimation below. Marital 
status (SCF variable X8023) is a dummy variable equal to one if married and zero otherwise. Income (SCF 
variable X5729) is the total income of the primary economic unit and its family living in the same premises 
that was received in 2015 from all sources, before taxes and other deductions. We include the log of income 
below. Job Status (SCF variable X6670) is a dummy variable equal to one if working or self-employed and 
zero otherwise. Business equity (SCF variable X3103) provides information on businesses that the primary 
economic unit or family owns. Business equity is coded as a dummy variable equal to one if the primary 
economic unit has ownership or share of ownership in any privately-held businesses, including farms, 
professional practices, limited partnerships, private equity, or any other business investments that are not 
publicly traded. Homeowner (SCF variable X701) is a dummy variable equal to one if the primary economic 
unit and family own the house and zero otherwise. Net worth is measured following the definition from the 
SCF bulleting available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/Networth%20Flowchart.pdf with 
data available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/scfp2016s.zip. We include below the log of 
net worth. Since some households have negative net worth we form the variable as follows: 
log(net worth − min(net worth, 0) + 1). Savings account (SCF variable X3727) is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the primary economic unit or anyone in the family living at the same premises has a savings 
or money market account and zero otherwise. Retirement account (SCF variable X3601) is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the household has a retirement account and zero otherwise. Mutual funds or hedge 
funds (SCF variable X3819) is a dummy variable equal to one if the household has an investment in a 
mutual fund or hedge fund and zero otherwise. Assets reported in this variable do not include any pension 
or 401(k) accounts. Financial knowledge (SCF variable X7556) measures knowledge about personal 
finance with -1 (not at all knowledgeable about personal finance) to 10 (very knowledgeable about personal 
finance).  Attitude towards risk (SCF variable X7557) measures on a scale from -1 to 10 willingness to take 
financial risks when saving or making investments with -1 (not at all willing to take risks) to 10 (very 
willing to take risks). For each of the three specifications we report the coefficients and the t-statistics in 
parentheses below and the marginal effects at the mean of the regressors (margins command in Stata). 
Standard errors are calculated to account for both imputation error and sampling variability following the 
SCF documentation available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/Standard_Error_ 
Documentation.pdf. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Brokerage account Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal 
Intercept -22.25***  -16.17***  -15.37***  
 (-20.34)  (-16.18)  (-15.58)  
Age       




 (2.73) (2.52) (2.02) (1.86) (2.24) (2.07) 
40-50 0.2342* 0.0428** 0.1415 0.0231 0.1689 0.0269 
 (2.82) (2.60) (1.58) (1.46) (1.88) (1.73) 
50-60 0.2631** 0.0481** 0.2362** 0.0385* 0.2918** 0.0465** 
 (3.18) (2.94) (2.68) (2.49) (3.27) (3.04) 
60-70 0.2917** 0.0532** 0.2080* 0.0340* 0.3067** 0.0489** 
 (3.13) (2.86) (2.13) (1.96) (3.15) (2.90) 
>70 0.4484*** 0.0819*** 0.3367*** 0.0550** 0.4694*** 0.0748*** 
 (4.36) (4.02) (3.42) (3.13) (4.69) (4.31) 
Education       
Below high school -0.2620** -0.0482** -0.1768 -0.0287 -0.1730 -0.0275 
 (-2.94) (-2.70) (-1.85) (-1.67) (-1.72) (-1.57) 
College or higher 0.5190*** 0.0947*** 0.3526*** 0.0578*** 0.2973*** 0.0474*** 
 (9.54) (8.93) (5.95) (5.53) (4.86) (4.53) 
       
Female-headed 
 
-0.2278*** -0.0416*** -0.2567*** -0.0419*** -0.1776** -0.0283** 
 (-3.89) (-3.55) (-4.09) (-3.75) (-2.80) (-2.57) 
Household size -0.1158*** -0.0211*** -0.0753** -0.0123** -0.0783** -0.0125** 
 (-5.31) (-4.95) (-3.18) (-2.93) (-3.29) (-3.03) 
Marital Status 0.0082 0.0015 -0.1181 -0.0193 -0.0769 -0.0122 














  (3.98) (3.73) (3.02) (2.81) (2.99) (2.79) 











  (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.41) (-0.38) (-0.86) (-0.79) 























  (4.64) (4.20) (2.77) (2.53) (2.39) (2.18) 











  (14.79) (12.94) (11.58) (10.16) (10.73) (9.52) 
       







    (3.98) (3.67) (3.90) (3.62) 







    (14.66) (13.12) (13.66) (12.27) 







    (11.92) (11.82) (11.12) (11.03) 
       
Financial knowledge     0.0080 
 
0.0013 
      (0.83) (0.77) 
Attitude towards risk     0.0939*** 
 
0.0149*** 
















Table D.A5. Ownership by retail shareholders by industry 
This table reports information on retail shareholder firm ownership by industry. The sample is limited to retail dataset proposals that are matched to 
data from ISS Voting Analytics and CRSP.  Industry is the Fama French 12-industry classification. “# of Investors” refers to the number of retail 
investors in the sample, in thousands, who own shares in the firm, averaged across firms in the group.  “Retail Ownership” is the percentage of 
outstanding shares of the firm held by domestic retail investors in the sample. 
  2015 2016 2017 












Industry:              
Business equipment  42 6 26 18 48 6 25 16 49 7 26 16 
Chemicals  25 7 18 15 34 6 20 15 30 7 19 14 
Consumer durables  73 5 26 20 67 5 24 19 61 5 24 21 
Consumer nondurables  54 8 26 20 60 10 24 17 63 8 23 16 
Energy  60 11 28 22 65 10 28 22 58 9 27 20 
Finance  19 2 38 26 21 2 37 26 23 3 28 24 
Healthcare  29 5 30 25 29 5 30 24 28 6 32 27 
Manufacturing  24 5 22 17 27 6 22 17 28 6 22 16 
Telecommunications  141 5 23 19 141 5 29 21 166 6 30 21 
Utilities  79 36 26 23 84 37 25 21 81 34 22 18 
Wholesale/Retail/Serv.  37 6 21 15 42 6 20 16 47 7 21 17 










Table D.A6. Retail voting by meeting 
This table reports voting results at the ballot level. % Cast is the proportion of ballots cast as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding. % voting 
only with mgmt. refers to ballots that entirely match management’s recommendation. % at least one against mgmt. refers to ballots with at least one 
vote that deviates from management’s recommendation. The columns with header “Retail votes” are at the shareholder vote level, while the columns 
with header “Retail account” are at the retail account level and weight each account equally. Rows relating to takeover defenses use SharkRepellent 
classifications and are limited to those observations that are matched with SharkRepellent.  












% at least one 
against mgmt. 
All meetings 32 76 24 11 59 41 
       
Annual meeting 32 76 24 11 58 42 
Special meeting 38 79 21 15 74 26 
       
Proposal sponsor/type:       
Meeting is 100% management proposals 34 82 18 11 70 30 
At least one shareholder proposal 30 69 31 12 52 48 
At least one shareholder prop. (environmental) 29 69 31 12 52 48 
At least one shareholder prop. (social) 29 67 33 12 51 49 
       
No disagreements between mgmt. and ISS 32 80 20 12 67 33 
At least one disagreement between mgmt. and ISS 32 74 26 11 54 46 
       
No takeover defense-related proposal 34 79 21 12 63 37 
≥1 takeover defense-related proposal 28 68 32 11 52 48 
≥1 proposal increasing takeover defenses 52 85 15 10 64 36 










Table D.A7. Retail shareholder and Big Three voting on shareholder proposals 
This table reports information on retail voting limiting the sample to retail dataset proposals that are matched with data from ISS Voting Analytics 
and CRSP. Each entry represents the average of all firm votes in the category. The first column, Retail Votes, provides the domestic retail voting 
rates from the retail voting data. The second column, All votes, provides the overall voting results from ISS Voting Analytics, with corrections from 
SharkRepellent and CRSP, as described in Appendix C.A1 in the paper.  The third column, Big Three, provides the votes cast by the Big Three 
institutional investors, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. The construction of the mutual fund voting records is described in Appendix C.A1. % 
For is the number of votes For divided by the number of votes cast.  Each row contains the average of % For across all proposals in the given 
category. We report the t-statistic of the test for the difference between All Votes (or Big Three) and Retail Votes, calculated as the absolute value 
of the t-statistic of the intercept from regressing the difference between Retail Votes and All Votes (or Big Three) with only an intercept term. 
 Retail votes All votes Big Three 
 % For t-statistic % For t-statistic % For t-statistic 
Shareholder Proposals:       
   Environmental 13 - 23 10.0 3 13.4 
     Climate Change 12 - 24 9.2 4 6.0 
     Sustainability 15 - 24 5.8 2 12.0 
     Other 15 - 16 0.4 0 14.4 
       
   Social 15 - 19 5.9 3 18.1 
      Diversity 14 - 17 1.6 6 2.8 
      Lobbying and political contributions 17 - 25 10.3 2 21.7 
      Other 11 - 8 3.4 1 16.0 
       








Table D.A8. Retail voting by proposal type, voter account value, and firm size 
This table provides voting results sorted by above-median and below-median account values (medians determined within a calendar year) and by 
firm size terciles. Account value is the sum of the account’s individual firm stake values, where the stake value is the number of shares owned by 
the account multiplied by the record date month end share price. Firm size is calculated as the product of CRSP variables csho and prc, and terciles 
are determined using the NYSE size breakpoints from Ken French’s website. Results are reported on the basis of shares rather than on the basis of 
accounts; the numbers reported are calculated for each proposal, then averaged across proposals.  Proposal categories are based on item descriptions 
from ISS Voting Analytics (see Online Appendix Table D.A1). 
 Account value Firm size terciles 





















Shareholder:           
Environmental 6 30 25 14 30 13 27 16 25 14 
Social 6 35 26 15 24 9 24 21 26 15 
Governance 6 38 29 22 40 46 30 27 27 19 
           
Management:           
Elect director 6 93 29 96 34 93 28 95 27 96 
Financial statements/Auditor 8 96 33 98 34 98 30 98 28 98 
Governance – board and shareholder rights 9 89 34 92 39 91 29 94 27 91 
Governance – compensation 8 80 32 88 34 86 29 90 27 90 
Governance – other 13 86 41 91 42 89 39 95 30 94 
Major Transactions – issuance, buyback,  
                                   distribution, stock split, or conversion 
11 74 34 84 32 82 33 90 28 92 
Major Transactions – M&A 15 90 46 95 51 95 41 95 34 93 
Other 10 91 35 90 37 89 29 93 30 94 
           
Sponsor:           
Management 7 90 31 94 33 92 27 94 26 96 










Table D.A9. Frequent and infrequent voters 
This table reports voting results by frequent and infrequent voters. To classify accounts as frequent or infrequent, we limit the comparison to accounts 
that have at least five voting opportunities over the 3-year sample and that voted at least once and classify those with below-median or median voting 
rates as infrequent and with above-median voting rates as frequent. The median voting rate in this group is 0.5.  Proposal categories are based on 
item descriptions from ISS Voting Analytics (see Online Appendix Table D.A1). 
 Frequent voter Infrequent voter 
 % Cast % For % Cast % For 
Shareholder:     
Environmental 80 13 18 20 
Social 82 15 19 24 
Governance 81 22 23 28 
     
Management:     
Elect Director 83 96 22 94 
Financial statements/Auditor 85 98 26 97 
Governance - board and shareholder rights 84 92 30 90 
Governance – compensation  83 88 27 85 
Governance - other 86 92 45 89 
Major transactions - issuance, buyback, distribution, 
stock split, or conversion 
85 84 38 80 
Major Transactions - M&A 88 95 53 93 
Other 84 91 34 91 
     
Sponsor:     
Management 84 94 25 92 











Table D.A10. Impact of retail voting: An alternative measure of Big Three ownership 
This table provides an analysis similar to that in Table 5 in which we ask how changes in voting outcomes under hypothetical changes in both the 
decision to vote, changes in retail ownership, and the voting preferences of certain groups of shareholders. We scale up the observed Big Three votes 
to the total holdings by Big Three open-end mutual funds on each firm, calculated from CRSP to address the possibility that we may undercount the 
shares held by the Big Three institutional investors as we only observe the votes of funds that appear in ISS Voting Analytics’ N-PX dataset. The 
analysis is otherwise identical to that in Table 5. In our counts of Big Three votes, we only include votes from Form N-PX for which we can match 
the fund to an ownership count for that firm from Form 13-F. For Big Three votes, for shares on which we observe votes on Form N-PX, we calculate 
the number of shares voted in favor and the number of shares voted against. Then we scale up these share numbers so the shares voted by the Big 
Three match the total number of shares owned by Big Three in the CRSP Open-End Mutual Fund Dataset. Panel A provides the number of proposals 
whose outcome would change if a voting group’s participation were set to zero. The sample consists only of proposals for which the voting base is 
the number of votes cast rather than the number of outstanding shares. We exclude routine proposals including auditor ratification and meeting 
adjournments, as well as director elections. Each row in Panel A designates a voting group whose participation is set to zero in the hypothetical. 
Columns (3) (and (4) reflect the number of proposals flipped under the hypothetical, and columns (5), (6), and (7) provide the number of proposals 
whose final percentage counts move by five, ten, and twenty percent, respectively. Panel B provides the number of proposals whose outcome would 
change if ownership were shifted between retail and non-retail shareholders. We use the same sample as in Panel A and change retail ownership by 
18.4% which is the standard deviation of retail ownership of all firms in the sample. Firms are sorted into quintiles of retail ownership and we ask 
how an increase (decrease) in ownership for firms in the bottom, second, and third (third, fourth, and largest size) quintile impacts vote outcomes. 
We report the consequences of these ownership changes separately for management and shareholder proposals. Since the Big Three institutional 
voting is not utilized in Panel B, the evidence reported below is identical to that in Panel B in Table 5. In Panel C we hold fixed observed shareholder 
participation and report the number of proposals whose voting outcome would change if a voting group’s preferences were altered. The two voting 
groups whose preferences we alter are those of retail shareholders, in the middle two columns, and the Big Three institutional investors, BlackRock, 
Vanguard, and State Street, in the right two columns. Voting choices are altered to the voting choice of the group described in the row header. To 
ensure a consistent comparison across the two voting groups, the number of votes we alter for a proposal is limited to the minimum of the number 
of retail votes and the number of Big Three votes. The sample in Panel C consists of the proposals in Panel A whose final overall number of votes 
in favor is between 4/5 and 6/5 of the number of votes required. That is, for a standard proposal which would pass by a majority of cast ballots, Panel 
C limits to proposals that received 40% to 60% in favor. In both panels, columns (1) and (2) (“# passing proposals” and “# failing proposals”) refer 
to the actual number of passing and failing proposals in each of the panel’s samples. In Panel C, columns (3) and (4) reflect the number of proposals 
whose outcome is changed under the hypothetical that retail voters alter their voting rate, and columns (5) and (6) reflect the number of proposals 
with changed outcomes under the hypothetical that the Big Three voters alter their voting preference. In both panels, retail votes come from 
Broadridge and are limited to domestic retail shareholders, overall vote totals come from ISS’s Voting Analytics dataset, and mutual fund votes 









Panel A: Consequences due to shocks to retail participation 
 Actual count Change if group participation goes to zero 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Group whose participation 





# passing proposals 
flipped to fail 
# failed proposals 
flipped to pass 
# of 5% 
movers 
# of 10% 
movers 
# of 20% 
movers 
Retail voters 11,545 1,392 122 39 1,144 465 132 
Big Three 11,545 1,392 116 117 1,437 325 72 
All non-retail shareholders 11,545 1,392 404 165 7,881 5,032 2,105 
 
Panel B: Consequences due to shocks to retail ownership 
 Actual count Change due to shocks to retail ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Retail ownership quintile 
whose ownership is either 







flipped to fail 
# failed 
proposals 
flipped to pass 
# of 5% 
movers 
# of 10% 
movers 
# of 20% 
movers 
Management proposals: 
  Bottom quintile, + stdev. 2,297 27 0 3 20 4 0 
  Second quintile, + stdev. 2,236 55 1 10 31 2 0 
  Third quintile, + stdev. 2,141 35 0 9 55 6 0 
        
  Third quintile, - stdev. 2,141 35 12 0 36 2 0 
  Fourth quintile, - stdev. 2,185 32 20 0 77 9 1 
  Top quintile, - stdev. 2,476 30 21 1 247 30 0 
        
Shareholder proposals: 
  Bottom quintile, + stdev. 45 219 3 0 3 0 0 
  Second quintile, + stdev. 48 248 5 0 11 1 0 
  Third quintile, + stdev. 56 355 8 0 22 1 0 
        
  Third quintile, - stdev. 56 355 0 7 14 0 0 
  Fourth quintile, - stdev. 46 325 0 8 32 5 0 








Panel C: Consequences due to shocks to retail voting preferences 
 Actual count Retail voters alter vote Big Three voters alter vote 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






flipped to fail 
# failed 
proposals 
flipped to pass 
# passing 
proposals 
flipped to fail 
# failed 
proposals 
flipped to pass 
Management proposals: 
  Group voting frequency to adopt:  
    Retail voters 243 88 0 0 14 25 
    Big Three 243 88 45 5 0 0 
    All non-retail shareholders 243 88 47 0 31 14 
    All in favor 243 88 0 17 0 33 
    All opposed 243 88 113 0 85 0 
 
Shareholder proposals: 
  Group voting frequency to adopt:  
     Retail voters 62 166 0 0 14 6 
     Big Three 62 166 0 12 0 0 
     All non-retail shareholders 62 166 0 23 4 21 
     All in favor 62 166 0 58 0 61 




Table D.A11. Retail shareholder decision to cast a ballot: Alternative 
measures of institutional block ownership 
This table extends the analysis reported in Table 6 in the paper in which we study retail shareholder turnout 
decisions. We follow the specifications in Table 6, columns (2), (4), and (6), and those in Online Appendix 
Table D.A16 and add three variables that are meant to proxy for the presence of blockholders in a 
company’s shareholder base. The table reports the slopes on these additional proxies, their interactions with 
account ownership, and triple interactions with account ownership and firm size. Top blockholder is the 
fraction of shares outstanding held by the top blockholder. Top 5 blockholders is the fraction of shares 
outstanding held by the top 5 blockholders. Institutional HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
ownership by institutional investors, all from Thomson Reuters. For information on the other covariates see 
Table 6. Standard errors clustered at the account and meeting level are in parentheses. Number of clusters 
refers to the number of distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 
levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log() 0.662 0.594*** 0.388 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.675) (0.025) (0.273) (1.293) (0.525) 
Log(ME)  0.471***    
  (0.036)    
Yearly abnormal return  0.167    
  (0.223)    
Dividend yield  0.167    
  (0.096)    
Tobin’s q  -0.114***    
  (0.032)    
ROA  -0.891**    
  (0.282)    
Special meeting  4.885***    
  (0.425)    
Institutional ownership  -2.097***    
  (0.309)    
Top 5 blockholders  0.002*    
  (0.001)    
Top blockholder  0.000    
  (0.001)    
Institutional HHI  -1.336***    
  (0.389)    
Log() × Log(ME) 0.063*  0.020 0.093 0.046 
 (0.029)  (0.011) (0.061) (0.024) 
Log() × Tobin’s q -0.207***  -0.030* 1.201*** 0.156 
 (0.027)  (0.013) (0.196) (0.118) 
Log() × ROA 0.392  -0.490*** 3.199 3.135** 
 (0.266)  (0.131) (3.452) (1.153) 
Log() × Special meeting 1.548***  1.687*** -1.637 -3.111** 
 (0.251)  (0.219) (1.392) (1.129) 




 (0.401)  (0.139) (3.356) (1.498) 
Log() × Top 5 blockholders 0.002*  0.001* -0.023* -0.008 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.012) (0.004) 
Log() × Top blockholder -0.003*  -0.000 0.019 0.009 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.016) (0.006) 
Log() × Institutional HHI -0.141  -0.675*** 6.954* 8.359*** 
 (0.345)  (0.158) (3.129) (1.697) 
Log() × Log(ME) × Tobin’s q    -0.060*** -0.007 
    (0.009) (0.005) 
Log() × Log(ME) × ROA    -0.099 -0.163** 
    (0.170) (0.057) 
Log() × Log(ME) × Special meeting    0.141* 0.209*** 
    (0.067) (0.054) 
Log() × Log(ME) × Inst. ownership    -0.167 -0.087 
    (0.160) (0.069) 
Log() × Log(ME) × Top 5 block.    0.001* 0.000* 
    (0.001) (0.000) 
Log() × Log(ME) × Top block.    -0.001 -0.000 
    (0.001) (0.000) 
Log() × Log(ME) × Inst. HHI    -0.397* -0.482*** 
    (0.171) (0.091) 
Intercept 7.925*** 9.344*** 9.594*** 7.891*** 9.654*** 
 (0.070) (0.035) (0.055) (0.065) (0.060) 
Industry FE  Yes    
Meeting FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes 
Account-Firm FE      
N 6,753,702 6,047,147 6,047,134 6,753,702 6,047,134 
Number of clusters 7,874 7,880 7,870 7,874 7,870 






Table D.A12. Retail preferences and turnout 
In this table, we report results of regressions designed to capture the relationship between turnout and 
preferences following Zachariadis et al. (2020). As in Zachariadis et al. (2020), we limit to shareholder 
governance proposals.  For each account-proposal combination, we calculate a leave-one-out vote score as 
the shareholder’s average vote on other shareholder governance proposals. We calculate the institutional 
vote as the value weighted vote on the proposal by mutual funds, using Form N-PX. For information on the 
additional covariates see Table 6. The first column includes the interaction of vote score and the institutional 
vote. The second column is limited to accounts with vote scores greater than 50%. The third column is 
limited to accounts with vote scores less than 50%. All columns include account-year and industry fixed 
effects. Standard errors clustered at the account and meeting level are in parentheses. Number of clusters 
refers to the number of distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample Governance score is 
greater than 50%  
Governance score is 
less than 50%  
Institutional vote 0.0405 -0.358 0.141 
 (0.560) (0.506) (0.558) 
Institutional vote × vote score -0.230   
 (0.371)   
Log() 1.462*** 1.017*** 1.547*** 
 (0.0999) (0.0949) (0.102) 
Log(ME) 1.787*** 1.197*** 1.881*** 
 (0.168) (0.153) (0.175) 
Tobin’s q -0.947** -0.911*** -0.942** 
 (0.298) (0.264) (0.311) 
ROA 0.630 3.881 -0.279 
 (2.637) (2.418) (2.772) 
Intercept 36.44*** 39.36*** 37.04*** 
 (3.857) (3.471) (4.042) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,661,339 1,889,498 5,520,206 
Number of clusters 593 591 593 








Table D.A13. Retail and institutional voting by proposal type 
This table reports regression results predicting proposal-level voting outcomes for four categories of proposals: director elections; say on pay; 
shareholder proposals; and other proposals. The dependent variable is the number of votes cast in line with management’s recommendation divided 
by the number of votes cast For or Against, aggregated across all shareholders and multiplied by 100. Log market equity is the log of market equity 
computed as price time shares outstanding from CRSP, as of the record date month. Yearly abnormal return is the firm buy and hold return for the 
period 13 months to one month prior to the record date, minus the buy and hold value weight market return from CRSP. Dividend yield is a binary 
variable equal to one if there is a positive difference in the firm’s buy and hold return with dividends and without dividends. Tobin’s q is book value 
plus market equity minus book equity, divided by book value. Return on assets, ROA, is EBITDA divided by total assets. Special meeting is a binary 
variable equal to one for special meetings. Institutional ownership is equal to the number of shares owned by institutions divided by the shares 
outstanding in the year prior to the meeting, both from Thomson Reuters. ISS against management is a binary variable that equals 1 if ISS has a 
recommendation other than For for a management proposal, or a For recommendation on a shareholder proposal. Columns 1 through 4 contain 
institutional voting results and columns 4 through 6 contain retail voting results. All columns include year-month and industry fixed effects, and 
columns are divided by proposal types. Industry fixed effects use Fama French 12-industry categories; time fixed effects are year-month; proposal 
category fixed effects use the proposal categories set forth in Online Appendix D.A1. All right-hand side variables are each demeaned over all 
observations in the sample (separately demeaned for each subsample) so the intercept reflects the average vote for an observation with average 
values of those covariates. Observations are weighted so that each meeting is weighted equally. Standard errors clustered at the meeting level are in 









 Institutional Voters Retail Voters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Vote with management Director 
elections 
Say on pay Shareholder Other Director 
elections 
Say on pay Shareholder Other 
Log(ME) 0.799*** 0.668*** 3.411*** 0.924*** 0.498*** 0.131 1.702*** 0.426** 
 (0.091) (0.112) (0.512) (0.167) (0.090) (0.103) (0.361) (0.133) 
Yearly abnormal return -0.008 -0.086 -5.911 -1.735* 2.938*** 5.099*** 3.027 4.250*** 
 (0.524) (0.583) (3.020) (0.786) (0.496) (0.579) (2.153) (0.579) 
Dividend yield 0.341 -0.053 4.828* -0.244 -0.102 -0.788* 0.975 -1.180* 
 (0.300) (0.400) (2.140) (0.523) (0.309) (0.366) (1.401) (0.461) 
Tobin’s q 0.128 0.442*** -0.839 0.283 0.450*** 0.534*** 0.101 0.335 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.650) (0.227) (0.085) (0.120) (0.469) (0.175) 
ROA -3.160 -0.556 10.986 2.725 -0.225 3.857** 14.091* 4.467*** 
 (1.755) (1.329) (8.054) (1.762) (1.198) (1.174) (5.828) (1.266) 
Special meeting  -8.099***  -0.668  -1.571  0.821 
  (1.118)  (1.255)  (0.907)  (1.057) 
Institutional ownership 5.946*** 2.636** 9.345* 5.430*** 0.799 3.393*** -2.721 3.221*** 
 (0.976) (0.847) (4.138) (1.142) (0.750) (0.729) (3.559) (0.908) 
ISS against management -36.346*** -47.588*** -26.204*** -52.816*** -0.386 -2.658*** -0.293 -1.503* 
 (1.555) (0.975) (1.231) (1.152) (0.716) (0.605) (0.909) (0.642) 
Intercept 96.002*** 89.688*** 70.496*** 85.380*** 95.359*** 87.241*** 82.612*** 87.593*** 
 (0.138) (0.177) (0.650) (0.256) (0.132) (0.155) (0.404) (0.207) 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal Category FE   Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
N 19,517 6,661 1,367 5,453 19,600 6,741 1,378 5,544 
Number of clusters 2,564 6,639 793 3,908 2,580 6,719 794 3,963 




Table D.A14. Comparison of retail shareholder and Big Three investors’ 
voting decisions 
This table reports regression results on shareholder voting in which votes are aggregated to the proposal 
level. The dependent variable is the number of votes voted in line with management’s recommendation 
divided by the number of votes cast For or Against, multiplied by 100. Yearly abnormal return is the firm 
buy and hold return for the period 13 months to one month prior to the record date, minus the buy and hold 
value weight market return from CRSP. Dividend yield is a binary variable equal to one if there is a positive 
difference in the firm’s buy and hold return with dividends and without dividends (ret and retx from CRSP, 
respectively). Log market equity is the log of market equity (price time shares outstanding from CRSP, as 
of the record date month). Tobin’s q is book value plus market equity minus book equity, divided by book 
value. Return on assets, ROA, is EBITDA divided by total assets. ISS against management is a binary 
variable that equals 1 if ISS has a recommendation other than For for a management proposal, or a For 
recommendation for a shareholder proposal. Industry fixed effects use Fama French 12-industry categories; 
time fixed effects are year-month; proposal category fixed effects use the proposal categories set forth in 
Online Appendix D.A1. All right-hand side variables are demeaned, so that the intercept reflects the turnout 
of an observation with average levels of each covariate. Observations are weighted so that each meeting is 
weighted equally. Standard errors clustered at the meeting level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 














Log(ME) 2.990*** 1.931***  0.257* -0.201 5.162*** 1.342*** 
 (0.264) (0.216)  (0.101) (0.113) (0.687) (0.206) 
Yearly abnormal return -0.460 -1.372 -1.923 0.220 0.601 -3.623 -1.000 
 (1.265) (1.046) (1.362) (0.518) (0.645) (4.129) (1.045) 
Dividend yield 2.562
** 0.140 -3.621 0.150 0.955* 7.506* -1.114 
 (0.856) (0.733) (2.571) (0.319) (0.477) (3.180) (0.691) 
Tobin’s q -0.870
* -0.349 1.628 -0.141 0.150 -2.636** -0.191 
 (0.342) (0.283) (0.834) (0.162) (0.160) (0.941) (0.288) 
ROA 8.773*** 5.827** -6.143 1.752 4.732** 22.171 6.988*** 
 (2.472) (1.940) (4.255) (2.167) (1.561) (11.786) (2.044) 
Special meeting 2.411 1.081 3.656  -19.018***  1.104 
 (1.945) (1.557) (2.579)  (1.910)  (1.531) 
ISS against management  -35.859*** -28.610*** -18.871*** -30.769*** -14.292*** -40.623*** 
  (1.366) (1.594) (1.820) (1.441) (1.629) (1.631) 
Intercept 88.779
*** 88.985*** 90.228*** 98.002*** 95.135*** 82.632*** 90.206*** 
 (0.388) (0.323) (0.286) (0.130) (0.193) (0.923) (0.323) 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal Category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE   Yes     
N 6,852 6,852 5,881 19,853 6,673 1,387 5,579 
Number of clusters 4,384 4,384 3,413 2,599 6,651 806 3,963 




Table D.A15. Retail shareholder decision to cast a ballot: Interaction of 
account ownership, firm size, and benefit from success 
This table provides regressions results describing retail shareholder turnout decisions. The dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the account casts a ballot and 0 otherwise, multiplied by 100. 𝛼 is defined as the 
account’s number of shares held divided by the firm’s number of shares outstanding as of the record date 
month, from CRSP. Log market equity is the log of market equity, computed as price time shares 
outstanding from CRSP, as of the record date month. Tobin’s q is book value plus market equity minus 
book equity, divided by book value. ROA, return on assets, is EBITDA divided by total assets. Special 
meeting is a binary variable equal to 1 for special meetings. Institutional ownership is equal to the number 
of shares owned by institutions divided by the shares outstanding in the year prior to the meeting, both from 
Thomson Reuters. All right-hand side variables are demeaned, so that the intercept reflects the turnout of 
an observation with average levels of each covariate. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the 
number of meetings for the account-year, so that each account-year is weighted equally. Standard errors 
clustered at the account and meeting level are in parentheses. Number of clusters refers to the number of 
distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Log() -0.118 0.020 
 (1.112) (0.409) 
Log() × Log(ME) 0.092 0.035 
 (0.054) (0.019) 
Log() × Tobin’s q 1.122*** 0.127 
 (0.199) (0.119) 
Log() × ROA 3.224 2.458* 
 (3.496) (1.060) 
Log() × Special meeting -1.554 -3.042** 
 (1.420) (1.150) 
Log() × Institutional ownership -2.604 -0.248 
 (1.762) (0.677) 
Log() × Log(ME) × Tobin’s q -0.056*** -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.005) 
Log() × Log(ME) × ROA -0.102 -0.133* 
 (0.171) (0.053) 
Log() × Log(ME) × Special meeting 0.138* 0.207*** 
 (0.068) (0.055) 
Log() × Log(ME) × Institutional ownership  0.109 -0.005 
 (0.084) (0.031) 
Intercept 7.933*** 9.732*** 
 (0.042) (0.059) 
Industry FE   
Meeting FE Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE  Yes 
Account-Firm FE   
N 6,753,702 6,047,134 
Number of clusters 7,874 7,870 




Table D.A16. Robustness to the replacement of Tobin’s q with Total q 
This table provides regressions results in which we repeat several analyses by replacing Tobin’s q with 
Total q from Peters and Taylor (2016). Panel A repeats the analysis for the relevant columns in Table 6 in 
which we study the decision to cast a ballot. Panel B repeats the analysis in in Table 9 in which we study 
retail shareholder voting decisions. Panel C repeats the analysis in Table 10 in which we compare retail and 
institutional investors’ decisions. Panel D repeats the analysis in Table 11 in which we study retail 
shareholder voting decisions and exit. 
Panel A: Retail shareholder decision to cast a ballot 
(4) 
(6) 
 (2) (4) (6) 
Log() -0.210 0.540*** 0.184 
 (0.439) (0.024) (0.180) 
Log(ME)  0.440***  
  (0.033)  
Yearly abnormal return  -0.165  
  (0.134)  
Dividend yield  0.048  
  (0.100)  
Total q  -0.068***  
  (0.020)  
ROA  -0.257  
  (0.205)  
Special meeting  4.505***  
  (0.427)  
Institutional ownership  -0.893***  
  (0.151)  
Log() × Log(ME) 0.093***  0.020** 
 (0.020)  (0.008) 
Log() × Log(Total q) -0.203***  -0.030*** 
 (0.024)  (0.009) 
Log() × ROA 0.718***  -0.242* 
 (0.208)  (0.103) 
Log() × Special meeting 1.391***  1.448*** 
 (0.241)  (0.197) 
Log() × Institutional ownership -0.123  -0.174** 
 (0.171)  (0.063) 
Intercept 7.081*** 9.290*** 9.224*** 
 (0.081) (0.044) (0.027) 
Industry FE  Yes  
Meeting FE Yes  Yes 
Account-Year FE  Yes Yes 
Account-Firm FE    
N 6,216,113 5,536,467 5,536,463 
Number of clusters 6,726 6,729 6,726 




Panel B: Retail Shareholder Voting Decisions 
(3)  (1) (3) 
Log()  1.012*** 0.413*** 
 (0.066) (0.046) 
Log(ME) 1.214
*** 0.678*** 
 (0.122) (0.069) 
Yearly abnormal return 4.222*** 2.555*** 
 (0.761) (0.277) 
Dividend yield 0.734 -0.104 
 (0.539) (0.254) 
Total q 0.253* 0.007 
 (0.120) (0.059) 
ROA 4.609 3.261** 
 (2.425) (1.063) 
Special meeting -2.916* -2.641** 
 (1.369) (0.844) 
Institutional ownership -0.610 0.913 
 (1.161) (0.579) 
ISS against management -2.305*** -2.328*** 
 (0.529) (0.419) 
Log account value 0.031  
 (0.023)  
2016 county presidential turnout -1.126  
 (1.189)  
Log zip code income 1.988***  
 (0.320)  
Fraction over 65 6.249***  
 (1.067)  
Density -0.000***  
 (0.000)  
Fraction with bachelors -3.225*  
 (1.623)  
Fraction with post-bachelors -7.228**  
 (2.726)  
Fraction in Finance/Insurance 4.348  
 (8.319)  
Intercept 85.390*** 86.273*** 
 (0.195) (0.048) 
Proposal Category & Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year-Month FE Yes  
Proposal FE   
Account-Year FE  Yes 
Account-Meeting FE   
Account-Proposal Category FE   
Account-Year FE   
Account-Firm FE   
N 7,388,040 7,771,765 
Number of clusters 7,239 7,591 




Panel C: Comparison of retail and institutional investors’ decisions 
 Institutional voters Retail voters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(ME) 0.981*** 0.794***  0.584*** 0.578***  
 (0.158) (0.106)  (0.092) (0.092)  
Yearly abnormal return 0.119 -1.111* -0.307 4.154*** 4.192*** 3.105*** 
 (0.774) (0.508) (0.429) (0.441) (0.440) (0.346) 
Dividend yield 1.602** -0.400 -3.273** -0.472 -0.568 2.275** 
 (0.519) (0.329) (1.220) (0.306) (0.305) (0.867) 
Total q -0.022 0.195** 0.412* 0.259*** 0.261*** 0.059 
 (0.126) (0.074) (0.201) (0.058) (0.060) (0.132) 
ROA 7.006*** 1.242 -1.930 3.751*** 3.647*** 1.604 
 (1.835) (1.174) (2.130) (0.902) (0.909) (1.340) 
Special meeting -7.130*** -3.447*** -2.996** -1.594 -1.497 -0.228 
 (1.651) (0.979) (1.100) (0.876) (0.879) (0.748) 
Institutional ownership 7.846*** 4.792*** 3.225 2.972*** 2.915*** -0.897 
 (1.122) (0.729) (2.335) (0.638) (0.641) (1.973) 
ISS against management  -50.318*** -46.751***  -1.875*** -1.772*** 
  (0.836) (0.748)  (0.465) (0.356) 
Intercept 87.910*** 88.250*** 88.587*** 88.880*** 88.856*** 89.501*** 
 (0.269) (0.170) (0.212) (0.150) (0.150) (0.160) 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes No 
Proposal Category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE   Yes   Yes 
N 29,377 29,276 29,006 29,622 29,511 29,243 
Number of clusters 6,646 6,636 6,366 6,732 6,721 6,453 






Panel D: Retail Shareholder Voting Decisions and Exit 
StillOwnNextYear (1) (2) 
Cast Ballott 2.346
*** 1.055*** 
 (0.232) (0.167) 
Log(t)  -0.578
*** 0.829*** 
 (0.099) (0.071) 
Log(MEt) 0.646
*** 1.740*** 
 (0.183) (0.132) 
Yearly abnormal returnt+1 -3.266
** -4.075*** 
 (1.114) (0.977) 
Dividend yieldt+1 -0.011 0.731 
 (0.930) (0.595) 
Total qt+1 2.413
** -0.453 
 (0.846) (0.625) 
ROAt+1 -0.193 0.507
*** 
 (0.141) (0.103) 
Institutional ownershipt 1.326 -1.161 
 (1.432) (0.808) 
Intercept 46.257*** 42.812*** 
 (3.327) (2.418) 
Year-month FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE  Yes 
N 4,473,407 3,948,997 
Number of clusters 2,081 2,081 







Table D.A17. Robustness to the exclusion of million-dollar accounts  
This table provides regression results describing retail shareholder turnout and voting decisions. Panel A is 
identical to Table 6, Panel A, but for the removal of all account-years with portfolio values greater than one 
million dollars. The dependent variable in Panel A is equal to 1 if the account cast a ballot and 0 otherwise, 
multiplied by 100.  Panel B is identical to Table 9, Panel A, in which the analysis is limited to account-
proposals in which the account voted on the proposal and excludes routine proposals (auditor ratification 
and meeting adjournment). We further remove all account-years with portfolio values greater than one 
million dollars. The dependent variable in Panel B is a binary variable that equals one if the account voted 
in line with management’s recommendation, and zero if it voted against, multiplied by 100. The covariates 
used in both panels are as follows. 𝛼 is the account’s number of shares held divided by the firm’s number 
of shares outstanding as of the record date month, from CRSP. Log market equity is the log of market 
equity, computed as price time shares outstanding from CRSP as of the record date month. Yearly abnormal 
return refers to the firm buy-and-hold return for the period 13 months to 1 month prior to the record date 
minus the value weighted market return from CRSP. The dividend indicator is a binary variable equal to 
one if there is a positive difference in the firm’s return with dividends and without dividends (ret and retx 
from CRSP, respectively). Tobin’s q is book value plus market equity minus book equity, divided by book 
value. ROA, return on assets, is EBITDA divided by total assets. Special meeting is a binary variable equal 
to 1 for special meetings. Institutional ownership is equal to the number of shares owned by institutions 
divided by the shares outstanding in the year prior to the meeting, both from Thomson Reuters. ISS against 
management is a binary variable that equals one if ISS has a recommendation other than “For” for a 
management proposal, or a “For” recommendation for a shareholder proposal. Log account value is the log 
of the total account value for that account in the calendar year defined as the sum across all firms held by 
the account of the product of share price and the number of shares owned. 2016 county presidential turnout 
is the number of county residents who cast ballots in the 2016 U.S. presidential election from CQ Voting 
and Elections, divided by the number of adult citizens from the Census Bureau. Log zip code AGI is the 
average adjusted gross income in the prior calendar year in the account’s zip code. Fraction over 65 is the 
fraction of zip code residents above the age 65, from the Census, defined as (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010015 +
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010016 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010017 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010018 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010019)/𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001. Density is the 
population divided by land area in square meters (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝐹0010001/𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷). Fraction with bachelors 
and fraction with post-bachelors are zip-code level five-year averages from the U.S. Census as of 2017. 
Fraction in Finance/Insurance is equal to the number of employed workers in Finance/Insurance divided by 
all-industries employment, both at the zip code level, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In Panel A, 
columns 1–2 use meeting fixed effects; columns 3–4 use industry and account-year fixed effects; columns 
5–6 use meeting and account-year fixed effects; and column 7 uses meeting, account-year, and account-
firm fixed effects. In Panel B, column 1 includes proposal category, industry, and year-month fixed effects; 
column 2 includes proposal fixed effects; column 3 includes proposal category, industry, and account-year 
fixed effects; column 4 includes account-meeting and account-proposal meeting; column 5 includes 
proposal and account-year fixed effects; and column 6 includes proposal, account-year, and account-firm 
fixed effects. Industry fixed effects use Fama French 12-industry categories; proposal category fixed effects 
use the proposal categories set forth in Online Appendix D.A1. All right-hand side variables are demeaned, 
so that the intercept reflects the turnout of an observation with average levels of each covariate. 
Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of meetings for the account-year, so that each 
account-year is weighted equally. Standard errors clustered at the account and meeting level are in 
parentheses. Number of clusters refers to the number of distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent 






Panel A: Retail shareholder turnout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log() 1.605*** 0.601 0.234*** 0.564*** 0.548*** 0.145 0.586*** 
 (0.052) (0.475) (0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.252) (0.110) 
Log(ME)    0.441***    
    (0.035)    
Yearly abnormal return    0.185    
    (0.216)    
Dividend indicator    0.137    
    (0.094)    
Tobin’s q    -0.112***    
    (0.031)    
ROA    -0.791**    
    (0.273)    
Special meeting    4.823***    
    (0.420)    
Institutional ownership    -1.003***    
    (0.158)    
Log() × Log(ME)  0.061**    0.023*  
  (0.023)    (0.011)  
Log() × Tobin’s q  -0.192***    -0.029*  
  (0.026)    (0.013)  
Log() × ROA  0.229    -0.463***  
  (0.242)    (0.130)  
Log() × Special meeting  1.595***    1.697***  
  (0.253)    (0.223)  
Log() × Inst. owner.  -0.197    -0.208**  
  (0.191)    (0.065)  
Intercept 7.628*** 7.647*** 9.112*** 9.031*** 9.123*** 9.355*** 10.081*** 
 (0.019) (0.044) (0.062) (0.034) (0.001) (0.056) (0.014) 
Industry FE   Yes Yes    
Meeting FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Firm FE       Yes 
N 6,441,435 6,307,410 5,732,896 5,604,060 5,732,882 5,604,047 4,073,464 
Number of clusters 8,264 7,874 8,271 7,880 8,260 7,870 7,628 




Panel B: Retail shareholder voting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log() 1.067*** 0.787*** 0.494***  0.251*** -0.399 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.047)  (0.050) (0.331) 
Log(ME) 1.008***  0.626***    
 (0.120)  (0.066)    
Yearly abnormal return 4.449***  2.570***    
 (0.724)  (0.277)    
Dividend indicator 1.463*  0.117    
 (0.577)  (0.263)    
Tobin’s q 0.373  0.132    
 (0.196)  (0.094)    
ROA 7.197**  3.318**    
 (2.771)  (1.283)    
Special meeting -4.585***  -2.915***    
 (1.167)  (0.780)    
Institutional ownership -2.116  0.640    
 (1.090)  (0.562)    
ISS against management -2.742***  -2.454*** -1.471***   
 (0.494)  (0.382) (0.318)   
Log account value 0.006 0.047*     
 (0.023) (0.023)     
2016 county presidential turnout 2.000*** 1.948***     
 (0.315) (0.305)     
Log zip code income 6.359*** 6.213***     
 (1.192) (1.169)     
Fraction over 65 -0.000** -0.000**     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Density -4.099* -2.488     
 (1.608) (1.565)     
Fraction with bachelors -7.080** -9.378***     
 (2.688) (2.607)     
Fraction with post-bachelors 2.568 5.964     
 (8.034) (7.644)     
Fraction in Finance/Insurance 85.209*** 85.402*** 86.114*** 87.778*** 86.338*** 86.304*** 
 (0.186) (0.116) (0.047) (0.009) (0.009) (0.067) 
Intercept 1.067*** 0.787*** 0.494***  0.251*** -0.399 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.047)  (0.050) (0.331) 
Proposal Category FE Yes  Yes    
Industry FE Yes  Yes    
Year-Month FE Yes      
Proposal FE  Yes   Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE   Yes    
Account-Meeting FE    Yes   
Account-Proposal Category FE    Yes   
Account-Year FE     Yes Yes 
Account-Firm FE      Yes 
N 6,414,393 6,500,231 6,726,393 6,653,955 6,819,813 6,798,544 
Number of clusters 7,087 6,564 7,501 4,985 7,277 6,570 




Table D.A18. Retail turnout at firms with a majority institutional owner 
This table provides regression results describing retail shareholder turnout decisions at firms whose largest 
institutional owner holds more than 50% of the firm’s shares outstanding, according to Thomson Reuters. 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the account cast a ballot and 0 otherwise, multiplied by 100. 𝛼 is 
defined as the account’s number of shares held divided by the firm’s number of shares outstanding as of 
the record date month, from CRSP. Each of the right-hand side variables is an indicator variable reflecting 
ownership levels. The reference category is accounts with ownership less than or equal to 10−9. In addition, 
column (2) is limited to meetings in which no proposal comes within 30 percentage points of a different 
outcome and column (3) is limited to accounts with account stake values of under $100. The regressions in 
this table begin with the entire universe of accounts, and are limited to qualifying firms and accounts, rather 
than sampling. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of meetings for the account-year, 
so that each account-year is weighted equally. Standard errors clustered at the account and meeting level 
are in parentheses. Number of clusters refers to the number of distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample No close proposals Stake less than $100 
𝛼 > 10−6  3.353*** 3.364*** 6.065*** 
 (0.412) (0.445) (0.616) 
𝛼 > 10−7  1.857*** 2.228*** -0.093 
 (0.508) (0.530) (0.729) 
𝛼 > 10−8  2.661*** 2.377** 2.566*** 
 (0.656) (0.686) (0.701) 
𝛼 > 10−9  0.896 1.699 0.896 
 (1.162) (0.875) (1.162) 
Intercept 1.677 0.928 1.677 
 (1.038) (0.682) (1.038) 
N 363,531 297,407 36,732 
Number of clusters 52 42 52 






Table D.A19. Retail shareholder decision to cast a ballot: Association with 
proposals on the ballot 
This table provides regression results similar to that in Table 6, describing retail shareholder turnout 
decisions. We extend the analysis in columns (2) and (6) of Table 6, Panel A, by including an indicator 
variable for whether there is an SRI proposal on the ballot and the interaction of log 𝛼 with this SRI indicator 
variable. The analysis is otherwise similar to that in Table 6, Panel A. The dependent variable is equal to 1 
if the account cast a ballot and 0 otherwise, multiplied by 100. 𝛼 is defined as the account’s number of 
shares held divided by the firm’s number of shares outstanding as of the record date month, from CRSP. 
Log market equity is the log of market equity, computed as price time shares outstanding from CRSP as of 
the record date month. Yearly abnormal return refers to the firm buy-and-hold return for the period 13 
months to 1 month prior to the record date minus the value weighted market return from CRSP. The 
dividend indicator is a binary variable equal to one if there is a positive difference in the firm’s return with 
dividends and without dividends (ret and retx from CRSP, respectively). Tobin’s q is book value plus 
market equity minus book equity, divided by book value. ROA, return on assets, is EBITDA divided by 
total assets. Special meeting is a binary variable equal to 1 for special meetings. Institutional ownership is 
equal to the number of shares owned by institutions divided by the shares outstanding in the year prior to 
the meeting, both from Thomson Reuters. SRI on ballot is a binary variable equal to one if any proposals 
at the meeting are shareholder environmental or social proposals. Shareholder governance on ballot is a 
binary variable equal to one if any proposal at the meeting is a shareholder governance proposal. Log 
(Number of proposals on ballot) is the log of the number of proposals on the ballot. Log account value is 
the log of the total account value for the account in the calendar year, defined as the sum across all firms 
held by the account of the product of share price and number of shares owned. Columns 1–2 use meeting 
fixed effects, columns 3–4 use industry and account-year fixed effects, columns 5–6 use meeting and 
account-year fixed effects, and column 7 uses meeting, account-year, and account-firm fixed effects. 
Industry fixed effects use Fama French 12-industry categories. All right-hand side variables are demeaned, 
so that the intercept reflects the turnout of an observation with average levels of each covariate. 
Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of meetings for the account-year, so that each 
account-year is weighted equally. Standard errors clustered at the account and meeting level are in 
parentheses. Number of clusters refers to the number of distinct meetings. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log() 1.751*** 1.825** 0.250*** 0.600*** 0.585*** 0.311 0.573*** 
 (0.055) (0.574) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026) (0.363) (0.106) 
Log(ME)    0.431***    
    (0.047)    
Yearly abnormal return    0.217    
    (0.224)    
Dividend indicator    0.186    
    (0.101)    
Tobin’s q    -0.112***    
    (0.033)    
ROA    -0.845**    
    (0.282)    
Special meeting    4.859***    
    (0.435)    




    (0.161)    
SRI on ballot    0.125    
    (0.089)    
Shareholder gov. on ballot    0.251**    
    (0.093)    
Log(Num. prop. on ballot)    -0.097    
    (0.113)    
Log() × Log(ME)  -0.003    0.024  
  (0.033)    (0.021)  
Log() × Tobin’s q  -0.194***    -0.035*  
  (0.028)    (0.015)  
Log() × ROA  0.469    -0.454***  
  (0.252)    (0.133)  
Log() × Special meeting  1.704***    1.579***  
  (0.259)    (0.192)  
Log() × Inst. ownership  0.024    -0.159*  
  (0.183)    (0.070)  
Log() × SRI On ballot  0.288**    0.018  
  (0.109)    (0.040)  
Log() × Gov. prop. on ballot  0.044    0.087*  
  (0.094)    (0.042)  
Log() × Log(Num. prop. on ballot)  0.059    -0.091  
  (0.095)    (0.061)  
Intercept 7.865*** 7.925*** 9.422*** 9.336*** 9.429*** 9.655*** 10.460*** 
 (0.020) (0.044) (0.063) (0.035) (0.001) (0.052) (0.011) 
Industry FE   Yes Yes    
Meeting FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Account-Firm FE       Yes 
N 6,497,253 6,753,702 6,183,205 6,047,147 6,183,191 6,047,134 4,440,020 
Number of clusters 3,153 7,874 8,271 7,880 8,260 7,870 7,644 







Figure D.B1. Voter participation and ownership by firm size 
This figure graphs the relationship between retail voter turnout and ownership by firm size quintiles. Firms 
are allocated to size quintiles using the Fama French size breakpoints. Within each size quintile we plot a 
binned scatterplot of turnout on stake size, 𝛼, defined as the account’s number of shares divided by the 
firm’s number of shares outstanding on the record date month, from CRSP. Each dot represents the average 
turnout for accounts whose fraction of the firm owned falls within the increment of 𝛼. Each of the three 
colored scatterplots provides a different range for share ownership, α. The first describes how turnout varies 
with share ownership in the range of [0 10-4] with increments of 10-6; the second, in the range of [0 10-3] 
with increments of 10-5; and the third in the range of [0 10-2] with increments of 10-4. 
Smallest firm size quintile 
 
Second firm size quintile 
 
Third firm size quintile 
 
Fourth firm size quintile 
 





Figure D.B2. Sensitivity of voting to yearly abnormal return 
This figure graphs the sensitivity of voting choice to yearly abnormal return, by owner type. We estimate 
the following specification for retail accounts: 






+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑍𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝜓𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑝 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 
where 𝑎 indexes accounts, 𝑝 indexes proposals, 𝑚 indexes meetings, 𝑐 indexes firms, and 𝑡 indexes years. 
𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑗 is a binary variable equal one if an account value (or turnover ratio, or log number of firms in portfolio) 
falls within the 𝑗’th bin. Account value bins correspond to six segments of the log 10 scale ([104 105), [105 
106), [106 107), [107 108), [108 109), [109 1010)). Turnover bins are [0 0.2), [0.2 0.4), [0.4 0.6), [0.6 0.8), [0.8 
), where the final bin includes the small group of investors with reported turnover ratios greater than 1, 
and log number of firm bins correspond to seven equally spaced segments ([1 2), [2 3), [3 4), [4 5), [5, 6), 
[6, 7), [7,8)). The dependent variable, 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 , is a binary variable that equals one if the account 
votes in line with management recommendation and zero if it votes against, multiplied by 100. 𝑋𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 is a 
vector of covariates including yearly abnormal return, Tobin’s q, return on assets, and whether ISS’s 
recommendation was in opposition to management’s recommendation. 𝑍𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 is a vector of additional 
covariates including log market equity, a binary variable for dividend yield, institutional ownership, and 
special meeting. For additional information on the covariates included in 𝑋𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 and 𝑍𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 see Table 9 
in the paper.  𝜓𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑝, 𝐼𝑛𝑑, and 𝜙𝑎𝑡 are proposal category, industry, and account-year fixed effects, 
respectively. 𝛽1𝑗 , 𝛽2𝑗 , and 𝛽3 are each vectors of coefficients. We report the retail investor sensitivity to 
lagged yearly abnormal return across account bins in Panel A, turnover ratio bins in Panel B, and breadth 
bins in Panel C. We repeat the estimation as described above for institutional investors. For retail, account 
value is the total account value for that account that calendar year defined as the sum across all firms owned 
by that account of the product of share price and number of shares owned. For funds, account value is 
calculated as its portfolio value. For retail, we calculate turnover ratio using CRSP’s definition, and take 
the minimum of purchases and sales divided by account value over the course of the year. For funds, 
turnover ratio comes from CRSP. For retail shareholders, log account number of firms in the portfolio is 
the log of the account’s firms in the retail dataset in a calendar year; for funds, it is the log of the fund’s 
number of N-PX securities in a calendar year. The analysis is limited to account-proposals in which the 
account voted on the proposal and excludes routine proposals (auditor ratification and meeting 
adjournment). For both retail and institutions, we only include bins where there are a sufficient number of 
distinct voters. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of meetings for the account-year, 
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Figure D.B3. Support for social responsibility proposals 
This figure graphs retail support for environmental and social proposals. We sort accounts into four account 
value bins that correspond to four segments of the log 10 scale ([104 105), [105 106), [106 107), [107 108)). 
For each of the four account value bins, we estimate the following specification for retail accounts where 
the dependent variable, 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝐼𝑛𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡, is a binary variable that equals one if the account votes for the 
proposal, multiplied by 100. 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑡  
where 𝑎 indexes accounts, 𝑝 indexes proposals, 𝑚 indexes meetings, 𝑐 indexes firms, and 𝑡 indexes years. 
Account value is the total account value for that account in the calendar year, defined as the sum across all 
firms held by the account of the product of share price and number of shares owned. We represent with a 
red line the average vote by funds on proposals in the sample. Observations are weighted by the inverse of 
the number of meetings for the account-year, so that each account-year is weighted equally. 95% confidence 






Appendix D.C. Institutional Background on Retail Shareholder Voting 
In this appendix we describe the method by which a firm’s shareholders, most of whom 
are not registered with the firm, receive voting materials. Fig. C1 below provides a synthesis of 
this information. 
Whereas registered owners hold securities through a direct registration system, beneficial 
owners hold a pro rata interest in all like securities of the intermediary held in common by all other 
customers who own the same security. These shares are registered in the name Cede & Co., the 
name used by the Depository Trust & Clearing Company (DTCC), which holds shares by 
custodians, usually banks and brokerage firms, under their title. Shares for mutual funds, pension 
funds, insurance firms, endowments, and trusts are usually held by bank custodians.  
Custodians, also known as “nominees,” own a pro rata interest in the aggregate number of 
shares of a particular issuer held at the DTCC, which in turn means that investors own a pro rata 
interest in the custodian’s shares. When an investor sells shares of an issuer from one custodian 
account to a buyer from another custodian account, Cede then shifts a corresponding number of 
shares of the issuer to the latter custodian account and removes them from the former custodian 
account. The beneficial owners’ name is not available, nor is it recorded. 
When it is time for a vote, usually during the annual general meeting of the firm, the issuer 
sets the date for the meeting and the record date. The record date under Delaware General 
Corporate Law (DGCL) §213 is fixed in advance of any vote and “shall not be more than 60 nor 
less than 10 days before the date” of the meeting. The individuals who are listed as registered 
owners as of the record date on the firm’s books are entitled to notice of, and to vote at, the 
shareholder meeting. Registered shareholders’ right to vote grants them the authority to appoint a 
proxy to vote on their behalf at the meeting. As their names and addresses are available to the 
issuer, the issuer directly sends the proxy materials to registered shareholders through the transfer 
agent. After receiving the proxy materials from the issuer, registered owners vote by executing the 
proxy card and returning it to the “vote tabulator.” A vote tabulator, usually the issuer’s transfer 
agent, is appointed by an issuer to collect and count votes. However, the issuer will sometimes 
hire an independent third-party vote inspector if needed to oversee contested elections. 
The process for soliciting proxies for beneficial owners is significantly more complex than 
the solicitation of proxies for registered owners. The issuer sends an inquiry to the DTCC asking 
for a list of participant custodians who hold shares of the issuer in the custodian’s account. The 
DTCC provides a “securities position listing” identifying the custodians who have a position in 
the issuer’s securities and the number of securities held by each of them. DTCC custodians also 
provide information on the omnibus securities positions held by the banks in their network, known 
as respondent banks. Respondent banks are those that deposit their clients’ holdings with larger 
bank custodians (Kahan and Rock (2008)). 
The issuer then sends a search card to all the banks and brokers identified by DTCC or 
Cede asking for the number of proxies needed. Brokers must respond to search cards within seven 
business days, while banks must identify all respondent banks within one business day and indicate 
the approximate number of beneficial owners holding the issuer’s shares directly with that bank 
within seven business days. Accurately conforming to these requirements can sometimes be a 
challenge due to a situation called “piggybacking” in which respondent banks keep track of their 





Brokers and bank custodians send beneficial owners the proxy materials including a 
“voting instruction form” (VIF), with a third party proxy service provider executing the process. 
Brokers and banks effectively reassign the proxy authority they receive from the DTCC to the third 
party proxy service provider who executes a legal proxy on their behalf. Broadridge Financial 
Solutions, Inc. is the most widely-used third-party proxy service provider, processing 
approximately 80% of the outstanding shares in the United States in fiscal year 2018 (see the 
annual report filed for fiscal year 2018 by Broadridge Financial Solutions). Issuers pay for the 
proxy processing services based on fees set by the New York Stock Exchange and approved by 
the SEC. 
Since the majority of shares of public firms are held by beneficial owners who object to 
disclosure of their names (objecting beneficial owners (“OBOs”), issuers that wish to communicate 
directly with them must send information through the investor’s custodian bank or broker-dealer, 
which generally is forwarded on a same-day basis. The SEC rules for “notice and access” permit 
firms to mail a notice of the internet-availability of their proxy materials instead of mailing a full 
package of proxy materials. The majority of shareholders receive proxy information electronically 
through e-mail, depending on the shareholder’s indicated preference. Shareholders always have 
the option to request paper copies of the proxy materials. 
Once the beneficial owners receive the VIF from the securities intermediary, they can 
instruct the intermediary on how to vote their shares (Gumbs, Hamblet, and Stortini (2013)). The 
VIF does not give the beneficial owner the right to attend the meeting, but he or she can request 
the appropriate documentation to do so from their intermediary if they so choose. The third party 
proxy service provider receives the voting instructions from the custodian, verifies receipt, verifies 
that the signatories have voting authority, executes the proxy on behalf of its custodian principal, 
and forwards a legal proxy to the vote tabulator.  
Issuers may also hire proxy solicitors (e.g., Okapi Partners, Innisfree, and Georgeson) when 
voting returns may be insufficient to meet state quorum requirements. In a contested election, 
management and the dissident also can employ their own proxy solicitors to identify beneficial 
owners holding large amounts of the issuers and encourage these shareholders to vote. Solicitation 
of shares held by retail investors, each owning a small stake, is possible with mass mailing of 
“fight letters” and marketing materials, along with targeted phone campaigns. Issuers are required 
to disclose the use, and the cost, of these services in their proxy statements. 
As Kahan and Rock (2008) point out, because of the complex chain of custody of shares 
held beneficially in street name, tabulators may disallow votes of omnibus proxies (which pass 
voting rights through the chain of custody) if they are not properly administered. For example, a 
name change not updated in the shareholder list would result in a break in the chain of custody. 
Shareholders typically do not have the ability to monitor whether their votes were cast as 
instructed. Racanelli (2018) cites Richard Grossman, a Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
attorney who states that “It’s difficult, if not impossible, for a beneficial shareholder [whose shares 
are not registered in their own name] to find out if the vote was cast as instructed and properly 
counted.” Grossman also states that “I am not aware of any obligations on the part of the various 
intermediaries to tell you.” 
Brokers cannot vote uninstructed shares in non-routine matters, so these become nonvotes. 
Kahan and Rock (2008) describe the problem of votes being voted by brokers if they do not receive 




Exchange. NYSE Rule 452 was amended in 2009 so that contested elections, non-contested 
elections for directors, and “vote no” campaigns are all now “non-routine” and broker discretion 
is not permitted for such non-routine matters. The recent rule change has led, however, to an 
increase in nonvotes (Gulinello (2010)). For firms that have adopted a majority voting standard, 
the brokers’ inability to vote without instructions from their client increases management’s burden 
of achieving a majority. This can lead to what Hirst (2017) refers to as a frozen charter. In his 
sample, broker votes represented 10.4% of the outstanding shares of corporations and for those 
corporations, particularly those with high supermajority requirements for certain charter 
amendments, these firms were unable to reach those requirements without broker votes. As a 
result, they were unable to amend certain parts of their charters, even where directors and 
shareholders strongly supported such amendments, and their charters were consequently frozen. 
Securities lending and shorting can also lead to confusion regarding who the beneficial 
owner of a stock really is. Additionally, there can be imbalances in the system described above. In 
such cases, broker-dealers must decide how to deal with them, and have developed a few different 
approaches to determine the allocation of votes between their customer accounts. These 
approaches are often influenced by whether the broker-dealer’s customers are primarily retail or 









Appendix D.D. Illustrative example of retail voting 
To further describe the scope of the retail voting data, we present detailed information on 
voting derived from one anonymized issuer’s annual meeting. The meeting includes a wide range 
of proposals for investors to vote on—including the election of director nominees, an advisory 
vote to approve executive compensation, ratification of the independent auditors, and shareholder 
proposals—allowing us to highlight variation in voting that we explore in more detail in the paper. 
The number of total management and shareholder proposals was between nine and fifteen. We 
report results for nine of them in a randomized order to preserve the issuer’s anonymity. 
Table D1 below presents three key aspects of the voting process, beginning, in Panel A, 
with a summary of the methods of proxy delivery to retail shareholders and the means by which 
shareholders returned their votes. Firms and shareholders have a choice regarding how materials 
are delivered to shareholders. Accounts choose to receive either (i) Hard Copy, (ii) E-Delivery, or 
(iii) the firm Default delivery method. Firms may choose to send the (a) Hard Copy or (b) Notice 
and Access, or may choose a mixture of the two (Notice to some shareholders, Hard Copy to 
others). Shareholders receive their choice of materials, or, if they did not select Hard Copy or E-
Delivery, they receive the firm’s choice. We summarize the following four options of what the 
shareholder receives, as coded in our retail voting data: If the shareholder chooses Hard Copy, or 
if the shareholder chooses Default and the firm chooses Hard Copy, then a complete copy of proxy 
materials including the proxy statement, annual financials, and ballot or vote instruction form is 
sent to the shareholder via the postal service. If the shareholder chooses Default and the firm 
chooses Notice and Access, then it mails the shareholder a notice to announce the meeting with 
information on how to get complete packages of proxy materials or use the service provider’s 
online website for voting. Under the rules for notice and access, requests for Hard Copy can be 
made by going to the Internet voting website, calling a toll-free number, or sending a request by 
e-mail. 
Panel A shows that accounts that choose the Hard Copy delivery method tend to own a 
larger number of shares per account and are far more likely to cast a vote. Whereas accounts 
receiving delivery by Hard Copy own an average of 1,416 shares (account choice) and 2,539 shares 
(firm choice) and vote at rates of 73% and 33.2%, respectively, accounts receiving material via E-
delivery or Notice own 506 and 326 shares on average and vote at just 20.4% and 7.3%, 
respectively. In all, retail shareholders at this issuer hold over one billion shares, comprising 
roughly one-third of shares outstanding, with an overall response rate of 31.2%, consistent with 
the response rates in the broader sample that we document in Section 4. The bottom of Panel A 
provides information on the voting method. Two features are noteworthy. First, shareholders that 
did not vote hold 68.6% of the total retail votes. These shareholders own fewer shares on average 
than accounts that participate in the voting. Second, among the shareholders who choose to vote, 
voting by hard copy accounts for about one half of all retail votes, followed by use of the internet. 
Panel B provides the voting results for the items on the ballot. To preserve the anonymity 
of the firm some of the shareholder proposals have been removed. For each of the remaining 
proposals we report the corresponding management and ISS recommendations. “F” indicates 
voting in favor of a given proposal, “N” indicates voting no/against a proposal, and “A” indicates 
abstaining from a vote. The column Retail Votes provides the percent of votes cast by retail 
shareholders, and within the votes cast, the percent of votes for and against. Consider first the votes 
cast for the election of the director nominees. As described above in Section 4, this meeting is one 




individual directors. Hence, we can only report the percent of votes cast by retail investors–which 
in this case was 30.3% of the 1.2 billion retail shares, much lower than the turnout rate by all 
shareholders, which was more than 60%. 
We report the retail voting outcomes for the remaining proposals. The advisory vote to 
approve executive compensation, known as “say on pay,” received support from 88.5% of retail 
shareholders, similar to the 86.9% at the issuer’s 2016 meeting. ISS supported the proposal in 2016 
but recommended against it in 2017, but retail support remained relatively constant, indicating a 
lack of influence of ISS over retail voting behavior. The remaining proposals are shareholder-
sponsored. Retail shareholders tend to vote along management’s recommendation against all of 
these proposals. 
Finally, we report in Panel C information on the range of voting decisions by retail 
shareholders for this meeting. Out of 16,681 observed permutations, including the proposals that 
have been omitted from the panel, we report those combinations of voting that were used most 
frequently. We report the number of retail accounts voting the specific combination, the number 
of shares voted, and the percent of shares accounted for by the specific combination relative to all 
retail shares. As noted above, a large number of shares were not voted. Slightly more than 1.5 
million accounts—comprising 86.1 percent of all retail accounts—did not cast a ballot, accounting 
for 68.8 percent of retail shareholder votes. This non-voting rate is slightly higher than that 
reported in Panel A since some shareholders returned their ballots but did not indicate a vote for 
any proposal. Although we count over 16,000 different permutations of votes cast across all of the 
proposals, 20.8 percent of retail votes voted entirely with management. The remaining 
permutations comprise a small fraction of votes. 
In sum, this example shows that retail shareholder turnout rates are lower than that of non-
retail and are strongly associated with the materials they receive; that retail support for 
management moves less with ISS recommendations than does non-retail support; and that the retail 






Table D1. Illustrative example of an annual meeting 
Panel A: Methods of proxy delivery and vote returns 








Hard copy—Account choice 203,378,545 143,587 1,416 73.0% 
Hard copy—Firm choice 408,438,592 160,873 2,539 33.2% 
E-mail 437,093,454 863,938 506 20.4% 
Notice 193,138,321 592,794 326 7.3% 
Total 1,242,048,913 1,761,192 705 31.2%  
  
  








Hard copy 203,910,890 144,928 1,407 16.4% 
Internet proxy vote 126,836,144 55,130 2,301 10.2% 
Investor mailbox 25,541,657 21,412 1,193 2.1% 
Telephone 25,224,002 15,583 1,619 2.0% 
Mobile proxy vote 7,616,283 6,542 1,164 0.6% 
Consolidated data feed 1,216,582 823 1,478 0.1% 
Did not vote 851,703,355 1,516,774 562 68.6% 
Total 1,242,048,913 1,761,192 705 100.0% 
 
Panel B: Individual proposal voting results 





% Cast % For % Against 
Management proposals:      
1 Individual director elections  F F 30.3 N/A N/A 
2 Advisory vote to approve executive comp. F N 29.7 88.5 11.5 
3 Ratification of independent auditors  F F 30.6 98.6 1.4 
       Shareholder proposals:      
4 ESG-related proposal  N F 30.0 12.5 87.5 
5 Restrict precatory proposals  N N 29.4 7.0 93.0 
6 Independent chairman  N F 29.8 15.4 84.6 
7 Increase capital distributions  N N 29.6 8.6 91.4 
8 Special shareholder meetings  N F 29.5 9.5 90.5 
9 Report on lobbying  N F 30.0 14.3 85.7 
  
Panel C: Permutations of votes cast across proposals 
 # of accounts % of accounts # of shares % of shares 
Did not vote 1,516,905 86.1% 854,516,673 68.8% 
Proposals:     
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9     
F F F N N N N N N 125,094 7.1% 258,064,223 20.8% 
F F N N N N N N N 3,833 0.2% 5,731,872 0.5% 
F F F F F F F F F 5,436 0.3% 4,395,938 0.4% 
F F F N N F N N N 2,691 0.2% 4,177,826 0.3% 
F F F A A A A A A 2,246 0.1% 2,838,453 0.2% 
… … … … … 
F F F A A N A F F 1 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 





Appendix D.E. The impact of information and voting methods on turnout 
In this appendix, we provide greater detail on Section 6.1.2.3, in which we ask whether the 
manner by which information is disseminated to a shareholder and a shareholder’s access to her 
preferred voting method have a causal effect on turnout. 
We focus on the SEC’s Notice and Access rule that allows firms to issue a notice of 
availability of online materials to certain shareholders instead of sending a full package of 
materials. Because Notice and Access only affects a subset of accounts within a firm, and we 
observe which accounts are impacted, we are able to estimate the treatment effect on the treated 
shareholders using the triple-differences strategy that we describe below. Prior research has found 
a negative effect of Notice and Access on retail turnout, using firm switches for identification. Lee 
and Souther (2019) find a 4% effect and Geoffroy (2018) finds a 7–13% effect. Both attribute the 
decline in participation to the change to electronic information dissemination. By focusing on the 
subset of retail accounts that are affected by Notice and Access, we estimate treatment effects on 
the treated and find that the effect size is upwards of 50% on the set of retail shareholders who see 
a switch to or from Notice and Access.  
Importantly, we show that the Notice and Access rule affects not just the information 
materials received by the account but also the methods of voting available to the account.53 We 
find below that the entire turnout effect is determined by a change in available voting methods. 
Shareholders who vote in year 𝑡 by mail or telephone (as opposed to internet) who retain those 
options to vote have 63% turnout in 𝑡 + 1, whereas those who now face an extra obstacle to voting 
by mail or telephone have a voting rate of only 16–18% in 𝑡 + 1 — a sizeable effect of the inability 
to continue with their preferred voting method. 
Approach to Identification  
We are identifying the effects of the materials an account receives on turnout. We model 
an account’s decision to vote as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 +𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐𝑡 + 𝜈𝑎𝑐𝑡   (E1) 
where 𝑎 indexes account, 𝑐 indexes firm, and 𝑡 indexes time. 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 is account 𝑎’s decision 
whether to participate at firm 𝑐’s meeting at time 𝑡, 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑡 equals one if the account actually receives 
 
53 To our knowledge, we are the first to make this observation. The change to voting methods appears to be a 
consequence of the SEC rule creating Notice and Access: “The Notice of Internet Availability of Proxy Materials 
must contain the following… (10) Instructions on how to access the form of proxy, provided that such instructions 
do not enable a security holder to execute a proxy without having access to the proxy statement…” (emphasis 
added). Notice and Access rule, 17 CFR § 240.14a-16(d)(10), available at 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.14a-16. As explained by the SEC in the accompanying release 
documents, the above rule does not permit the initial Notice and Access delivery to contain a telephone number or, 
presumably, a hard copy ballot: “[W]e are clarifying that the Notice must contain instructions on how to access the 
proxy card. Such information… may not include a means to execute a proxy, such as a telephone number, which 
would enable the shareholder to execute a proxy without having access to the proxy statement and annual report.” 
The release later states that “We believe that the proxy statement and annual report to security holders represent the 
information necessary to make an informed voting decision. The Notice is intended merely to make shareholders 
aware that these proxy materials are available on an Internet Web site; it is not intended to serve as a stand-alone 
basis for making a voting decision.” (emphasis added). Federal Register (2007), Vol. 72, No. 18, at 4149-4150, 




Hard Copy materials at time 𝑡, 𝑋𝑎𝑐𝑡 is a vector of additional covariates, 𝑎𝑐  are account-firm fixed 
effects, 𝜙𝑎𝑡 are account-year fixed effects, and 𝜆𝑐𝑡 are firm-year fixed effects. 
As discussed in the main text, the materials 𝑀 are determined by the intersection of the firm’s 
choice and the account’s choice. If the account chooses a certain material, then it receives that 
material; if the account selects the Default option, it receives the firm’s choice, either Hard Copy 
or Notice. 
We exploit variation in materials 𝑀 resulting from the subset of firms that switch their choice 
of materials (from Notice to Hard Copy or vice versa) during our sample period. Because only 
accounts that have chosen Default are affected by the firm’s choice, only these Default accounts 
are in our treatment group. We use a triple-differences approach — (i) across firm choice whether 
to switch or not, (ii) across time whether post-switch or not, and (iii) across shareholder choice 
whether Default or not. The first two dimensions of variation form the core differences-in-
differences; the third dimension of variation (whether the account chose Default) separates out 
accounts that are unaffected by treatment. There are two potential treatments: removing of 
materials (switch from Hard Copy to Notice) and adding materials (switch from Notice to Hard 
Copy). 
If we assume momentarily that an account never changes its choice of materials (so we can 
write its choice as 𝐷𝑎𝑐), then any change in materials 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑡 received at time 𝑡 is fully determined 
by the triple-interaction of (i) 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 or 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐 (whether the firm switches 
delivery methods, separated by the direction of switch), (ii) 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 (a binary variable equal to one 
if time 𝑡 is post-switch for switching firm 𝑐 and zero otherwise), and (iii) 𝐷𝑎𝑐  (the account’s choice 
of Default): 
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑐0 − 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎𝑐 +  𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎𝑐 (E2) 
Substituting Eq. (E2) into Eq. (E1), and absorbing 𝑀𝑎𝑐0 into account-firm fixed effects 
yields: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎𝑐  
(E3) 
        + 𝛽2𝑋𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 +𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐𝑡 + 𝜈𝑎𝑐𝑡  
Eq. (E3) should causally identify the impact of Materials 𝑀 on the decision to turn out, 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡. With 
this setup we compare Default accounts at post-switch Hard Copy (or Notice) firms with: (i) the 
same accounts at the same time at different firms in their portfolio that did not switch, which 
controls for any correlation between the firm decision to switch and changes in the voting tendency 
of its shareholder base; (ii) the same accounts at the same firm prior to its switch, which controls 
for any correlation between the firm decision to switch and time-invariant firm-specific turnout; 
and (iii) non-Default accounts at the same firm at the same time, which controls for any correlation 
between the firm decision to switch and changes to its shareholder turnout not driven by the switch. 
To absorb as much variation as possible, we include two-way fixed effects for account-
firm, account-year, and firm-year. Account-firm ensures we are comparing the same account at 
the same firm over time. Account-year ensures we are comparing the same account at the same 
time to other firms in its portfolio. Firm-year ensures we are comparing different accounts at the 




such as 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 (or 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐), 𝐷𝑎𝑐 , year dummies, and all interactions of these 
variables are absorbed by the fixed effects. 
We make the following adjustment to Eq. (E3). Since accounts may change their choices 
over time, and since the change in choice may be associated with the firm’s decision to switch, we 
proxy for the account’s actual choice of Default, 𝐷𝑎𝑐𝑡 , with the account’s original portion of all 
firms in its portfolio that are Default, 𝐷𝑎0. We use the original rather than current selection because 
a small group of accounts switch their choice of methods over time, and we use the share of Default 
rather than the selection for a given firm because a small group of accounts have variation across 
their firms in their choice of materials. A simple analogy is to a laboratory drug experiment with 
a treatment group and a control group. Suppose assignment to the treatment group raises one’s 
odds of receiving the treatment, but not by 100% (i.e. some members of the treatment group choose 
to not take the experimental drug and/or some members of the control group choose to take the 
experimental drug). Then to regress on whether participants actually took the drug would introduce 
a bias. Instead, we would regress on which group they were assigned to (i.e. intent to treat), and 
scale by the percentages in each group that took the drug to obtain the average effect of treatment 
on the treated.  
As a consequence of proxying for the account’s choice at firm 𝑐 at time 𝑡, the triple 
interaction terms 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 and 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 are not fully 
determinative of materials 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑡. Thus, we estimate the causal variable of interest 𝑀 in the first 
stage and separately estimate the reduced form equation. 
First Stage: 
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝛾0 − 𝛾1𝐴𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 + 𝛾1𝐵 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 
(E4) 
      + 𝛾2𝑋𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 +𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐𝑡  
Reduced Form: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝐴𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 + 𝛿1𝐵𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑎0 
(E5) 
      + 𝛾2𝑋𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 +𝜙𝑎𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐𝑡  
Effectively, we scale the coefficients 𝛿1 by the coefficients 𝛾1 to convert 𝛿1, the effect of 
the triple interaction terms on turnout into 𝛽1, the effect of materials on turnout (see Eq. (E1)). If 
each account made the same selection for each firm in its portfolio and never changed selections, 
then we would have 𝛾1𝐴 = 𝛾1𝐵 = 1 and the reduced form equation would reduce to the second 
stage equation in Eq. (E1). In practice, because we estimate 𝛾 as close to 1 (roughly 0.90, as seen 
in column 1 of Table 7), this adjustment makes fairly little difference.  By separately estimating 
𝛾1𝐴 from 𝛾1𝐵 and separately estimating 𝛿1𝐴 from 𝛿1𝐵, we allow that 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐻𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑁𝑐 and 
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑁𝑡𝑜𝐻𝐶𝑐 may have different impacts on 𝑀 and 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡, respectively.  However, we estimate 
a singular 𝛽1, aggregating the separate effects. 
Note that we do not require that the firm decision to switch materials is exogeneous. The 
primary identifying assumption for the triple-differences is parallel trends (in materials received 
and in turnout) among Default shareholders at switching firms as compared to non-Default and 
non-switching firms. We only identify the switch between Hard Copy and Notice; the relative 
effects of E-Delivery are not identified. We show evidence of parallel pre-trends with our empirical 




Hard Copy in 2017 have virtually no pre-switch pre-trend in voting rates from 2015 to 2016. Nor 
are there pre-trends in our placebo groups, non-Default accounts and non-switching firms. Our 
assumption is that those trend lines would remain similar if, counterfactually, accounts did not 
receive different materials. In fact, we show that Default accounts at switching firms that switch 
from Hard Copy to Notice see a large drop in voting rates and Default accounts at switching firms 
that switch from Notice to Hard Copy see a large spike in voting rates, whereas accounts that do 
not actually switch materials (non-Default accounts and accounts at non-switching firms) do not 
see any change in voting rates. This is strong evidence for our identifying assumptions. 
We conduct extensive robustness checks. Our main regression removes accounts that do 
not appear in 2015, but not doing this yields essentially identical results. We also obtain virtually 
identical results when we use an account’s original choice of Default at a specific firm, rather than 
an account’s share of Default across the firms in its portfolio. This alternative method is what we 
use in our figures because it allows for graphical representation. In addition to our main 
specification with three two-way fixed effects covering our main dimensions of variation (account-
year, account-firm, and firm-year) as shown in Eq. (E4)-(E5), we also use a specification with 







Chapter 3 Appendix 
Appendix E.A. Cost of Exercise Function 
In this appendix, I derive the convex cost of exercise function 𝜓(𝑥), used for my model 
in Section 3, from the exercise timing framework in Section 4. 
As in Section 4, I consider a single CEO’s decision when to exercise a given option 𝑗. 
Each option has a value of exercise in any given month; here I relabel 𝑓𝑗 as 𝑓?̂?𝑗 where ?̂?𝑗 is the 
best exercise month for option 𝑗 and 𝑓?̂?𝑗 is a single-peaked function peaking at ?̂?𝑗. ?̂?𝑗 may be the 
expiration month of the option. Alternatively, if we consider a series options with identical 
expiration and varying strike prices, in which the CEO desires a stream of income from selling 
stock, then the CEO should exercise the options in order of strike price, and ?̂?𝑗 represents a the 
ranking of a given group of options by strike price. 
The CEO’s benefit of exercise in month 𝑡 can be written as: 
     𝜋𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑓?̂?𝑗(𝑡) + 𝛺𝑗 ∗ 1{𝑡 < 𝑀}     (5
′) 
Suppose that the peaks of the CEO’s 𝑓 function are distributed by 𝑔(?̂?𝑗). This 𝑔 curve-- 
the distribution of the peaks of the CEO’s f functions—is the distribution of her option exercises 
if there were no early-exercise benefit. To exercise 𝑥 options at time 𝑀 in the lowest-cost way, 




The utility cost of exercising 𝑥 early options at time T in the lowest cost way is  







If 𝑔 is uniform (i.e., optimal option exercise months are uniformly distributed across 
months) and the cost of early exercise is linear in the number of months early, then the cost of 
exercising 𝑥 options early will be increasing in the square of 𝑥. 
I can also derive the specific functional form that I use for Figure 2. If 𝑔(?̂?𝑗) is uniform 
across a space of length 𝑐 > 1 and the benefit of option exercises in month 𝑡 is given by the 
single-peaked function 𝑓?̂?𝑗(𝑡) = −|𝑡 − ?̂?𝑗| − 𝑘0𝑐1{𝑡≠?̂?𝑗}, and I normalize 𝑀 to 0, then the cost of 
early options exercise is 









𝑐𝑥2 + 𝑘0𝑐𝑥 
where 𝑐 > 1 indexes the cost of early exercise. This functional form produces (i) a CEO 
indifference point of 𝑠1 = 𝑘0 ∗ √
𝑐
𝑐−((1−𝑇)2−(1−𝑇−𝜏)2)
, a markup on the no-options tax threshold 
𝑘0 that increases with tax 𝜏 and decreases with exercise cost 𝑐; and (ii) a firm no-tax indifference 
point of 𝑠2 = (𝑉 − 𝑣)
(1−𝑇)2
(1−𝑇)2+𝑐








Table E.B.1. Summary Statistics of Straddling and Non-Straddling Target Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Straddling  Non-Straddling  Difference 
 N Mean N Mean  SE 
CEO Tenure (Months) 55.72 830 46.73 1751 8.99*** 1.54 
Log(Market Value of Equity) 5.95 755 5.42 1587 0.53*** 0.09 
Debt 2303.04 772 1696.76 1603 606.29 1135.38 
Book Leverage 0.26 772 0.28 1603 -0.02 0.05 
Profitability 0.02 743 -0.09 1566 0.11 0.09 
Note: The first two columns containing summary statistics from deals for which signing and closing straddle the calendar year; column (3) contains results from 
a regression of the variable on straddling. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. CEO tenure is from merged 
datasets from Execucomp, Thomson Reuters Insiders, and scraping of Def 14A filings. Other variables are from Compustat. 
 
Table E.B.2. Golden Parachute Cutbacks on December Exercises 








Number of Clusters 589 
Note: All observations are at the CEO-firm-month level. Sample is drawn from CEOs whose firms are acquired in straddling deals. Dependent variable is the 
share of firm acquired in basis points. Cutback refers to a CEO whose golden parachute payment is explicitly cut back to the IRC §280G limit (or cut back to the 
limit if the CEO would be better off after taxes). December refers to exercises in the month of December. The regression includes fixed effects for year-month, 
the number of years of CEO tenure, and CEO ID. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the CEO level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 








Appendix Figure E.B.1 – Relative Exercise 






   





   
Note: Sample consists of CEO-months for CEOs whose firms were acquired. The second column limits to deals which were announced and closed in the same 
calendar year; the third column limits to deals which were announced and closed in different years. The x-axis of the first row contains the relative month to the 
announcement of the deal. The x-axis to the second row contains the relative month to the final December prior to the closing. The y-axis contains the number of 
shares the firm the CEO acquired through exercise, divided by that CEO’s average number of shares exercised. CEOs who never exercise in the dataset have 0’s 









Appendix Figure E.B.2 – Binary Exercise 






   





   
Note: Sample consists of CEO-months for CEOs whose firms were acquired. The second column limits to deals which were announced and closed in the same 
calendar year; the third column limits to deals which were announced and closed in different years. The x-axis of the first row contains the relative month to the 
announcement of the deal. The x-axis to the second row contains the relative month to the final December prior to the closing. The y-axis contains the probability 




Appendix E.C – Examples of Change-in-Control Contract Provisions 
 
Example of Pure Cutback Provision: 
Any provision in this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, in no event will Executive 
receive a payment which would trigger the excise taxes and disallowance of deductions 
contemplated by Sections 280G and 4999 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended 
(the "Code").  In the event that any amount calculated hereunder would result in such a payment, 
such amount shall be reduced to the largest amount that would not result in such a payment.  
This reduction shall apply to any and all compensation, including compensation pursuant to 
stock option grants governed by separate agreement between the Company and Executive.  If, at 
the time of any such payment, no stock of the Company is readily tradable on an established 
securities market or otherwise, then the Company agrees to use its best efforts to cause such 
payment to meet the exemption set forth in Sections 280G(b)(5)(A)(ii) and (B) of the Code, so 
that no reduction will be required hereunder. 
 
Example of Best-After-Tax Cutback Provision: 
Anything in this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, if it shall be determined that any 
payment, distribution or benefit provided (including, without limitation, the acceleration of any 
payment, distribution or benefit and the acceleration or exercisability of any stock option) to the 
Executive or for his or her benefit (whether paid or payable or distributed or distributable) 
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or otherwise would be subject, in whole or in part, to the 
excise tax imposed by Section 4999 of the Code (the “Excise Tax”), then the amounts payable to 
the Executive under Section 4(ii) of this Agreement shall be reduced (by the minimum possible 




however, that no such reduction shall be made if the net after-tax benefit (after taking into 
account Federal, state, local or other income, employment, self-employment and excise taxes) to 
which the Executive would otherwise be entitled without such reduction would be greater than 
the net after-tax benefit (after taking into account Federal, state, local or other income, 
employment, self-employment and excise taxes) to the Executive resulting from the receipt of 
such payments with such reduction. 
 
Example of Gross-Up Provision: 
In the event that any payment or benefit received or to be received by the Executive with respect 
to any stock option, restricted stock or stock unit, stock appreciation right, bonus or other 
incentive compensation plan or agreement (collectively “Incentive Payments”), or any payments 
or benefits under any severance or other plan, arrangement or agreement of the Company or any 
of its affiliates (“Other Payments” and, together with the Incentive Payments, the “Payments”) 
would be subject to the excise tax imposed by Section 4999 of the Code (the “Excise Tax”), the 
Company shall pay to Executive an additional amount (the “Gross-Up Payment”) such that the 
net amount retained by the Executive, after deduction of all Excise Taxes on the Payments, and 
all Excise Taxes, federal, state and local income taxes, and federal employment taxes on the 
Gross-Up Payment, and any interest, penalties or additions to tax payable by Executive with 
respect thereto, shall be equal to the total present value (using the applicable federal rate (as 
defined in Section 1274(d) of the Code in such calculation) of the Payments at the time such 
Payments are to be made. 
